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ABSTRACT 
CELAL BAYAR AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, 1937-1960 
Yiğit, Ahu 
Ph.D., Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper 
 
January  2013 
 
This dissertation sets its objective as studying Celal Bayar‟s leadership 
from 1937 to 1960 in order to present the portrait of Bayar as a political leader. 
The interactive approach is employed to structure this analysis. In line with this 
approach, external and internal resources of Bayar‟s leadership are defined. 
External resources are considered with regard to institutional and non-institutional 
aspects. The non-institutional resources referred to are the main characteristics of 
economy, of international relations and of political regime in 1937-1960. 
Institutional aspect of Bayar‟s leadership in 1937-1960 is studied with regard to 
executive offices he held. With regard to the internal resources of leadership, the 
effects of certain life experiences on Bayar‟s politics and his understanding of 
major political concepts such as democracy and secularism are discussed. Primary 
and secondary resources, as well as interviews with his close circle provide the 
material for this study. In the conclusion part, the impact of certain internal
 iv 
 
resources on his leadership, such as his commitment to the main principles of the 
Republican regime is acknowledged but it is pointed out that external resources, 
such as Atatürk‟s trust in him, had a greater impact on his leadership. It is also 
observed that the portrait of Bayar as a political leader falls in a category in 
between a state elite and a political elite. Regarding the interactive approach, it is 
concluded that under non-institutionalized regimes, the institutional offices lose 
their defining characteristics on leadership and that other resources such as the 
leader‟s relations with other leaders and his/her interpretation of political office 
gains extra emphasis.  
Keywords: Political leadership, Celal Bayar, the Democrat Party, the Interactive 
Approach  
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ÖZET 
CELAL BAYAR VE SİYASİ LİDERLİK, 1937-1960 
Yiğit, Ahu 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper 
 
Ocak 2013 
 
Bu çalıĢma 1937-1960 yılları için Celal Bayar‟ın liderliğini incelemekte ve 
bir siyasi lider olarak Celal Bayar‟ın  portresini çizmektedir. Bu analizin 
çerçevesini interaktif yaklaĢım belirlemektedir. Bu yaklaĢımın ıĢığında Bayar‟ın 
liderlik kaynakları içsel ve dıĢsal etkenler olarak incelenmekte ve bu etkenlerin 
Bayar‟ın liderliği üzerindeki etkileri tartıĢılmaktadır. Bu çalıĢmada dıĢsal etkenler 
kurumsal ve kurumsal olmayan özelliklerine göre değerlendirilmiĢtir. Ele alınan 
kurumsal olmayan dıĢsal etkenler arasında 1937-1960 yılları için ekonominin 
durumu, uluslararası iliĢkiler ve siyasi rejim yer almaktadır. Bayar‟ın liderliğini 
etkileyen kurumsal dıĢsal etkenler olarak da baĢbakanlık ve cumhurbaĢkanlığı ele 
alınmıĢtır. ÇalıĢmada değinilen içsel liderlik etkenleri arasında Bayar‟da iz 
bırakan hayat ve siyaset tecrübeleriyle demokrasi ve laiklik gibi belirli baĢlı 
siyasal kavramları yorumlaması yer almaktadır. Bu çalıĢma için Bayar‟ın 
yakınlarıyla görüĢmeler de dahil olmak üzere birincil ve ikincil kaynaklar 
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kullanılmıĢtır. ÇalıĢmanın sonuç kısmında, Bayar‟ın belirli içsel kaynaklarının 
liderliği üzerindeki önemine dikkat çekilmekte ancak netice itibariyle bazı dıĢsal 
etkenlerin Bayar‟ın siyasi hayatı açısından daha belirleyici olduğu sonucuna 
varılmaktadır. Bunun yanısıra, bir siyasetçi olarak Bayar‟ın devlet seçkinleriyle 
siyasi seçkinler arasında bir yerde bulunduğuna dikkat çekilmektedir. Ġnteraktif 
yaklaĢım açısındansa, kurumsallaĢmamıĢ rejimlerde liderlik pozisyonlarının 
pratikte önemlerini bir ölçüde yitirdikleri ve bu pozisyonların yerine incelenen 
liderin sistemdeki diğer liderlerle iliĢkileri ve kendi pozisyonunu yorumlaması 
gibi baĢka etkenlerin önem kazandıkları gözlenmektedir. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Siyasi liderlik, Celal Bayar, Demokrat Parti, Ġnteraktif 
YaklaĢım 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 An Introduction to the Study of Political Leadership 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the third president of the 
Turkish Republic Celal Bayar‟s (1883-1986) political leadership (leadership from 
here onwards) from 1937 to 1960 according to a categorization of external and 
internal resources of leadership. Bayar was a member of the Committee of Union 
and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası-ĠTC)1 from 1907 until its dissolution at 
the end of the First World War and a member of the short-lived last Ottoman 
Parliament (1920) as a deputy from the Saruhan (currently Manisa) region. He 
was influential in the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922), during which he 
joined the Aegean brigades fighting against Greek occupation in 1919. In 1920, he 
joined the national independence movement in Ankara. After that, Bayar occupied 
several executive leadership positions. He served as Minister of Economics 
(1921-1922, 1932-1937) and as Minister of Population Exchange, Settlement and 
Development (1924). In 1937, Bayar replaced Ġsmet Ġnönü as Prime Minister on 
                                                          
1
 The ĠTC was a political movement initiated mostly by JeuneTurcs who were a group of  
intellectuals reacting against Sultan Abdülhamit II‟s (1842-1918) authoritarian way of governing 
the state. This group established the Association for the Union of Ottomans in 1889, which later 
evolved into the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee established itself as a political 
party in 1909 (Heper and Criss, 2009: 337).  It should be noted that  not all the ĠTC members were 
former JeuneTurcs. 
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President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk‟s wishes and served in this post until 1939. In 
1946, Bayar resigned from his duties as deputy of Ġzmir and shortly after from the 
Republican People‟s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). In 1945-1946, he 
played a leading role in the establishment of the opposition party, the Democrat 
Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) and served as its chairman between 1946  and 1950.  
In 1950, Bayar was elected president of the Republic and remained in this 
office until the 1960 military intervention. This decade forms the most 
controversial part of Bayar‟s political career. He was accused of neglecting his 
constitutional role as president and failing to contain political tensions by 
facilitating negotiation between political parties especially after 1957 (Harris, 
2002: 56).  It has also been claimed that he breached his constitutional role when 
he openly supported the DP on a number of political matters and thus undermined 
the chances of the development of a healthy democracy during that time (Harris, 
2002:57). After 1960, Bayar did not take any executive leadership positions but he 
remained an important and respected political figure.  
Out of this long political career, the years from 1937 to 1960 are chosen as 
the main focus of this dissertation. The rationale for this focus draws upon the 
definition of leadership adopted here. There is an ongoing debate on the definition 
and types of political leadership. In this debate leadership is understood in a broad 
sense, ranging from executive office holders to civil society leaders or even to 
opinion leaders.
2
 For the purposes of this dissertation, leadership is defined with 
reference to executive offices. According to the Turkish constitutions of 1924, 
1961 and 1982, the executive consists of president and government. Bayar‟s terms 
                                                          
2
 In his study Handbook of Leadership, Bass mentions 221 definitions of leadership derived from 
587 academic publications (2008: 15). 
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as Minister of Economics and Minister of Population Exchange, Settlement and 
Development are less important for the purposes of this analysis, because in the 
Turkish context government ministers have considerably less influence than prime 
ministers and presidents, thus making these positions less relevant for an 
assessment of leadership.  
1.2 Objectives of the Study and the Theoretical Backdrop 
The motivation for this dissertation is the lack of any comprehensive 
scholarly study in political science literature on this seminal Turkish leader that 
takes into account his external and internal leadership resources respectively. So 
far studies on Bayar prioritized one set of resources, for instance his personality at 
the expense of others, such as the characteristics of executive offices he held. In 
an attempt to fill this gap, the main research objective in this dissertation is the 
study of Celal Bayar‟s leadership according to the interactive approach in the 
study of leadership, detailed below.  
It should be underlined that this dissertation does not offer a 
comprehensive biography nor explore all the details of Bayar‟s political life and 
views, but focuses instead on pursuing four complementary aims:  
(1)  Identifying the external and internal resources of Bayar‟s leadership in 
1937-1960, 
(2) Evaluating whether and to what extent the external or the internal 
resources had been more influential on Bayar‟s leadership,  
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(3) Depending on the first and second aims, adopting a comprehensive 
approach to Bayar‟s leadership and introducing Bayar as a political leader. 
(4) Discussing whether and how the findings of this study would provide a 
fresh perspective to the interactive approach, the methodology adopted in 
this dissertation.  
It has been suggested that leadership is the outcome of the interplay of 
external and internal resources on a leader‟s activities (Cole, 1994a, 1994b; 
Gaffney, 2010; Elgie, 1995). External resources refer to a combination of the 
political regime, political history, the constitution, institutions and political 
circumstances of the period under study. Internal resources include a leader‟s 
socialization, biography, interpretation of his/her significant political ideas and 
political goals. It has also been suggested that the study of these two domains are 
key to the analysis of leadership and leaders in political science (Elgie 1995; Cole, 
1994a, 1994b). Elgie calls this approach the interactive approach in the analysis of 
leadership. The interactive approach does not offer a ready set of rules concerning 
the interaction of these resources, but requires that each case be considered sui 
generis. (Yiğit, 2012: 84). 
Several studies utilizing this categorization were conducted. Alistair Cole 
based his studies on French President François Mitterrand (1916-1996) on the 
categorization of external and internal resources (1994a, 1994b).  Another similar 
analysis was pursued by John Gaffney in his Political Leadership in France 
(2010). In this study Gaffney looks into the leadership practices during the Fifth 
Republic (1958 onwards) and discusses how personal leadership resources of 
French presidents interact with the French political context starting with Charles 
de Gaulle, president in 1958-1969 and ending with Nicolas Sarkozy, president in 
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2007-2012. Mariana Llalos and Ana Margheritis explore the Argentinean 
leadership from the perspective of such a divide for Fernando de la Rúa, president 
between 1998-2001 (Llanos and Margheritis, 2006: 98).  In his book Political 
Leadership in Liberal Democracies Robert Elgie (1995) discusses the leadership 
patterns for liberal democracies, including France, Britain, Germany, Japan and 
the United States, and introduces an analysis of internal and external resources of 
leadership.  
This perspective of internal and external resources of leadership is also 
valuable for the study of Turkish politics mainly because Turkish politics is often 
leader/leadership oriented. There has always been a tradition of powerful leaders 
in Turkey. Although the 1924 Turkish Constitution was very much concerned 
with limiting the powers of individuals, powerful leaders such as President 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938) and President Ġsmet Ġnönü (1938-1950) 
emerged during the first few decades of the Republic. This tradition of powerful 
leaders continued later on. 
Turkish leaders have been enjoying extensive formal and informal power 
in their executive leadership positions. Most important policy decisions tend to be 
taken by leaders on their own with a few favorite ministers being included 
(Özbudun, 1996: 136). The terms of Adnan Menderes as Prime Minister (1950-
1960), Turgut Özal as Prime Minister (1983-1989) and President (1989-1991), 
and Tansu Çiller as Prime Minister (1993-1995) are examples of powerful 
leadership pattern (Özbudun, 1996: 136).  
Turkish political party structures also enhance powerful leadership. 
Leaders typically have absolute control over their party organizations. They 
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control the nominations of candidates for elections and have the power to abolish 
local party units that oppose party headquarters. A high level party discipline is 
coupled with a lack of intraparty democracy, which in turn makes the decision-
making process in political parties further personalized (Cizre, 1997: 145).  
Despite their significance, Turkish leaders and Turkish leadership patterns 
have not drawn much attention of political scientists. An exception is the Metin 
Heper-Sabri Sayarı edited volume Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey 
(2002).
3
 Although this volume is not based on the categorization introduced 
above, it does offer a systematic analysis of a number of Turkish political leaders. 
Nevertheless, considering their importance to Turkish politics, Turkish leaders 
should be studied more comprehensively. The dissertation at hand is a step in 
addressing this deficiency from the perspective of one specific political leader in 
Turkey.  
1.3 Literature Review 
Celal Bayar has been a topic of several scholarly and popular studies but 
as mentioned earlier, a study that takes into account the external and internal 
resources of his leadership on a broad scale to cover his executive leadership 
positions have not so far been undertaken. This is not necessarily a fault of the 
studies that are mentioned below. The studies in question focused either on 
                                                          
3
 Here the following unpublished PhD dissertations should also be alluded to: Ozan Örmeci‟s 
“Portrait of a Turkish Social Democrat: Ismail Cem” (2011), Güliz Sütçü‟s  “Democratic Party 
and Democracy in Turkey: With Special Reference to Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes‟ (2011), 
Zeynep Çağlayan Ġçener‟s “Presidents, the State and Democracy in Turkey: The Ideas and Praxis 
of Süleyman Demirel” (2010), (Bilkent University, Political Science Department). Although these 
studies are not necessarily written with a leadership perspective, they provide extensive 
information on the leaders that are taken up.  
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internal resources, for instance on personal characteristics without considering the 
external resources such as political context and institutions or took the opposite 
approach and presented Bayar as an outcome of the political context, without 
taking into account his personal leadership resources. Those fail to provide a 
comprehensive account of Bayar‟s leadership from the leadership perspective. 
The following studies are among those, which focus mainly on Bayar‟s 
internal resources of leadership: Ġsmet Bozdağ‟s Zaferlerle ve Şereflerle Dolu Bir 
Hayat: Celal Bayar (A Lifetime of Victories and Honorable Deeds: Celal Bayar) 
(1986) and Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle Celal Bayar: Türk Milletine Vasiyet (Celal 
Bayar and His Unknown Aspects: Will to the Turkish Nation) (2005), Cemal 
Kutay‟s Bayar’ın Yazmadığı, Yazamadığı Üç Devirden Hakikatler (Facts from the 
Three Decades that Bayar Could Not and Did Not Write About) (1982) and Celal 
Bayar: Bir Türk’ün Biyografisi (Celal Bayar: The Biography of a Turk) (1950). 
Bayar himself contributed to these studies by granting interviews. Both Bozdağ 
and Kutay give detailed accounts of Bayar‟s political experiences and they 
overemphasize, often positively, internal resources of Bayar‟s leadership, such as 
his patriotism or determination.  
Erkan ġenĢekerci‟s study Türk Devriminde Celal Bayar: 1918-1960 (Celal 
Bayar and the Turkish Revolution: 1918-1960) (2000) explores Bayar‟s role in the 
critical turning points of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in 1918-
1960, a period that the author refers to as the Turkish Revolution. Written mainly 
from an historical perspective with an emphasis on mostly internal resources for 
Bayar‟s leadership, institutional structures and political culture are often neglected 
in this otherwise engaging study.  
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Cihad Baban‟s Politika Galerisi: Büstler ve Portreler (Gallery of Politics: 
Busts and Portraits) (1970) is a collection of the author‟s observations about a 
number of political figures with whom he worked. Baban (1911-1984), a 
prominent journalist and a deputy in Parliament from the DP slate in 1946-1956, 
allocated a chapter of this volume to Bayar where he shares insights to Bayar‟s 
internal leadership resources. ġafak Altun‟s Atatürk, İnönü, Bayar'ın İktisat 
Kavgası (The Economy Dispute between Atatürk, Ġnönü and Bayar) and Ġsmet 
Bozdağ‟s Siyasal Kıyamet, Bitmeyen Devlet Kavgası: Atatürk-İnönü, İnönü-Bayar 
(Political Apocalypse, Never-Ending State Dispute: Atatürk-Ġnönü, Ġnönü-Bayar) 
(2007) are accounts of the political disputes between the leaders mentioned. 
Although the relations between executive office holders are a part of external 
resources of leadership, not enough attention is paid in these studies to the 
institutional aspects of the relationships among the mentioned leaders. The 
disputes are analyzed through a discussion of differences among these leader‟s 
internal resources, such as the differences in their understanding of the economy. 
In her article “Civic Nationalism in Turkey: A Study on the Political Profile of 
Celal Bayar” (2007) ġule ToktaĢ discusses Bayar‟s interpretation of Turkish 
nationalism based on primary resources but ends up neglecting the background of 
the issues Bayar commented upon.  
The following resources should be mentioned among those that focus 
mainly on external impacts on Bayar‟s leadership. NurĢen Mazıcı‟s Celal Bayar 
Başbakanlık Dönemi: 1937-1939 (Celal Bayar‟s Prime Ministry: 1937-1939) 
(1996) is a comprehensive analysis of Bayar‟s eighteen months as prime minister. 
In this study Mazıcı gives a comprehensive account of the institutional 
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perspective of Bayar‟s leadership in 1937-1930. The scope in this book does not 
extend beyond Bayar‟s prime ministry.  
Rıfat Bali‟s article “Azınlıkların Demokrat Parti Sevdası: Celal Bayar‟ın 
Amerika Ziyareti” (Minorities‟ Crush on the Democrat Party: Celal  Bayar‟s Visit 
to the United States) (2004) is an account of Bayar‟s long visit to the United 
States in 1954 which lasted one and a half months and the warm welcome he 
received from the American citizens previously living in Ottoman or Turkish 
lands. This piece also fails to provide any comprehensive analysis for motivations 
behind Bayar‟s visit and mainly focuses on how well he was received by these 
communities.  
George Harris‟s chapter “Celal Bayar: Conspiratorial Democrat” (2002) in 
Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey volume should be mentioned as an 
exception in this literature review. In this article a considerable attempt is made to 
provide a discussion of external and internal resources of Bayar‟s leadership. 
However, being an article, this piece has a narrower scope and although certain 
internal and external resources are referred to throughout the discussion, they are 
not categorized as internal or external resources of leadership and thus this article 
does not make use of political science literature on leadership. Harris  is a scholar 
of history and it would be unfair to expect him contribute to the field of political 
science.  
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1.4 Resources and Methodology  
In this study the interactive method, shortly introduced above, is employed 
in order to identify the external and internal resources of Bayar‟s leadership and 
assess the weight of these resources. The interactive methodology obliges each 
study to come up with its own categories of external and internal resources as it 
does not provide a set of fixed categories for the study of leaders. General 
conclusions without reference to case studies are considered artificial (Cole, 
1994a: 466) because each case study is likely to bear its own categories of 
external and internal resources.  
The interactive method also does not give out any guidelines on how to 
establish whether external or internal resources have been more influential on the 
leader under focus. Each study undertaken with this methodology has to develop 
its own framework on this question as well. For instance, Elgie concludes that for 
the liberal democratic systems he studied (1995), political context, i.e. an external 
resource, seems to be more influential in the exercise of leadership than the 
internal resources of leaders. Nevertheless, he still highlights the importance of 
leaders themselves, and arrives at the conclusion that leaders do make a 
difference. Gaffney, in his analysis of French presidents since 1958, indicates that 
the fifth Republic paved the way for a strong presidency. The political context 
drew the limits for the exercise of leadership; however according to him, personal 
resources and political skills of the leaders have been central to the direction and 
form of the Republic since 1958 (Gaffney, 2010: 206). For instance in his study of 
François Mitterrand, Cole arrives at the conclusion that Mitterrand‟s personal 
charisma and skills shaped his presidency, but even then it is arguable to what 
extent Mitterrand shaped the political circumstances - he owed a considerable 
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share of his success to developments beyond his control such as the economic and 
the international restraints that called for innovative leadership solutions (Cole, 
1994a: 467). For the Argentinean case, the authors suggest that the political 
context determined by the presidential system calls for a strong leadership trait 
which in turn emphasizes the importance of personal resources (Llanos and 
Margheritis, 2006: 97-98). Although internal resources are more prominent in 
their discussion, the importance of the political context is also acknowledged. In 
the current dissertation, an original framework of external and internal resources 
for the study of Bayar‟s leadership will be introduced and the discussion on the 
weight of these resources will depend on this framework. 
Throughout this dissertation, primary and secondary resources will be used 
for the analysis of Bayar‟s leadership. Primary resources include the volumes 
Bayar himself wrote on a number of issues ranging from his relationship with 
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to his admiration for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and 
his involvement in the Turkish War of Independence. Bayar‟s speeches, delivered 
on several different occasions, such as election campaigns, were professionally 
compiled and these will also be used as primary resources in this dissertation. The 
parliamentary proceedings in 1937-1960 are also among the primary resources 
that were surveyed. Primary sources provide an important contribution especially 
for the analysis of Bayar‟s internal leadership resources. Nevertheless, they may 
also include valuable insights into certain external resources. 
Secondary resources used for this dissertation come in a number of 
categories. The first category is the press. Newspapers, monthly and weekly 
magazines listed in detail at the end of this dissertation have been surveyed for the 
years 1937-1960 in the archives of the Istanbul-based History Foundation of 
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Turkey (Türk Tarih Vakfı) and of the Ankara-based National Library (Milli 
Kütüphane). Also, a complementary research has been conducted on the website 
of the Ankara-based Directorate General of Press and Information (Basın Yayın 
Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü). This institution has been compiling news printed 
in the main newspapers monthly since 1920 and opened its resources to public on 
its website.  
The second category consists of memoirs that refer to Bayar extensively 
and are written by certain important figures of the period under study. The 
following books are among the memoirs consulted for this dissertation: Samet 
Ağaoğlu‟s Demokrat Parti'nin Doğuş ve Yükseliş Sebepleri: Bir Soru (The 
Reasons for the Birth and the Rise of the Democrat Party: A Question) (1972), 
Marmara’da Bir Ada (An Island in the Marmara Sea) (2011) and Arkadaşım 
Menderes (My Friend Menderes) (2011). The author was a member of the DP 
governments and a close associate of Celal Bayar. Rıfkı Salim Burçak and Tekin 
Erer are two other prominent DP affiliates who shared their observations on the 
DP and Bayar in their memoirs. Burçak (1913-1998) was a member of Parliament 
from Erzurum, minister for customs in 1951 and minister for education from 1953 
to 1954. He wrote his memoirs in the following volumes: On Yılın Anıları: 1950-
1960 (Memoirs of A Decade: 1950-1960) (1998), İdamların İçyüzü: Adnan 
Menderes, Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, Hasan Polatkan (An Insight to the Executions: 
Adnan Menderes, Fatih RüĢtü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan) (1997) and Yassıada ve 
Öncesi (Yassıada and Earlier Years) (1976). Tekin Erer (1921-1997), a journalist 
close to the DP and a member of Parliament from the Justice Party (Adalet 
Partisi-AP) between 1965-1973 also shared his memoirs in the following 
volumes: 10 Yılın Mücadelesi (A Decade-Long Strives) (1964) and Yassıada ve 
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Sonrası (Yassıada and its Aftermath) (1965). Haldun Derin's Çankaya Özel 
Kalemini Anımsarken: 1933-1951 (Remembering the Private Secretariat of 
President at Çankaya: 1933-1951) (1995) is another example. Derin spent the 
years from 1933 to 1951 first with Ġnönü and then with Bayar as presidents. 
Although most of the anecdotes are from the years Derin worked for President 
Ġnönü, he also shared his observations about Bayar. Metin Toker‟s volumes 
Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları (Our Democracy during Ġsmet Pasha Times), 
especially volumes from one to five (consecutively 1998, 1991, 1991, 1992, 1998) 
that explore the years 1944-1961 are among resources based on memoirs. Ġsmet 
Ġnönü‟s collected memoirs Defterler: 1919-1973 (Notebooks: 1919-1973) (2008) 
is another important resource for this dissertation as Ġnönü mentions certain 
circumstances where Bayar and Ġnönü faced each other as political rivals. Turhan 
Dilligil‟s Bayar-İnönü Yakınlaşması (The Rapprochement between Bayar and 
Ġnönü) (1969) is an account of the reconciliation between Bayar and Ġnönü 
brought about by the author (1920-1997) who was a journalist close to the DP and 
a member of the Parliament from the AP in 1965-1969.   
 Memoirs provide useful insights both for Bayar‟s internal and to some 
extent external leadership resources. Yet here it should also be acknowledged that 
memoirs may often be biased in favor of or against Bayar.  To avoid any mistakes 
that can result from using memoirs without caution, a critical selection is pursued: 
relying on the judgmental or excessively favorable parts of the memoirs on Bayar 
as the main resource for information is avoided.   
Third, a number of interviews were conducted with certain acquaintances 
of Bayar who worked with him or were close to him through family ties. Mehmet 
Arif Demirer, an author of several books on the DP and the son of Minister of 
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Transportation Arif Demirer (1955-1957), Üner Kırdar, a Turkish career diplomat 
and the son of Lütfü Kırdar, Minister of Health (1957-1960), Tülay Duran, a 
historian and Celal Bayar‟s assistant and DemirtaĢ Bayar, Celal Bayar‟s grandson 
were interviewed. Another close acquaintance of Bayar who prefers to remain 
anonymous was also interviewed. These interviews have been useful especially 
for their contribution to the analysis of Bayar‟s internal leadership resources. 
Fourth, the political science literature on the DP period was extensively 
used, mainly for the analysis of the external resources in 1937-1960. The 
following should be mentioned among many such resources: Mustafa Albayrak's 
Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti: 1946-1960 (The Democrat Party in 
Turkish Political History) (2004) is an extensive study of the DP from its 
establishment to its downfall. Cem Eroğul's  Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi 
(The Democrat Party: Its History and Ideology) (1970) is an attempt to study the 
ideological background of the DP. Ġlkay Sunay's article “Populism and Patronage: 
The Democrat Party and Its Legacy in Turkey” (2004) is an analysis of the DP 
populism which the author considers having started a new pattern of populism in 
Turkey. Feroz Ahmad‟s The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975 
(1977), Kemal Karpat‟s Türk Demokrasi Tarihi: Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel 
Temeller (Turkish History of Democracy: Social, Economic and Cultural 
Foundations) (2007), Cemil Koçak‟s “Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950)” (Political 
History 1923-1950) and Mete Tunçay‟s “Siyasal Tarih (1950-1960)” (Political 
History 1950-1960) chapters in Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980 
(History of Turkey: Modern Turkey 1908-1980) edited by Sina AkĢin (1990) and 
Mehmet Ali Birand,  Bülent Çaplı and Can Dündar‟s Demirkırat: Bir 
 15 
 
Demokrasinin DoğuĢu (The Iron Horse: Birth of a Democracy) (2006) were also 
consulted.  
Fifth, certain resources mentioned above in the literature review will also 
be used. In that respect studies by Bozdağ and Kutay should be repeated here. 
Neither of these authors are scholars and their writings on Bayar are often biased 
in favor of him. Neverthless both authors had frequent access to Bayar and they 
were able to interview him for their studies several times. Thus, Bozdağ‟s and 
Kutay‟s books will also be used throughout this dissertation.  However these 
books will be relied upon only for biographical details about Bayar‟s life and 
Bayar‟s own statements that come out throughout the text.  
1.5 Organization of the Study  
This study comprises of six chapters including this Introduction. In the 
second chapter, first the interactive approach employed throughout this 
dissertation is detailed. Second, an account of the political context in 1923-1960 
from the perspective of certain issues such as the nature of the political regime, 
the role of the armed forces in political affairs, international affairs and the 
economic background is provided. In this dissertation these are referred to as non-
institutional resources of Bayar‟s leadership.  
The timeframe for this analysis in Chapter II is the period from 1923 to 
1960. Although Bayar did not take any executive leadership position in 1939-
1950, this period is also included in the political context analysis because political 
history had an important impact on the formation of the political context that 
 16 
 
Bayar operated in during 1950-1960. Besides, it would be unreliable to provide 
two separate analyses of the political context in 1937-1939 and 1950-1960 and 
ignore the interim phase, because political issues have a great deal of continuity. 
Matters taken up in this chapter do not constitute a comprehensive account of that 
period, neither are they confined to the political circumstances that Bayar had 
been a part of. These topics were preferred because they are the major political 
issues that dominated the years from 1937 to1960. 
In Chapter III, Bayar‟s personal leadership resources will be taken up. 
This will be done first with regard to his life experience, earned through certain 
key moments that he himself defined as crucial. These moments were influential 
on the way that his politics evolved later. For instance, his experience as a young 
banker had an impact on his later role as one of the macro-economic planners. 
Likewise the ĠTC experience endowed him with a specific understanding of 
politics and the Turkish War of Independence further contributed to establish him 
as a Turkish nationalist. Second, Bayar‟s understanding of certain major political 
concepts, such as democracy and nationalism will be clarified in this chapter. 
In Chapter IV and V, the institutional dimension of Bayar‟s leadership will 
be examined. In Chapter IV, Bayar‟s role as prime minister in 1937-1939 will be 
taken up. For this purpose, first the background for the prime minister will be 
explored. The prime minister‟s powers and authority according to the 1924 
Constitution will be taken up and a short assessment of the office of prime 
minister until Bayar‟s term will be provided. Second, in this chapter it will be 
shown how Bayar perceived his position in 1937-1939. In order to conduct this 
analysis, Bayar‟s acts as prime minister and his role in the political circumstances 
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will be discussed. Among other matters, Bayar‟s relations with the President of 
the Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk will also be examined in this chapter.  
 In Chapter V, Bayar‟s presidency in 1950-1960 will be taken up. Similar 
to the categorization in the Chapter IV, first the authority and powers of the 
president under the 1924 Constitution will be explored and an assessment of the 
president‟s position since the establishment of the Republic will be presented. 
Second, Bayar‟s perception of this office in 1950-1960 will be outlined through 
an analysis of his actions as president. Matters such as his role in the repression of 
the opposition, restriction of the freedom of the press, ascending political tension 
and foreign policy will be explored. His relations with Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes and the head of the main opposition party Ġsmet Ġnönü will also be 
considered in this chapter.  
In the concluding chapter, first the primary findings of the previous 
chapters will be summarized and evaluated. Second, the extent to which external 
as opposed to internal resources influenced Bayar‟s leadership will be analyzed. 
Third, the question what kind of a leader profile Bayar provides will be put into 
context and an answer will be provided. Fourth, the interactive approach will be 
reconsidered according to the findings of this dissertation on Bayar‟s leadership. 
Last, follow-up questions for further studies will be introduced. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE INTERACTIVE APPROACH IN THE STUDY OF 
LEADERSHIP AND THE NON-INSTITUTIONAL 
RESOURCES OF LEADERSHIP  IN 1923-1960 
 
2.1. Interactive Approach in the Study of Leadership 
 
This study is concerned with executive political leadership (here 
onwards leadership) in the Turkish context; which according to the 
constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 1982 consists of the president and the 
government. Executive leadership is only one form of political leadership 
as all political leaders are not necessarily executive office holders 
(Helms, 2005: 3). Adopting this definition in the current study is useful 
firstly because it does not indulge in the extensive discussions of what 
political leadership is.
4
 Secondly, the study of executive political 
leadership is not necessarily confined to “democratic forms of 
leadership” or “leadership in democratic regimes” (Helms, 2005: 3). This 
                                                          
4
 Elgie mentions “thousands of competing definitions of leadership” (Elgie, 1995:2). 
Various definitions have been grouped under nine categories and some of these categories 
overlap and repeat each other (Blondel, 1987:2). In another resource, 221 definitions are 
mentioned (Bass, 2008: 15).   
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is an important perspective for this dissertation, as Celal Bayar had been 
an executive leader during the single party period, which can hardly be 
categorized as democratic and his time in office as prime minister is 
included in this study.  
Under the academic discipline of political science, individual 
leaders are often studied with regard to the resources of political 
leadership. Resources of leadership have been categorized under two 
titles: external and internal. This is an essential categorization because 
leaders act against the backgrounds set by the political environment, i.e. 
the historical context and existing institutions (Hargrove, 2004: 580; 
Llanos and Margheritis, 2006: 86).  
External and internal resources of leadership are not static or 
predetermined (Elgie, 1995: 8; Helms, 2005: 20). Leaders change their 
political environment and they themselves change due to their interaction 
with the political environment. Thus although external factors may 
constrain the leaders in many ways and partially determine the political 
issues to be addressed by them, leaders are not hostages to their 
environment (Helms, 2005: 20).  
This perspective, which takes into account external and internal 
resources of leadership is referred to as the interactive approach (Elgie, 
1995: 8; Helms, 2005: 19-20). Although executive leadership positions 
and political institutions are different in presidential and parliamentary 
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systems, this approach has been embraced by scholars who work on 
either of these different political systems.
5
 
The current dissertation also depends on the external and internal 
resources of leadership categorization for the study of Celal Bayar‟s 
leadership. The proper definitions of internal and external resources on 
the exercise of leadership change according to the leader, the country and 
the period studied. None of the contemporary scholars working on the 
questions of leadership have attempted to provide a universal scheme of 
external and internal resources that can be applied to the study of leaders. 
It has been noted that “it would be artificial to discriminate in an abstract 
manner between personal characteristics, positional context and 
environmental constraints without reference to specific cases” (Cole, 
1994a: 467). Each leadership study that uses the interactive method has 
to identify the external and internal resources that have an impact on the 
leader under focus.  
Thus, this study also does not depend on a predetermined 
categorization of internal and external resources. However, below, a 
framework to study Bayar‟s leadership from the perspective of the 
interactive approach is introduced. This methodological approach is 
applied throughout the dissertation. This framework is inspired by 
previous studies on several leaders and the theoretical contributions of 
scholars. These contributions have been selectively incorporated taking 
into account Turkey‟s political context in 1937-1960, as well as Celal 
                                                          
5
 For the employment of this approach in parliamentary systems see Cole, 1994a; Cole,  
1994b and Gaffney, 2003.  For the presidential interpretation, see Barber, 2008 and Llano 
and Margheritis, 2006. 
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Bayar‟s leadership. This framework should not be interpreted as an ideal 
guide to study other Turkish leaders.  
2.1.1 External Resources 
The external resources of leadership have been conceptualized in a 
number of different ways. For instance, the concept of structure has been 
employed to refer to the factors, which do not derive from leaders 
themselves.
6
 However, the term structure has been found limiting as it 
fails to include the non-institutional aspects of external resources. Thus, 
other conceptualizations such as leadership environment (Elgie, 1995: 
191), context (Hargrove, 1994: 583), environment (Blondel, 1987: 25) 
and environmental constraints (Moskop, 1996: 622; Cole, 1994a: 467-
468) were developed to expand the scope of the factors that are studied as 
part of the external resources of leadership. Here, in order to provide a 
clear expression for many different categories introduced to the study of 
Bayar‟s leadership, the umbrella conceptualization of external resources 
was preferred.  
The external resources that are influential in the exercise of 
leadership can be broadly defined as the wider “historical context, 
including ideas, politics and social currents within which leaders operate 
and within which they are subsumed” (Hargrove, 2004: 622). This 
formulation, embodies both institutional aspects of leadership such as the 
nature of the executive offices as dictated by the constitution, and non-
                                                          
6
 For instance see Jones, 1989: 4. 
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institutional aspects such as political culture and political context shaped 
by contemporary challenges faced by leaders. 
External resources are important for leaders in a few different 
ways. Firstly, they often determine the limits of the leader‟s agenda and 
political goals. For instance, the different combination of external 
resources in Egypt and Germany present dramatically different agendas 
for executive leaders in these countries respectively. While the German 
leaders, in 2012, are occupied with the European Union‟s fiscal crisis or 
further development of a green economy in their country, Egyptian 
leaders are faced with the difficulties of institution-building. Thus, 
Egyptian leaders are less likely, at this moment, to work on developing 
green development schemes whereas German leaders are not concerned 
with the installment of basic democratic institutions.  
Secondly, external resources limit a leader‟s activities and legally 
frame the scope for their activities. Thus the most powerful leaders will 
be likely to be found in political systems where the laws give them the 
most powers. However, this observation only applies to the contexts 
where the political regime is regulated through laws and the rule of law is 
respected.  
A discussion of the external resources of leadership is vital for the 
analyses of leaders. However studies that overemphasize these resources 
underestimate the leaders‟ impact on the political environment 
(Imbroscio, 1999: 47) and fail to analyze the constraints on the political 
context (Cole, 1994a:466). In this study, this one-dimensional focus was 
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avoided by including a chapter on the internal resources of Bayar‟s 
leadership during 1937-1960. On the other hand, the impact of external 
resources was acknowledged and an extensive analysis of these factors 
was included for the period from 1923 to 1960. Below the channels 
through which external resources of leadership are operationalized are 
described. 
2.1.1.1 The Institutional Aspect of the External Leadership Resources  
As far as this dissertation is concerned, it is the institutions that 
may transform individuals into leaders. Thus, they are given a great deal 
of attention in this study. Institutions define the “rules of the political 
game” for leaders in office (Elgie, 1995:204). The characteristics of the 
institutions studied depend largely on the political systems under focus. 
Different political systems provide similar executive positions with 
different powers and responsibilities. Yet in leadership studies 
irrespective of different characteristics of political systems and regimes, 
the institutional dimension is often taken up in a study of following 
categories.  
2.1.1.1.1 Characteristics of the Executive Position 
The most significant questions in the study of executive 
leadership in institutional terms are, firstly, the ones related to the 
constitutional and technical characteristics of the office in question as 
opposed to the practice.  Simply put, the greater the power given to an 
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executive office, the more effective the leader holding this office will be 
while implementing his/her policies (Elgie, 1995:15). However, it should 
again be highlighted that this observation applies to the political regimes 
and systems where the rule of law is observed.  
Secondly, the system of election, whether the leader is for example 
elected through universal suffrage or indirectly by the parliament, affects 
the leader‟s activities in practice and power because the method also 
determines whom the leader will be dependent on for his/her re-election 
(Elgie, 1995: 15).  
Thirdly, the tenure of the leader should be brought up as a part of 
institutional analyses. There are often restrictions on the re-election of the 
head of state in contemporary political systems (Blondel, 1987: 159). For 
instance, due to the constitutional arrangements, the French and 
American presidents cannot be elected for more than two consecutive 
terms. The fixed tenure has an impact on the leader's activities in office 
as it may encourage leaders to focus on short and medium term political 
goals instead of investing in long-term agendas, which will deliver 
results in a longer time frame (Blondel, 1987: 162). The prime ministers 
in parliamentary systems, on the other hand, might be re-elected as often 
as their electoral success permits them except for the cases when political 
parties impose restrictions on themselves. 
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2.1.1.1.2 The Leader’s Relations with Other Executive Leaders and the 
Legislative Body 
The interactive approach places emphasis on the constitutional 
arrangements that regulate relations between different executive offices. 
As the relationship already takes place in a constitutional setting and is 
thus defined by law this depends on how the constitution defines the 
hierarchy between these executive offices such as prime ministry and 
presidency. In certain regimes, the potential for tension between the 
prime minister and the president is built into the political structure. For 
instance in France, in cases of cohabitation, where the president and the 
prime minister are from different political parties, the initiative passes to 
the prime minister in most policy issues. Under those circumstances the 
president takes the role of an arbitrator of political conflict (Cole, 1994a: 
460).  
Executive‟s relations with the legislative should also be taken into 
consideration in this respect. The degree of an executive leader‟s control 
over the parliament and the parliament‟s influence on the executive 
depends on a combination of factors ranging from the characteristics of 
political parties, constitutional regulations and political culture (Elgie, 
1995: 14).   Political parties often provide one of the more significant 
resources of a leader's powers (Elgie, 1995:19).  
In cases where the leader is also the head of the party, s/he is likely 
to hold more power than leaders who are not party leaders. Leaders who 
have a strong hold over their parties and over their parties‟ parliamentary 
group have a higher amount of influence. Under such conditions, prime 
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ministers can focus on implementing their own policy agendas rather 
than addressing challenges to their leadership deriving from the party  
In other cases, there may be more room for tension within the party 
group and the prime minister might have to engage in a continuous 
negotiation with his/her party in order to stay in power (Elgie, 1995: 14).  
For instance, after its 1950 electoral victory, the Democrat Party‟s first 
few years in the government were marked by intra-party conflicts. The 
DP Parliamentary Group remained a strong political influence until the 
second half of the 1950s. In other words, it took some time for Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes to establish his control over the party and 
concentrate more fully on governmental issues. A leader‟s relations with 
his/her political party and the support s/he gets from the political party 
are thus, important (Helms, 2005: 21). 
2.1.1.1.3 Relations with the Non-executive Branches of the State 
Relations between the non-executive branches of the state and the 
executive leaders also influence the leader‟s agenda and capacities in 
different ways. For instance, higher courts have influence over executive 
leadership in varying degrees. While the existence of strong higher courts 
place constraints on the exercise of political leadership, their non-
existence or weakness provides leaders with more room and less 
boundaries (Elgie, 1995: 17).  The latter was the case in Turkey until the 
introduction of the Constitutional Court in 1961. Since its foundation, the 
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Court closed down several political parties and banned their leaders from 
participating in active politics for certain periods of time.
7
  
In certain other political systems, high courts limit the leaders‟ 
activities in less dramatic ways. For example, in the Unites States the 
Supreme Court often uses its power to say the last word on issues upon 
which the Congress and the President disagree (Elgie, 1995: 128) and 
this essentially determines the leader‟s powers and capabilities 
concerning those issues (Elgie, 1995: 130).  
2.1.1.2  Non-institutional Aspects of External Resources of Leadership 
2.1.1.2.1 The Historical Context  
The historical experiences of a nation affect the leader's agenda, 
priorities and goals. Firstly, democracies that have experienced 
authoritarian regimes in the proximite past are more likely to place 
formal limits on the exercise of executive leadership (Elgie, 1995:21).  
Likewise, regimes that replace monarchies tend to place more emphasis 
on limiting the powers of executive office holders. For instance in the 
Turkish case most of the discussions that took place in the Parliament on 
the draft of the 1924 Constitution concerned powers of the president. The 
memories of the Ottoman monarchy affected the formulation of the 1924 
Constitution and the concentration of power in the office of the president 
was avoided in the text (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 13). 
                                                          
7
 These restrictions on leaders and parties were loosened with the 2011 Constitutional 
changes and the grip of the Court on leaders is less these days. 
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In democracies that have recently suffered from unstable 
governments, political leaders may benefit from reforms that have been 
pursued to decrease such instability (Elgie, 1995: 21). For instance, the 
1958 French Constitution facilitated strong leadership (Baumgartner, 
1989: 124) and limited the powers of the legislative body, i.e. the 
Parliament, in order to avoid instabilities caused by a strong legislature. 
Likewise, the 1982 Turkish Constitution strengthened the position of the 
president and transformed this post from a ceremonial to an active 
position by granting the president important political and appointment 
functions.  
Secondly, the effects of historical experiences are not necessarily 
only manifested through institutional and constitutional regulations. In 
some cases, the practices and political traditions of former regimes leave 
a strong mark on the leaders who continue politics under new 
arrangements. If the previous system had been based on authoritarian 
ruling practices, leaders might have a tendency to continue using the 
political methods they are familiar with from their earlier political 
experiences.  
2.1.1.2.2 International Context and Economic Background 
The two other non-institutional components of external resources 
of leadership are the international context and the economic background. 
The impact of the international context on leaders was often stressed in 
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theoretical debates and case studies.
8
 The international context consists 
of a combination of factors, such as the country‟s geopolitical position, 
major issues of conflict or dispute in the foreign policy agenda and 
membership in international institutions.  
The international context‟s impact on leadership mainly derives 
from the fact that it identifies an important part of the challenges that the 
leader faces or is likely to face during his/her term of office. For 
example, the presidents of the Swiss Federal Council are not very likely 
to undertake major foreign policy operations (Blondel 1987: 29). The 
international context does not only pose challenges. It presents 
opportunities to the leaders to display their leadership skills and divert 
public attention from failures in the domestic realm to their achievements 
in the international arena. Such achievements contribute to the creation of 
national unity and pride (Blondel, 1987: 196). In certain international 
crisis contexts, leaders might even be able to push forward certain policy 
goals, which would not be welcomed in normal times (Blondel, 1987: 
30). In such instances, the international environment enhances the 
leader‟s capacity to realize his/her own agenda. For instance, Margaret 
Thatcher, the British Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990, gained 
considerable popularity after the Falkland War in 1983 (Blondel, 1987: 
77).   
Similar to the international context, economics also predetermines 
an important part of a leader‟s agenda and activities (Elgie, 1995: 8, 16; 
Jones, 1989: 3). For instance, the executive leaders of a developing 
                                                          
8
 For example, see Blondel 1987: 100 and Cole, 1994a: 468. 
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country suffering from fiscal failure are not likely to carry out major 
industrial investment schemes in their country (Blondel 1987: 29-30). 
Likewise, if there is a fiscal crisis in the economy, leaders will be likely 
to address this issue and may have to undertake dramatic austerity 
measures, which will often decrease their popularity in elections. In such 
cases leaders are disempowered by the economic context (Elgie, 1995: 
23). In other words the economic background affects the leader‟s agenda 
and his/her chances to be re-elected.  
2.1.2 Internal Resources  
Defining elements of the internal resources of leadership is easier 
than defining the external resources. However, the study of internal 
resources of leadership is much more challenging than study of external 
resources. This difficulty stems from the complexity of these internal 
resources and the lack of political science‟s methodological tools that 
can be employed in such inquiries.  
The internal resources that are referred to in this study are a 
combination of political worldview and experience in politics 
(McDermott, 2004: 227; Llanos and Margheritis, 2006: 85). In specific, 
this approach first refers to the study of a leader‟s understanding of basic 
political concepts. The study of these basic concepts makes it possible to 
identify traits that the leader consistently displays in his/her acts over the 
years. Changes in a leader‟s political worldview should also be taken into 
account in these analyses.  
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Second, the study of the leader‟s internal resources also includes a 
discussion of leader‟s goals. Some leaders are more ambitious in their 
agenda and goals in comparison to other leaders (Elgie, 1995: 10). 
Similar to the leader‟s interpretation of major political concepts, the 
leader‟s goals also are not static and they change over time (Blondel, 
1987: 82). Thus, the (in) consistency of goals over time may also be 
observed within the scope of the internal resources of leadership. Third, a 
leader‟s political activities and involvement in political matters at earlier 
phases of his/her life also matter as these formative years have a major 
impact on a leader‟s understanding of politics (Helms, 2005: 21). 
Importance of personality for leadership studies was also noted.
9
 
However, studies that focus on personality are often taken up in the field 
of political psychology. Political science does not have the tools and 
methods to thoroughly discuss personality and the impact of personality 
on the leader‟s actions (Blondel, 1987: 147). Thus questions of 
personality are not brought up within the scope of this study. However, 
the portrait of Celal Bayar provided here will certainly give the reader a 
background from which to consider Bayar‟s personality.  
Studies that are only concerned with the internal resources of 
leadership, such as personality, a leader‟s life story, experiences and 
his/her interpretation of major political concepts are criticized for 
ignoring the role of the political context (Seligman, 1950: 912). In 
contrast, this study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
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external and internal resources that affected the leadership of Celal 
Bayar.  
2.2 Non-Institutional External Resources in 1923-1960 
In this section, the non-institutional external resources of Celal 
Bayar‟s leadership are taken up through the study of a number of sub-
categories. These sub-categories are non-institutional in the sense that they 
do not refer to executive leadership positions and the powers that these 
positions give to leaders and, in this case to Bayar. Non-institutional 
external resources of Bayar‟s leadership from 1923 to 1960 are interpreted 
with regard to the nature of the political regime, international affairs, 
economic background and the role of the armed forces in political affairs. 
Institutional external resources are covered in the next chapters of this 
study.  
A study of the categories introduced here does not necessarily cover 
all the political dynamics of Turkey at that time. Nor are the political, 
historical and intellectual development of these categories taken up at 
length. Lastly, Bayar‟s role in these categories is not evaluated in this 
section. Such evaluation is raised elsewhere in this study. These categories 
are brought up in order to present the political and historical background of 
Bayar‟s leadership. A focus on these matters gives the reader the possibility 
to consider the external resources of Bayar‟s political leadership.  
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The specific focus on the phase 1923-1960 should also be justified. 
Analysis of Bayar‟s executive positions in this study starts from 1937 
onwards. However, as the preceding section on the methodology of 
leadership studies should have made clear, the study of the external 
resources of political leadership is not limited to the study of the politics of 
the leadership phase itself. Historical background should also be brought up. 
Including the study of the relevant historical background is important for 
two reasons. First, it has a substantial impact on building the political 
context of the period under focus. Second, the historical background forms 
certain traditions and political behavior patterns that pass to the next 
generation of leaders. Thus, the historical background of certain issues, such 
as international relations, opposition in politics, the constitutional context 
and economic policies are included in the narration below.  
2.2.1. The Political Regime According to the Constitution 
Although constitutions are not the only legal documents that work for 
this purpose, they, in part, define the basic characteristics of political 
regimes. They identify the distribution of political power and form the legal 
and normative framework for political structures (Bilgin, 2007: 123). 
Turkish constitutions are no exception to this observation. This section 
presents the regime under the 1924 Turkish Constitution. For a discussion of 
the political regime according to the constitution, two categories are 
introduced: (1) political power, checks and balances and (2) the six 
principles of Kemalism. 
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2.2.1.1. Political Power and Checks and Balances 
After the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, a new constitution 
was drafted, debated and legislated in 1924 to replace the 1921 Constitution. 
The main characteristic of the 1924 Constitution was its emphasis on 
national sovereignty. This principle was initially introduced in the 1921 
Constitution and it formed an integral part of the Turkish political regime 
later on (Ahmad, 2008: 135). In the 1924 Constitution the priority of 
national sovereignty was expressed through an emphasis placed on the 
legislative. Parliament was described as the supreme state organ (Özbudun, 
2000: 52-53; Karpat, 1967: 123-124; Dodd, 1992: 20).  
Yet, due to the impact of strong executive leaders and single party 
discipline, the parliament‟s supremacy merely remained on paper as it was 
instead the executive body that dominated politics during the single party  
period (1925-1946) (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 11). As the executive 
became the main state authority in practice, consequently the Parliament‟s 
powers were rendered insignificant during the single party phase (Karpat, 
1973: 59-60). Due to this arrangement, the CHP could, for instance, control 
the nominations of candidates to the Parliament, whose “supreme powers 
came to be exercised by the party leadership and the executive” (Özbudun, 
2000: 52-53). 
The 1924 Constitution maintained a democratic spirit but in effect it 
represented a majoritarian interpretation of democracy which lacked a 
system of checks and balances (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 13; Tanör, 
2011: 328; Karpat, 1967: 123-124).  This majoritarian understanding was 
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manifested through the lack of guarantees for the basic rights and freedoms 
of citizens, the unavailability of channels to provide judiciary review of the 
constitutionality of laws and the independence of the judiciary (Özbudun 
and Gençkaya, 2009: 11; Dodd, 1992: 20).  
In line with this majoritarian tone, the 1924 Constitution did not 
provide channels for the representation of groups and ideologies that were 
not in power. This state of affairs did not pose any major problems for the 
political regime during the single party years. It was, after all, a single party 
regime mostly controlled by the charismatic leader Atatürk and the lack of 
checks and balances was not really problematized by the political actors of 
the time on a major scale.  
This state of affairs changed with the transition to multiparty politics. 
The transition to multiparty politics was not accompanied by major 
structural changes in the system. For instance, the 1924 Constitution was not 
changed or amended. It was thought that there was no technical need to 
amend the Constitution as the notions of political parties or a single party 
regime were not explicit in the text (Karpat, 1967: 384; Koçak, 1990: 96-
97).  
The only official changes were the ones introduced in the election, 
press and association codes (Özbudun, 2000: 53). In 1947, there were also 
some minor and insufficient amendments to the internal regulations of the 
Parliament (içtüzük) to provide ground for the inclusion of different political 
parties to the Parliamentary organs. However these changes were not 
enough for the well-functioning of a multiparty system. The unavailability 
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of the notion of political parties in the key legal documents, combined with 
the lack of mechanisms of checks and balances posed serious problems. The 
vague position of the 1924 Constitution on the questions of a multiparty 
regime in general gave a free hand to the prime ministers and the 
governments to act as it pleased them.  
It can be said that the insufficiency of the legal framework left room 
for the authoritarian tendencies of the DP, the victorious party of 1950, 1954 
and 1957 national elections to surface. Such tendencies were actualized 
especially after the first half of the 1950s. In the absence of the “judicial 
review of the constitutionality of laws”, the DP governments enacted a 
number of laws, which were restrictive of the opposition‟s rights and in 
effect marginalized the opposition (Özbudun, 2000:53). This, in return, 
created frustration for opposition parties and caused several political 
confrontations between governments and opposition parties.
10
  
2.2.1.2 Kemalism and the Six Principles of the Republic 
The discussion of Kemalism includes two dimensions: the rhetoric, 
which was evident in the legal texts, including the CHP documents 
produced during Atatürk‟s lifetime and the practice, which comprises the 
political acts done in the name of Kemalism during and after his lifetime. 
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 During the decade, the CHP remained the main opposition party.  The other major 
political parties that took seats in Parliament in 1950-1960 were the Freedom Party 
(Hürriyet Partisi) (1955-1958), the Nation Party (Millet Partisi) (1950-1953) and the 
Republican Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi) (1954-1958).  
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The Kemalist policy practice did not always follow the rhetoric. For 
instance the Republic was constitutionally divorced from Islam when the 
article stating Islam as the religion of the country was removed from the 
Constitution in 1928 and when the principle of secularism was inserted to 
the Constitution in 1937. Yet in practice Turkish secularism did not refer to 
the state‟s withdrawal from affairs related to religion. The state undertook 
the task of regulating religious activity through its control of, for instance, 
“education of religious professionals and their assignment to mosques, the 
content of religious education and the wearing of religious symbols and 
clothing in public space” (White, 2008: 357).  
However, this mismatch was not in all cases a sign of a contradiction 
between principles and actual policies. It derived from the flexible nature of 
Kemalism. Kemalism, in contrast to some of the rigid European ideologies 
of the 1930s, was a flexible way of thinking, open to different 
interpretations according to the needs of different times and circumstances 
(Findley, 2010: 258). Kemalism was not an ideology in the sense of being 
strictly defined. It was rather a worldview advising Turkish people on 
certain fundamental principles such as “how to think” (Heper, 2012). Thus, 
it was an approach to interpret political conditions rather than a universal 
recipe for solving political conflicts.  
A discussion of both Kemalist political discourse and Kemalist 
practice exceeds the purposes of this section. For this reason, only the 
rhetorical aspect of Kemalism is examined here through a focus on its six 
central principles (republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, and 
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reformism). These principles are taken up under the constitution section 
because they were integrated into the constitution.  
The principles, which were referred to as Kemalism as early as 1936, 
reveal the conceptual background of Kemalism as they became a source of 
reference for most of the programs developed by Atatürk and his successors 
(Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 375; Ahmad, 2003: 63; Karpat, 1991: 52).
11
 The six 
principles were launched in the 1931 CHP congress and they were 
integrated into the 1924 Constitution in 1937 all together and at once 
(Ahmad, 2003: 63). The public‟s reaction to these principles was diverse. 
Certain principles were discussed more and raised more controversy than 
the others. For instance nationalism and secularism raised more controversy 
in the society and/or among the policy-makers than republicanism or 
reformism. Below, these principles are briefly discussed.  
Republicanism referred to the abolishment of the monarchy and the 
establishment of a republican regime. In practice, this change was expressed 
through the slogan “sovereignty belongs to the people” (Shaw and Shaw, 
1977: 375). The understanding of republicanism did not change over time 
and the Democrat Party did not interpret it differently. The republican 
nature of the regime rarely became a major topic of debate.  
The same observation can also be made for populism (Ahmad, 2003: 
63). During the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923), populism was 
defined as a search for governance “for the people by the people”. Later it 
was thought that this expression could be used to justify a Bolshevik-style 
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 It should be noted that Atatürk himself did not use the term of Kemalism. It became 
widespread only after his death (Heper, 2012; Karpat, 1991: 52). 
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regime or the restoration of the monarchy and the caliphate as people might 
prefer these paths to a democratic system (Karpat, 1991: 55). Thus, 
populism was redefined as meaning a classless society, and equality before 
the law with a strong emphasis on national unity (Karpat, 1991: 55). In 
practice, populism meant that the parliament held legislative and executive 
functions and that universal suffrage was extended to all citizens above 
eighteen, including women in 1934. The DP did not challenge the principle 
of populism. The party‟s discourse on democracy, which emphasized the 
will of the nation, was already similar to the notion of populism.  
Nationalism was, and to this day remains, among the more debated 
principles of Kemalism. In retrospect, Turkish nationalism can be 
interpreted on two levels: the international aspect and the domestic aspect. 
The international aspect of Turkish nationalism was initially about putting 
an end to foreign occupation, earning full independence, removing the 
capitulations and securing the borders with an internationally recognized 
treaty (Karpat, 1991: 53). These issues were addressed mostly in line with 
Turkey‟s preferences by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. From 1923 
onwards, the international aspect of nationalism had been about Turkey‟s 
efforts to be a respected member of the international community and ensure 
equal treatment in the international arena with other respected nations 
(Köker, 2007: 153). This aspect of Turkish nationalism did not raise any 
considerable domestic debates and was widely shared by leading political 
actors.  
The domestic aspect of Turkish nationalism was a different issue and 
the Turkish national identity became a matter of debate once the borders 
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were secured through the Treaty of Lausanne (Karpat, 1991: 53). The theme 
of the debate was to identify on which grounds Turks and Turkish 
citizenship would be defined. The 1924 Constitution defined all citizens of 
the Republic of Turkey as Turks regardless of their ethnic origins and 
religious beliefs. The constitutional description favored a civic rather than a 
cultural interpretation of nationalism. The main difference between civic 
and the cultural interpretations of nationalism lies in the fact that the latter 
notion underlines a subjective identity whereas the former emphasizes an 
identity of an objective nature. In the civic version of nationalism, declaring 
loyalty to a state is enough for being registered as a citizen of that state. In 
the cultural version, there are preconditions for citizenship such as sharing 
common values, ideals, faith and attitudes (Heper, 2007: 89).  
In practice, Turkish nationalism also had the elements of cultural 
vision. The cultural aspect of Turkish nationalism derived from the 
emphasis on Islam and the Turkish language. As already mentioned the 
reference to Islam was removed from the 1924 Constitution although the 
divorce did not extend to “sociological” terms. Islam remained an important 
component of the national identity (Heper, 2007: 91). Turkish language was 
also defined as “one of the strongest links” among the Turkish citizens 
(Çağaptay, 2008: 14) and it was imposed on different groups such as the 
Kurdish and the non-Muslim citizens whose mother tongues were other than 
Turkish. Campaigns such as “Citizen Speak Turkish” (VatandaĢ Türkçe 
KonuĢ) launched in 1928, were directed at non-Muslims who continued to 
 41 
 
use their native languages (Çağaptay, 2008: 25-26).12 Likewise, speaking 
Kurdish in public was banned, although the implementation of this ban was 
not always observed strictly.
13
 
In this “civic-cum-cultural” (Heper, 2007) version of Republican 
nationalism, the Turkish race and its “superiority” also was occasionally 
brought up by the state. Initiatives to promote Turkishness and the Turkish 
language included the Sun Language Theory and the Turkish History 
Thesis. The Sun Language theory was introduced during the Third Turkish 
Language Congress in 1936. The theory purported the Turkish language to 
be the first spoken language (Çağaptay, 2008: 256). On the other hand the 
Turkish History Thesis, which claimed Turks as the ancestor of all civilized 
nations, including Sumerians, Egyptians and the Greeks, was introduced 
from 1931 onwards through the activities of the Turkish Historical Society 
and the history congresses. The initiative was developed by Atatürk‟s 
adopted daughter, anthropologist Afet Ġnan and was supported by him 
(Çağaptay, 2008: 246). In effect, pursuits such as the Sun Language Theory 
and the Turkish History Thesis were often attempts to inject a sense of pride 
in Turkish citizens and were not related to an ethnic interpretation of 
nationalism (Mardin, 1990: 204; Heper, 2007: 179).  After a while, Atatürk 
lost interest in these initiatives (Heper and Criss, 2009: 315).  
On the nature of Turkish nationalism it should finally be noted that the 
republican nationalist vision had another precise objective as brought up 
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 This was not an official campaign raised by the state. It was initiated by the Istanbul 
University‟s Student Union and it was inspired by a speech the Prime Minister Ġsmet Ġnönü 
delivered.  Despite the unofficial character of this initiative, Turkish statesmen supported 
this campaign and some municipalities passed regulations banning languages other than 
Turkish to be spoken in public. See Çağaptay, 2008: 26.  
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 See Heper and Yiğit, 2012: 19. 
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several times by Atatürk. Atatürk defined this objective as reaching the level 
of advanced civilizations and nations (Köker, 2007: 153-154). This task 
could be brought about by working for a “progressive and civilized” nation 
(Heper, 2007: 92). In other words, Turkish nationalism had a civilizing 
vision too.  
 Policies related to nationalism invoked different reactions 
depending on ethnic or religious background of those who were affected by 
policy practices. The non-Muslim population had already become 
insignificant in terms of numbers after the population exchanges in the early 
years of the Republic. Consequently the non-Muslim Turkish citizens did 
not organize mass movements against practices of cultural nationalism such 
as the imposition of the Turkish language. Besides, due to the guarantees of 
the Treaty of Lausanne, the non-Muslim Turkish citizens had the means to 
teach their native languages and practice their religion. Nevertheless, this 
guarantee certainly did not stop initiatives such as “Citizen, Speak Turkish”. 
On the other hand, Kurdish origined citizens of the Republic were not 
provided with similar means in terms of their language. Combined with 
sometimes-arbitrary practices of the state officers/officials on the ground in 
the Eastern regions and resentment toward the principle of secularism, 
Kurds rose against the Republican regime in the early years of the Republic. 
The 1925 Shaikh Said, 1930 Ağrı and 1937-1938 Dersim uprisings were the 
major Kurdish revolts during the early years of the Republic.  
The practice of nationalism during the CHP and the DP governments 
was not very different from each other. The DP sought to develop close ties 
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with the Kurdish and non-Muslim citizens but in policy practice, the DP 
governments did not implement different policies related to these groups. 
For instance the Capital Levy (Varlık Vergisi) funds collected from non-
Muslims in 1942-1943 were not returned despite the electoral promise to do 
so. Yet, the non-Muslims preferred the DP over the CHP in elections and 
non-Muslim candidates were elected to the Parliament from the DP lists 
(Bali, 2004: 14). The reason for this preference might have been non-
Muslim Turkish citizens‟ deep distrust toward the CHP due to the 
experiences of the single party years. 
A similar observation can also be made about the DP‟s contacts with 
Turkish citizens of Kurdish-origin. For example, during the 1957 national 
elections, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes became instrumental in Shaikh 
Said‟s grandson Abdülmelik Fırat‟s election to Parliament on the DP slate 
(Heper and Yiğit, 2012: 10). Yet in practice, this did not result in a shift in 
the Republic‟s policies toward the Kurdish origin citizens. The DP 
governments, for example, continued changing the names of Kurdish 
villages into Turkish.
14
  
Secularism was also among the more controversial principles. In 
1928, Article II of the Constitution, which defined the state‟s religion as 
Islam, was amended and the referral to the religion of the state was 
completely removed from the Constitution.   In 1937, the principle of 
secularism was added to the same article. However, separation of religion 
and state had started before 1928.  The Caliphate was abolished in 1924, 
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Term: 11,  Volume 4: 54). 
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secular schooling was adopted in 1924 through the Law on the Unification 
of Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu), sufi and dervish lodges were 
banned in 1925, Sharia courts were annulled in 1926, and Islamic civil law 
was replaced with a Swiss-inspired family code the same year.  
Nevertheless, these reforms did not bring about the state‟s withdrawal 
from the domain of religious activity. The state continued to oversee, 
control and regulate the organization of Sunni religious activity through the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs, a sub-branch of the prime ministry 
established in 1924 to replace the Ottoman state office of Sheikh-ul Islam, 
the head of the Sunni establishment in the Ottoman state (Karpat, 1991: 53; 
Hale and Özbudun, 2010: xvii).  
Turkish secularism was not only about these political and institutional 
arrangements. Just like the principle of nationalism, secularism also 
presented a civilizing vision for the citizens of the new Republic. The 
civilizing aspect was related to the goal of changing the system of values 
based on religion (Köker, 2007: 161).  In this regard, secularism envisaged 
the “liberation of individual mind from restraints [imposed] by traditional 
Islamic concepts and practices” (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 385).  
Similar to the principle of nationalism, the principle of secularism also 
caused protests. The 1925 Shaikh Said revolt in the east of the country was 
mainly directed against the secular rule of the Republic as various sermons 
delivered by the Shaikh  Said himself prior to the uprising show.
15
 Another 
violent incident against secular rule took place in the small western town of 
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Menemen in the city of Ġzmir where a group of Sunni Muslims led by a 
cleric demanding the reinstitution of a Sharia regime revolted. When a 
young officer, Lieutenant Kubilay, attempted to calm down the protestors, 
the crowd fiercely beheaded him (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 60). In both cases, the 
revolts were suppressed by military means and the rebels were executed.  
The basic understanding behind the principle of secularism remained 
essentially unchanged over the years. Nevertheless, in practice the strict 
interpretation of secularism, strict in the sense that the presence of Islam in 
the public sphere was substantially limited, was loosened to a degree by the 
CHP in the aftermath of the transition to the multiparty phase. For instance, 
religious instruction was introduced to the primary schools, a number of 
prayer leader and preacher training courses were initiated and the Faculty of 
Theology was established as part of the Ankara University (Tachau, 1991: 
104). Also, foreign currency began to be provided to the people who were 
going on the pilgrimage (AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 28).16  
The DP also continued with these liberalization measures in religion. 
Of the six principles of Kemalism, the DP was by far most criticized for 
degenerating the principle of secularism. The DP governments in fact took a 
populist approach to the issue of religion as they sought to appeal to voters. 
For instance, they lifted the ban on the recitation of the call to prayer in 
Arabic in 1951, allowed the broadcasting of pieces from the Koran on state 
radio and further increased the number of prayer leader and preacher 
schools. More funds were made available for the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs and 15.000 mosques were built during 1950-1960. Among the DP 
                                                          
16
 Pilgrimage is one of the five pillars of Islam.  
 46 
 
ranks there were numerous deputies and party members who had strong 
links with religious sects in the east of the country (Sarıbay, 1991: 128; Hale 
and Özbudun, 2010: xix).  
Despite the criticism and the mentioned policies and actions, the DP 
had an instrumental rather than a substantial approach to the issue of 
religion, and in essence this approach did not pose a threat to the principle 
of secularism. The DP leaders made Islam a significant part of their political 
discourse only after the mid- 1950s, when they faced serious economic 
difficulties (Heper, 1986: 375; AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005 : 31; Sarıbay, 1991: 
124). Even then they did not, for example, discuss the amendment of the 
civil and criminal codes in line with Islamic law nor did they open the 
principle of secularism to public debate (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: xix). On 
the contrary, whenever there emerged a serious threat to secularism, they 
acted rigorously. For instance in 1951 when members of the fundamentalist 
Ticani Order destroyed quite a few Atatürk statues the DP government 
immediately reacted and initiated judicial procedure. Likewise in 1953 the 
Nation Party (Millet Partisi) was banned due to its “fundamentalist and 
religious agenda” (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: xix).  
Étatism was also among the more debated principles. However, in 
contrast to secularism and nationalism, which caused controversy and unrest 
among wider segments of the population, debates on étatism were mainly 
restricted to the political and intellectual elite. The cause for the debate was 
the vagueness embodied in the constitutional definition of étatism regarding 
the extent of state intervention in the economy (Ahmad, 2003: 63).  
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Étatism was originally developed in response to the world economic 
crisis in 1930 and as will be elaborated upon in the economic policies 
section, it was a sharp departure from the Republic‟s earlier liberal 
economic policies in 1923-1929 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 390). Étatism 
implied that the state would intervene in the economy to undertake major 
investment projects while at the same time continuing to support private 
enterprise (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 390). Private enterprise was not 
marginalized in this formulation (Köker, 2007: 189).  
The notion of state intervention in the economy through the principle 
of étatism was carefully framed as a temporary policy specific to Turkey 
and Turkish conditions at the time, in order to distinguish it from socialism 
(Hale, 1980: 105). Thus, étatism in Turkey did not have any implications in 
the realm of politics, in contrast to the socialist systems in which state 
ownership and control of economic activity was complemented by the total 
regulation of political and social life. Turkish étatism was a technical 
answer to the question of how to achieve economic and industrial growth of 
the country.  
In practice, the interpretation of étatism changed from period to period 
and even from minister to minister (Koçak, 1990: 109), as the economic 
conditions also kept changing. As it was a time and problem-specific 
formulation, which was continuously updated according to needs, étatism 
was one of the most flexible principles of Kemalism.  
The principle of reformism was related to the methodology to be 
followed while undertaking reforms. The debates evolved around the 
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question of whether the Republican reforms should completely break ties 
with former practices or if a transformative phase should be allowed. The 
decision was made in favor of the former option because the objective was 
to realize the transformation from a traditional to a modern society in the 
shortest time frame possible (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 384). The most 
dramatic example was presented by the alphabet reform. In 1928, the 
alphabet, which consisted of Arabic letters was officially replaced by the 
Latin alphabet without a transition period. This approach was adopted in 
other reforms as well. Once the more substantial reforms had been 
introduced, the debates on reformism ended and it became an umbrella 
concept referring to the state‟s commitment to continuous reform. 
2.2.2 The Opposition and Opposition Parties  
The study of opposition parties in 1923-1960 is relevant to our topic 
for two reasons. First, the political opposition and the issues that caused 
tensions between opposition and government parties in 1923-1960 form an 
important part of the political and historical background during Bayar‟s 
leadership years. Second, as one of the founders of the first major 
opposition party in 1946, Bayar had firsthand experience of being in the 
opposition. It should be noted that Bayar was not affiliated with the first two 
opposition parties in the Republican period, the Progressive Republican 
Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası-TCF) established in 1924 and the 
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Free Party (Serbest Fırka-SF) established in 1930.17 Yet, although he was 
not involved in these short-lived attempts, it can be assumed that he derived 
some lessons from them on how to organize political opposition in the 
Republican era.  
The first political party of the Republic, initially the People‟s Party 
(Halk Partisi), renamed in 1924 as the Republican People‟s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP), was established in August 1923 (AltunıĢık 
and Tür, 2005: 17). From then onwards, the CHP evolved into the single 
political party of the Turkish regime. Despite the fact that the 1924 
Constitution did not place restrictions on the establishment of political 
parties, the CHP became the de facto single party of the early republican 
era.  
Turning to the two opposition parties of the early years of the 
Republic, the Progressive Republican Party was formed by some of the core 
personalities of the Turkish War of Independence era such as Refet Bele, 
Adnan Adıvar and Rauf Orbay. The founders‟ main concern was Mustafa 
Kemal‟s unilateral control of domestic affairs (Koçak, 1990: 98). The 
party‟s founders also shared a different political worldview, which can be 
described as more gradualist as opposed to the radical reformist approach of 
the CHP core (Ahmad, 1991: 66, 79). In policy practice this difference in 
worldviews meant that the TCF emphasized an approach that adopted 
“continuity” rather than “drastic change” in social and political reforms that 
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were undertaken (Ahmad, 1991: 79) and that it was after “reform”, not 
“revolution” (Dodd, 1992: 18).  
One of the more significant implications of this difference in 
worldviews from the perspective of the new Turkish political regime was 
related to secularism. The central TCF administration did not have a 
fundamentalist religious agenda. Despite that, the party‟s more conservative 
outlook led to its association with religious fundamentalists. Such 
association was deemed threatening at the time of the Shaik Said uprising 
(Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 381). Besides, certain members of the party were 
tried by the Independence Tribunal (İstiklal Mahkemesi) and found guilty of 
participating in the revolt (Koçak, 1991: 101). As a result, the Independence 
Tribunal initially forced the TCF to close down its local branches in the 
Eastern provinces. Finally, in June 1925 the government completely closed 
down the party (Koçak, 1990: 101). 
The second opposition party, the SF was established under the control 
of Atatürk unlike the TCF, which was established as the outcome of an 
independent opposition movement. Both Atatürk and Ġnönü thought that 
throughout the years they were cut off from the people and an opposition 
party could provide a useful means to rediscover the needs and problems of 
the population (Heper, 1998: 177-178). Thus Fethi Okyar, a close 
acquaintance of Atatürk whom he could trust to abide by the fundamental 
tenets of the Republic, initiated the SF upon Atatürk‟s request (Weiker, 
1991: 86).  
 51 
 
The central divergences between the CHP and the SF were mainly in 
economic and financial matters (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 382). The SF had a 
more liberal approach to the economy and in the party program the abolition 
of state monopolies and decreases in tax burden were proposed. This would 
eventually lead to an economy that was more open economy to international 
markets (Weiker, 1991: 87).  
Although the party program did not make any promises on matters 
related to religion, the new party attracted the attention of religious fanatics 
far beyond expectations. Due to the overwhelming number of membership 
applications it received, members could not be carefully screened, contrary 
to Okyar‟s earlier promise (Weiker, 1991: 88; Mango, 2008: 168). This was 
how religious fundamentalists could get into the party.  Upon these 
developments, Atatürk told Okyar that he could no longer remain 
welcoming to the SF (Heper and Criss, 2009: 255). Okyar understood and in 
order to avoid the escalation of any tension around the principle of 
secularism, the party abolished itself in November 1930.  
From 1930 to 1946, opposition in the form of political parties was 
nonexistent in Turkish politics. However, Atatürk was in favor of political 
deliberation and he did not support attempts to silence different political 
opinions completely. Different channels of expression were introduced for 
an opposition in the absence of opposition parties. For instance in the 1931 
elections, thirty seats were reserved for deputies who were not members of 
the CHP to be elected to the Parliament. In the 1935 elections, the number 
of seats was reduced to sixteen, but a legal change was made to allow the 
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formation of assembly groups, which gave the opposition formal privileges 
in parliamentary debates (Weiker, 1991: 92).  
In retrospect, the first two opposition parties in 1924-1925 and 1930 
were not long-lived, mainly due to the worries that they would cause 
backslides in the reform agenda and prevent the effective carrying out of 
reforms (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 380). It can be concluded that the 
experience from these parties highlighted two issues for opposition parties 
to come. First, it showed that maintaining the fundamental characteristics 
and tenets of the republican reforms was of primary importance to the state 
establishment. Thus, whenever a threat against these main tenets, especially 
against secularism and nationalism, emerged, opposition parties were 
considered the guilty party.  
Second, even if the opposition party leaders might be devoted to the 
basic principles of the Republic, their leaders needed to have strong control 
over their party organizations so that these organizations and the parties‟ 
supporters did not pose a threat to the Republic. In other words, any 
successful opposition party and party leadership would not only give 
guarantees to the state establishment that the party would be loyal to 
Republican values, but it would also have a firm grasp on its political base.  
The first long-lived opposition party, the DP was officially established 
in 1946. The DP remained in opposition in 1946-1950 with the CHP as the 
government party. Throughout these four years, there were often tensions 
between the CHP and the DP. The DP claimed that the government hindered 
its activities by using the police and gendarmerie. The government on the 
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other hand accused the opposition of engendering anarchy.  In most cases, 
President Ġsmet Ġnönü skillfully negotiated to ease the tension. For instance 
in December 1946 when Prime Minister Recep Peker called the DP deputy 
Adnan Menderes a psychopath for his criticism of the following year‟s 
budget, the DP group as a whole withdrew from Parliament. President Ġnönü 
was able to convince the DP group to return to the Parliament, through his 
negotiations with one of the principal founders of the DP, historian Fuat 
Köprülü, and Celal Bayar (Albayrak, 2004: 99).  When tension again rose in 
1947 for similar reasons, it was once again Ġnönü who announced the July 
12 Declaration (12 Temmuz Beyannamesi). In the Declaration Ġnönü pointed 
out that the opposition party was entitled to benefit from the same rights as 
the government party. The government, according to Ġnönü, had to pay 
attention not to put pressure on the DP‟s activities and the DP for its part 
had to stay within the lawful framework and not to seek illegal ways to 
come to power (Heper, 1998: 184).   
Apart from Ġnönü‟s individual efforts to develop better conditions for 
the activities of the opposition parties in this phase, certain structural 
changes were also introduced to comply with the requirements of a 
multiparty regime. These changes were often related to improving freedom 
of speech. For example, the government delegated its mandate to ban 
newspapers to the courts (AkĢin, 1996: 216). The autonomy of the 
universities was also increased (Turan, 2010: 147). The 1946 University Act 
granted universities a relatively high degree of autonomy “within the limits 
of the Republican ideology” (Turan, 2010: 147). The 1938 dated Law of 
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Associations was also amended in 1946 and restrictions on the foundation of 
class-interests based political parties and associations were partially lifted. 
Following the 1950 general elections, the DP came to government 
with a landslide electoral victory. The CHP became the main opposition 
party and remained so for the entire decade. During this phase, the DP 
gained enough success at the 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections to form 
majority governments. In the initial years of DP rule relations between the 
government and the opposition were quite balanced in comparison to later 
years. During these initial years, the DP contributed to the expansion of the 
freedom of expression and individual freedoms through the adoption of a 
relatively liberal press law and the amendment of some of the restrictive 
laws (Sarıbay, 1991: 126).  
This situation changed dramatically after 1953 and confrontations 
between the opposition and government became a common occurrence. The 
government introduced restrictive laws and regulations to reduce the amount 
of criticism against its rule. The DP government, for instance, passed a law 
in 1954 which forced civil servants, including judges and professors, to 
early retirement after twenty-five years of service or once the age of sixty 
was passed. This was considered an attack against the bureaucracy‟s 
existing autonomy from the executive (Sarıbay, 1991: 126). The press law 
was tightened and the press was kept under significant pressure.
18
 For 
instance, the government issued twenty-three publication bans and fifty 
journalists were sentenced to different penalties in 1959 for undermining the 
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 For an overview of press-government relations in 1950-1960, see Korkmaz, 1998.   
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government‟s authority, the stability of the country and the personal 
integrity of government members (Robinson, 1965: 192).  
In addition to putting limits on the freedom of expression, the DP also 
restricted the activities of opposition parties. In 1953, a law that transferred 
all the CHP movable and immovable properties to the Treasury, with the 
exception of buildings used as party branches, was passed. The party‟s 
affiliated newspaper Ulus had to suspend its operations due to this 
regulation (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:410-411). A number of changes were 
introduced to electoral practices. The electoral law was amended so that a 
candidate rejected by one political party could not seek candidacy in another 
party for subsequent elections. Electoral cooperation between political 
parties was also banned and opposition parties were prohibited from using 
state radio as part of their election campaigns (Sarıbay, 1991: 126).  
During this period, the most severe limitation to the opposition and the 
press was brought in April 1960 when the Parliament established the 
Investigation Committee (Tahkikat Komisyonu) composed of solely DP 
deputies. The Committee‟s tasks were described as investigating the 
opposition parties‟ activities and preventing the alleged provocations of the 
opposition to involve the army in political matters. In practice, the 
Committee worked to further limit the opposition‟s activities and the 
freedom of the press (Karpat, 2004a: 44-45).  
One of the Committee‟s first acts was to ban press coverage on its 
own activities (AkĢin, 1996: 228). Later on, the Committee‟s powers were 
increased and it was given the mandate to ban publications, close 
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publication houses and limit political activities of the opposition as it saw 
fit. When Ġnönü criticized these measures, he was banned from the 
Parliament for twelve sessions (AkĢin, 1996 : 229). In legal terms, the 
committee and the judicial powers granted to it were violations of the 
principle of competitive politics and against the distribution of political 
power in that system (Turan, 1984: 98).  
In practice, besides restraining the opposition‟s freedom of expression, 
these limitations resulted in provoking physical attacks against the members 
of the opposition by the DP partisans. For instance, in April 1959 the DP 
partisans sabotaged the opposition leader Ġnönü‟s visit to Ġzmir. He was hit 
on the head with a stone. On his return to Istanbul, he was stopped by a mob 
in Topkapı on his way from the airport to his residence. He was saved in the 
last minute with the efforts of a passing officer (AkĢin, 1996: 228). Other 
CHP members such as Kasım Gülek, Secretary-General of the CHP also 
became victims of similar attacks.  
The difficulties experienced by the opposition parties in 1950-1960 
had many reasons. As already explained in the section on the constitution 
above, the legal and constitutional framework was insufficient to provide 
guarantees for the opposition. Beyond the legal framework it was also a 
matter of political culture and historical legacy.  The DP had been born out 
of the single party tradition and senior DP members were previously single 
party elites. The DP simply did not know how to treat the opposition in a 
multiparty system (Sarıbay, 1991: 127). Consequently there was no vision 
on how to treat the opposition in a multiparty system (Sarıbay, 1991: 127). 
The opposition‟s activities were viewed as treasonous by the government 
 57 
 
and any criticism directed against the government was often seen as 
questioning the government‟s legitimacy, rather than criticism of its policies 
and program (Rustow, 1973: 104; Sarıbay, 1991: 128).  
2.2.3 The Armed Forces  
The role of the Turkish armed forces in politics can be broken into 
two phases during 1923-1960. The first phase, 1923-1950, is on the whole 
characterized by the withdrawal of the army from everyday politics. The 
former officers had a considerable presence in the Parliament during the 
Turkish War of Independence and this made them potential wielders of 
political power in the Republican era. Against this possibility Atatürk forced 
the officers who were pursuing political careers to choose between the two 
paths through a law legislated in 1924. This law made membership in the 
Parliament incompatible with active service in the military (Rustow, 
1959:547).  
This operation was not motivated by a concern to establish civilian 
control of the state and the government. It was introduced to eliminate a 
potential rival to the ruling elite (Cizre, 2008: 305). Yet irrespective of the 
motivations, the armed forces and civilian authorities of the state and the 
government were on an equal footing in 1923-1946 as they had separate 
functions (Mango, 2008: 166).  In institutional terms, the armed forces were 
removed from the supervision of the president and brought under the direct 
control of the prime minister in 1944 and placed under the ministry of 
national defense in 1949 (Harris, 1986: 157).  
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The second phase started with the DP‟s electoral victory in 1950. The 
army became suspicious of the new government even before the DP 
government succumbed to restrictive measures in the second half of the 
1950s. In 1950, for instance, Adnan Menderes had been warned that the 
army was planning a takeover. The government responded by 
decommissioning fifteen high-ranking generals and one hundred and fifty 
colonels (Albayrak, 2004: 191-192). Similarly, the so-called nine officers 
incident in 1957 revealed a group of officers‟ intentions for a military 
intervention. In 1957, Major Samet KuĢçu informed the government of a 
plot devised by a group of nine officers to topple it. The government failed 
to take effective action against this warning. Although the nine conspirators 
were initially arrested and questioned, in the end it was only the informer 
Samet KuĢçu who was sentenced to two years of prison (Ahmad, 1977: 59).  
There were a number of reasons for the military‟s unfavorable stance 
toward the DP rule and for the military intervention in 1960. Firstly, the DP 
government‟s policies were thought to be harmful to the Kemalist principles 
and to made concessions to the Islamist fundamentalists (Ulus, 2011: 13). 
Secondly, the army had been concerned by the government‟s increasing 
authoritarian tendencies (Heper and Tachau, 1983: 21; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 
86). Thirdly, the military class had suffered from a loss of social standing 
and economic income due to the DP government‟s inflationary policies 
(Ahmad, 1977: 67).  
During Bayar‟s term in office as Prime Minister (1937-1939) in the 
single party years, the military‟s influence was not among the issues that 
were likely to preoccupy a prime minister. Due to this background, most of 
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the DP leadership was not aware that the Turkish military was a potential 
political actor that could become active under certain circumstances. 
However, as will be elaborated in the next chapters, with his political 
experience Bayar himself was aware that the military might pose a threat to 
the government.  
2.2.4 The International Context: From Regime Consolidation to 
Alliance Formation  
Turkey faced a number of considerable challenges during 1923-1960 
in the domain of international politics. The first and foremost challenge was 
to secure the physical borders of the country by an internationally 
acknowledged treaty, thus to gain international recognition (AltunıĢık and 
Tür, 2005: 95). This objective was largely realized with the ratification of 
the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. However, a few contested issues remained 
on the Turkish foreign policy agenda, such as the status of Mosul and 
Alexandretta (Kayalı, 2008: 146; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 42). Mosul, currently 
within the borders of northern Iraq, was mentioned as part of the Turkish 
homeland by the 1919 National Pact (Misak-ı Milli). However, the city fell 
under British occupation in a clear violation of the 1918 Armistice of 
Mudros, which excluded the lands controlled by the Ottoman forces at the 
time the treaty‟s signing from Allied occupation (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 42).19  
Turkey based its claim on Mosul on the argument that it was 
demographically composed of Turks and Kurds and would thus be a natural 
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 The armistice was signed between the Ottoman State and Great Britain, on behalf of the 
allied powers and it set the terms of the Ottoman surrender.  
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extension of Turkish borders. Another supporting argument for Turkey‟s 
claim was that the British forces were in fact twelve miles away from Mosul 
when the armistice was declared. The League of Nations and International 
Court of Justice resolutions rejected Turkish claims and the Turkish demand 
for a plebiscite in Mosul. In the end, a compromise was reached when 
Turkey gave up its territorial claims and agreed to receive ten percent of oil 
revenues generated from the region for twenty-five years (Findley, 2010: 
263; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 42).  
Similarly, the Alexandretta (currently Hatay) matter was solved 
through foreign policy dialogue with France. Alexandretta was first 
occupied by Britain in the aftermath of the Mudros Armistice. The city was 
later passed to France under a special administrative regime, as a 
requirement of the 1921 Ankara Agreement signed between Turkey and 
France. When Syria started negotiations for independence with France, 
Turkey brought up the matter of Hatay‟s status. The issue was settled when 
the League of Nations supported the establishment of a self-governing 
entity, which in 1939 voted to join Turkey (AltunıĢık and Tür , 2005: 97). 
Toward the Second World War Turkey once again faced the 
challenges of securing its borders and staying out of the conflict. Before the 
war, it had tried to enhance its ties with Britain and France as a precaution 
against Italian and German threats (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 397-398). The 
Italian threat was particularly prominent as Italy made demands on the 
Mediterranean coasts of Turkey. Once the war broke out, Turkey came 
under pressure from both Germany and Britain to enter the war on their 
side. Threats to the country‟s territorial integrity and neutrality continued 
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throughout the war as Bulgaria and Greece were invaded by German armies 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 63). However, President Ġnönü and the government 
successfully resisted the German and British pressures. Turkey declared war 
on Germany in February 1945, only after German defeat was certain.  
By the end of the war, Turkey was already established as a “security 
conscious state” due to threats against its territorial integrity (Lesser, 2010: 
258). The Cold War eventually became the central concern of Turkish 
foreign policy (Karpat, 2004g: 509) and it further increased Turkey‟s 
security concerns. The priority was again to defend the borders and the 
regime, but this time against a possible Soviet threat (Lesser, 2010: 266; 
Karpat, 2004g: 509). This threat had been evident since 1945 when the 
Soviets did not renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship signed with Turkey. 
This was accompanied by verbal demands of the restoration of Kars and 
Ardahan to the Soviet territory, parts of Thrace to Bulgaria and a revision of 
the 1936 Montreux Agreement in favor of Soviet demands (Shaw and Shaw, 
1977: 400; Aydın, 2000: 107). 
Turkey‟s response to the Soviet threat was to increase its efforts to 
deepen the ties with its Western allies, especially through institutional 
organizations. Following its participation in NATO‟s 1951 Korea operation, 
Turkey became a NATO member in 1952. Turkey‟s admission to NATO 
showed that the international community now acknowledged the strategic 
importance of the country. NATO membership was also a natural outcome 
of the Western orientation in Turkey‟s foreign policy (Aydın, 2000:111). 
Turkey‟s strategic importance was further recognized when the country took 
a seat in the United Nations Security Council in 1951-1952 and 1954-1955. 
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Another defense alliance that Turkey joined in 1955 was the short-lived 
Baghdad Pact, which aimed to form a buffer zone against possible Soviet 
expansion to the Middle East (AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 106).20  
This short overview of Turkey‟s responses to the challenges in 
international politics makes clear that the principles employed to address 
them remained the same all throughout this phase: alliance-seeking, the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts and a Western orientation in foreign policy. 
Throughout this period Turkey not only sought to be a member of major 
international organizations but it also focused on establishing its own 
international alliances with its neighbors.  As early as 1933 Turkey headed 
the efforts to form the Balkan Pact between Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, 
and itself. In 1937, the Sadabad Pact between Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Iran was established to oppose the threats that might arise from 
Turkey‟s eastern borders. Although these pacts were rendered ineffective 
for several reasons, they demonstrated Turkey‟s willingness and inclination 
to establish regional cooperation organizations.  
The international alliances Turkey pursued during 1923-1960 were not 
only defense-oriented. Turkey became a member of Western economic, 
political and social cooperation organizations such as the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1948 and the Council 
of Europe in 1949. Turkey also applied for membership of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1959.  
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 The pact, in fact further divided the region. Egyptian president  Gamal Abdel Nasser who 
was becoming the champion of Arab nationalism and non-alignment movement harshly 
criticized it, and his verbal attacks against the organization scared even the countries that 
had excellent relations with the Western bloc, such as Jordan and Lebanon into staying 
away (AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 106). 
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The Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy remained in place 
throughout this period.  Before the Second World War, the foreign policy 
was Western oriented but this orientation was mostly derived from the fact 
that the new Turkish regime was essentially Western in its civilizing 
vision. In other words, modernization was described as Westernization and 
a Western-oriented foreign policy was only a natural outcome of this. Yet 
during this time, Turkey still maintained close ties with the USSR (The 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and that country was not considered 
to be the main threat to the Republic. However, as tensions with the USSR 
increased, the Turkish regime‟s ideological orientation toward the West 
became accompanied by tangible security concerns, as expressed through 
Turkey‟s vigorous search for alliances.  
The security-oriented foreign policy had a number of important 
consequences for politics in Turkey in 1923-1960. First, Turkey rarely 
showed interest in movements such as anti-colonization or those of non-
aligned nations (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 76). Thus Turkish foreign policy did 
not evolve into a direction where values such as democracy, human rights 
and self-determination would have gained prominence in its foreign policy 
discourse. It was a strictly security oriented foreign policy that refrained 
from voicing an opinion about regimes and their shortcomings, an approach 
that may be expressed through the term non-interventionist.  
Second, the focus on security, often defined through a fear of a 
Communist takeover, had an impact on domestic politics as anti-
communism became the motto of subsequent Turkish governments. As a 
result, Communist movements were attributed a capacity beyond their 
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support base in Turkey and members of Communist organizations were 
ruthlessly prosecuted.  
The predominance of the Turkish leaders in the planning and conduct 
of Turkish foreign policy should be mentioned to complete this short tour of 
Turkish foreign policy.  For the most part, Atatürk had been the most 
influential foreign policy actor until his death and later Ġnönü assumed a 
similar role. The DP government also approached the issue in a comparable 
manner granting the executive leaders a firm grasp over foreign policy. 
Parliament was often not involved in the processes related to foreign policy 
(AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 92). In sum, the Republican tradition until Bayar‟s 
presidency allowed presidents to potentially play an important part in the 
foreign policy making and implementation 
2.2.5 The Economic Background  
Deprived of a large part of its young population, foreign trade 
revenues and state income due to subsequent wars, the Turkish economy 
was in a state of devastation in 1923 (Hale, 1980: 102). In nominal terms, 
the continuous state of war from 1912 to 1922 had caused a 20 percent 
decline in the population and 40 percent decline in per capita income. This 
made the question of economic development one of the undisputed priorities 
for the Republic, perhaps only second to the objective of securing the 
borders.  
For the Republican elites economic recovery and growth were not 
purely technical pursuits. The objective of economic growth had a strong 
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political component for two reasons. First, the new Turkish economy had to 
be national, in other words the means of the economy should be owned and 
the economy should be carried out by Turks. This was a lesson the new 
leadership had derived from the experience of the Ottoman state where 
economic dependence on Europe resulted in grave problems (Pamuk, 
2008:276). The search for a national economy thus comprised the 
replacement of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie by a Muslim Turkish 
bourgeoisie who had the ownership of capital.  
Second, economic development and growth were defined as a part of 
Turkey‟s modernization ambitions, especially with regard to 
industrialization. The new regime considered industry and civilization to be 
complementary, thus achieving “the goal of civilization” without 
industrialization was not possible (Ahmad, 2003: 93). 
Although these two principles remained central to the Turkish 
economy, phases and methods in the pursuit of economic development 
varied in 1923-1960. The initial phase was the first five years that followed 
the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty removed the capitulations, which had 
for centuries provided privileges to foreigners doing business in Turkey. 
However, the Treaty also established that the new Republic would be free to 
formulate its own commercial policies only after five years (Pamuk, 
2008:276). For instance, Turkish government would not be able to impose 
certain tariffs during that phase (Lewis, 1968: 281). The Treaty also obliged 
 66 
 
Turkey to pay 67 percent of the prewar Ottoman debt (Barlas, 1998: 122).
21
 
This was a considerable burden on the finances of the new Republic.  
Due to the Lausanne arrangements, in 1923-1928 the Turkish 
economy was completely open to the international markets. There were no 
restrictions on foreign capital in the form of direct investment or credit. The 
value of foreign currencies was determined on the market as there was no 
Central Bank to regulate it (Keyder, 1981: 3). Although the government 
could not have much say on the financial markets during that time, it 
nevertheless did undertake a number of initiatives to support industrial 
development.  
One such measure was the establishment of the İş Bankası (ĠĢ Bank) 
in 1924 under the leadership of Celal Bayar. The bank was to provide credit 
to entrepreneurs (AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 18). The following year, the 
Turkish Industrial and Mining Bank was established to provide capital to the 
government for the development of state industries in those fields (Shaw 
and Shaw, 1977: 390). Another initiative was the Law for the 
Encouragement of Industry promulgated in 1927.  The rationale behind all 
this economic activism was to stimulate industrial growth. Under these 
circumstances in 1923-1929 the economy grew at a “healthy rate” and a 
yearly increase of circa 9.5 percent was reached on average. This signaled 
recovery to prewar levels (Hale, 1980: 103). However, the government‟s 
initiatives did not result in industrial growth at desired levels and the share 
of industry in the  gross domestic product (GDP) remained at the same level 
as it was at in 1923 (Hale, 1980: 103).  
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By 1929, Turkey‟s obligations under the Treaty of Lausanne came to 
an end. The outbreak of the Great Depression that same year presented 
difficulties to be addressed by the economy planners of Turkey. The main 
effect of the world crisis on the Turkish economy was the decline in the 
world prices of agricultural products, which were Turkey‟s main exports 
and a large source of income (Pamuk, 2008: 277). The government‟s 
response to the crisis and the lack of industrial development was to take 
matters into its own hands from 1929 onwards, as it now had the freedom to 
pursue its own financial policies (Pamuk, 2008: 276).  
First, protective measures were taken to support Turkish entrepreneurs 
against foreign competition. A series of protective custom duties were 
introduced. The Central Bank, established in 1930, further assured 
government control over the currency and domestic financial markets (Shaw 
and Shaw, 1977: 368; AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 19). As a result of these 
protective measures, the economy evolved into a protective phase from the 
open economy of the initial years (Pamuk, 2008: 277). Second, in order to 
achieve industrial growth, the strategy of étatism was put into effect in 
1930. It established the state as the “leading producer and investor” in the 
field of economy (Pamuk, 2008: 277; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 390).  
The main framework of the statist economic policies was laid by the 
two five- year economic plans in 1933-1937 and 1938-1942. The first plan 
emphasized the chemical, earthenware, iron, paper, sulfur, sponge, cotton 
textile, worsted hemp and sugar industries as targets of state investments 
(Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 392). The second plan emphasized heavier 
industries such as mining, electricity, ports and heavy machinery. This 
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plan‟s implementation, however, was interrupted by the Second World War 
(Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 392). In these plans, the state was defined as the 
major engine of industrial and economic growth. Growth was to be achieved 
through state ownership and the establishment of major industrial premises 
by the state (AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 19). The étatism of 1930 did not 
outlaw private enterprise, but in practice privately held initiatives remained 
insufficient for a number of reasons. First, potential private entrepreneurs 
lacked the capital required for investment (Lewis, 1968: 283). Second, the 
few who had capital were intimidated by the preceding years of war and 
reluctant to undertake major-scale investment operations under a new and 
thus, unfamiliar regime (Lewis, 1968: 283). Third, private capital refrained 
from investing in industries where the state invested heavily (Shaw and 
Shaw, 1977: 393). In the final analysis by the end of the 1930s, state-owned 
industries became quite significant and the state even became the principal 
producer in certain sectors such as textiles, sugar and iron (Pamuk, 2008: 
277).  
Despite the negative effects of the Second World War and problems 
of inefficiency, when the DP came to power in 1950 the economic record 
was relatively good, with a balanced budget and considerable gold and cash 
reserves (AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 70). Aid schemes such as the 1947 
Truman Plan provided by the Unites States, amounting to a sum of 150 
million dollars had a contributed a considerable cash flow (AltunıĢık and 
Tür, 2005:104). The DP‟s macro-economic approach was to promote a 
liberal economy but on a moderate level and through moderate means. This 
meant that the DP refrained from taking dramatic measures such as 
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abolishing state enterprises in line with a radical liberal interpretation of the 
economy (Dodd, 1983: 9).  
Instead, the DP governments loosened the state hold on the economy, 
gave further support to private enterprises and founded the Industrial 
Development Bank (Sınai Kalkınma Bankası) (AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 70). 
To stimulate industrial growth the government increased the amount of land 
available to cultivation and used Marshall Plan funds, initiated by the Unites 
States in 1948, to increase the use of machinery in agriculture (Pamuk, 
2008: 281).  
Until 1954, the DP‟s record in the economy was quite positive as 
indicators of industrial infrastructure and agricultural output continued to 
show improvements (AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 72). However after 1954, the 
Turkish economy gradually fell into a crisis. In 1954, GDP fell for the first 
time during the DP rule (Çakmak, 1998: 26). The conditions that had led to 
the increase in demand for Turkish agricultural products and conditions that 
contributed in an increase in Turkey‟s agricultural supply simultaneously 
decreased. Favorable weather conditions that had increased agricultural 
output deteriorated after 1954 and world demand for Turkish agricultural 
products declined with the end of the Korean War (Pamuk, 2008: 282). 
Decreasing exports and the fall in the agricultural output led to increases in 
foreign debts, balance of payment issues and higher inflation (AltunıĢık and 
Tür, 2005: 73).  
The government‟s search for international credit also proved futile as 
the United States refused to provide further credit to Turkey. In 1958, the 
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crisis succumbed to such a level that the DP government had no option but 
to accept the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
recovery plans. As a result the Turkish lira was devalued and price increases 
were introduced, with a substantial impact on the lives of Turkish citizens 
(AkĢin, 1996 : 225). The Turkish lira was devalued up to 330 percent 
overnight in 1958 (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 81). Public debt more than tripled 
from 1950 to 1960 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 409).  The economic crisis of 
1958 and the devaluation of the lira particularly affected state employees 
who were on a fixed payroll, their purchasing power declining considerably. 
Economic conditions deteriorated even further toward the 1960 military 
intervention.  
In sum, the DP provided an example of agriculture-led economic 
growth in the first half of the 1950s and despite the attempts to support 
industrial growth, industry did not become the largest sector of the economy 
(AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 71; Pamuk, 2008: 281).  Yet, the DP was able to 
promote the expansion of private capital and the number of private 
establishments doubled from 1950 to 1960 (AltunıĢık and Tür, 2005: 70). 
Also, considerable state investment made possible major public 
infrastructure projects, such as the renovation of Istanbul and construction 
of modern roads.  
As this short introduction aims to show, macro-economic policies in 
1923-1960 had to address many different issues. This provided leaders of 
the Republic with both challenges and opportunities. The challenges lied in 
the scale of the problems faced. Recovery and growth out of a war 
economy, which had already been considerably crippled during the last 
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years of the Ottoman state, was not an easy task. The opportunity also 
derived from the same challenge. Economic difficulties presented the 
leaders with a venue to display their skills and have success in a field where 
there were plenty of problems to address.  
2.2.6 Concluding Remarks on the Non-Institutional External Resources 
The discussion introduced above draws attention to four major factors 
to consider during Bayar‟s leadership years in terms of non-institutional 
resources of leadership. First, the regime was in a process of establishment 
when Bayar became involved in politics. Thus there was plenty of room for 
individual leaders‟ input about the shape of things to come. For the same 
reason, there was also room for differences of opinions, which would 
eventually lead to political polarization that proved hard to contain under 
this imperfect system.  
Second, the immediate priorities of the regime were quite prominent 
in the political choices made. These priorities were maintaining the physical 
security of the state and of the nation against external threats and building 
up economic wealth. Over the years, these priorities did not lose their 
importance and often dictated Turkish statesmen‟s policy preferences.  
Third the regime had a clear ideological scope expressed through its 
six principles. It was committed to the goals of Westernization, nationalism 
and secularism. These ideals would not be compromised under any 
circumstances. Fourth, the regime lacked the institutional background and 
the political culture to accommodate a well-functioning democracy. In 
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particular, checks and balances mechanisms that would provide a healthy 
background for democracy especially in terms of the opposition‟s rights and 
an effective legal control on the executive were absent. Besides, in political 
practice the executive office holders did not follow the constitutional 
descriptions of their powers and duties as further detailed in the next 
chapters on institutional leadership. The political culture was also not 
accommodating for the groups that were not in power. The political actors 
who became operational through this unfavorable political culture 
maintained their unwelcoming approach to opposition regardless of their 
political party affiliation. All in all, the Turkish political regime in 1937-
1960 did not qualify as a fully institutionalized regime.  
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CHAPTER III 
CELAL BAYAR’S POLITICAL VIEWS AND 
CORNERSTONES IN HIS LIFE 
 
3.1 Cornerstones in Bayar’s Life 
There are certain life experiences that Bayar emphasized in his memoirs, 
interviews and, more generally in his political discourse. His emphasis on these 
experiences highlight the impact that they had on his politics. Such experiences 
and cornerstones in Bayar‟s life are examined below as components of his internal 
leadership resources.  
3.1.1 Bursa and İzmir: Banking and Economic Activities 
Bayar had the reputation of an economist before having that of a politician 
(Harris, 2002: 56). He owed this initial reputation to his particular understanding 
of economics and the practice of this understanding in the offices he held. Bayar‟s 
approach to the economy will be further taken up in detail in a subsection of 
Chapter IV. In the current section, Bayar‟s background in economics is explored, 
as these experiences certainly had an impact in shaping his approach toward 
economic policy.  
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Bayar began working as a clerk at the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası) 
in Mudanya branch, a town in the northwestern city of Bursa, at the early age of 
eighteen in 1911. He had ranked first in the entrance examination. Due to his 
success in the bank, he was then employed by the Deutsche Orient Bank Bursa 
branch in 1915. In the Deutsche Orient Bank office, he was the one of the two 
employees who had the authority to sign papers on behalf of the bank (Bozdağ, 
2005: 13-14). When he was promoted to senior manager, he is likely to have been 
one of the first Muslim Turks to rise to such commercial success (Rustow: 1967: 
12).  
Having worked in a Turkish and later in a German bank, Bayar was able to 
compare the two working cultures and he found them strikingly different. He 
thought that the Turkish bank was preoccupied with minor everyday issues 
(kırtasiye) whereas he found the German bank was preoccupied with more 
substantial issues. In contrast to the Agricultural Bank, the bureaucratic 
procedures in the Deutche Orient Bank were not overwhelming and employees 
were encouraged to take initiative (Kocatürk, 1986). Bayar appreciated the 
effectiveness of this new working environment (Kocatürk, 1986). 
In those years drawing upon his observations of the local economy, Bayar 
arrived at the conclusion that in the Ottoman state non-Muslim Ottomans and 
foreigners controlled most of the economic activity. He reasoned that it was 
necessary to develop Turkish business to compete with these groups who were in 
an advantageous position due to the Capitulations.
22
 To work for this end, Bayar 
got in contact with wealthy Turkish local notables in Bursa, persuaded them to 
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 The Capitulations were economic privileges granted to European states from the sixteenth 
century onward. They were abrogated with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. For further details on the 
Capitulations, see Ġnalcık, 2003.  
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establish a maritime company, Hüdavendigar, and to save the profits for further 
investment (Bozdağ, 1986: 15-16). This was the first company established with 
local capital in Bursa.
23
 The company transported local Bursa products and 
passengers to Istanbul. Competition with foreign companies operating on the 
same route lowered the prices and as a result, producers of the local products as 
well as passengers became quite content with the company‟s services (Bozdağ,  
1986: 15-16).  
Bayar had further plans for developing the local economy in Bursa, such 
as improving the conditions of the silk industry prominent in the area and 
preventing the flooding of Nilüfer River in order to decrease the loss of crops. He 
could not, however, initiate these projects as he was assigned to Ġzmir by the 
Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti-ĠTC) (Bozdağ, 
1986: 16). 
Bayar followed similar economic pursuits in Ġzmir where he endeavored to 
enhance Turkish involvement in the local economy. In order to bypass Greek 
merchants who sold the agricultural products of Ġzmir to foreign markets and 
earned considerable profits, Bayar established a cooperative that took over the 
marketing of agricultural products. As a result, producers were able to make 
greater profits from their products (Bozdağ, 1986: 19). Bayar also established an 
employment bureau in Ġzmir through which he supported the employment of 
Turks in various functions (ġenĢekerci, 2000: 48).  
In those years Bayar developed a particular approach to the problem of 
business and capital generation which he employed in later life on major and 
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 Interview with Tülay Duran, online correspondence, April 2, 2012. 
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minor scales. This approach can be summed up as support for entrepreneurship. 
Details and examples are provided in Chapter IV. Here it should only be stated 
that as part of this understanding, Bayar recognized the importance of supporting 
entrepreneurs through state institutions as a method of boosting economic growth. 
In particular he brought together entrepreneurs with moderate capital, encouraged 
them to establish various businesses and allied them with experts to administer 
these businesses (Bozdağ,  1986: 16-17). 
3.1.2 Committee of Union and Progress 
Bayar‟s reputation as a politician eventually overtook his initial image of 
economist. He started political life as a member of the ĠTC. Bayar highlighted the 
importance of the ĠTC in his political life on many occasions and did not refute 
his ĠTC heritage even when the party was discredited following defeat in the First 
World War. In the records of the last Ottoman Parliament Bayar‟s occupation 
preceding his membership in Parliament was referred to as the ĠTC Ġzmir 
representative. There were no other former ĠTC members in that Parliament who 
declared their ties with the failed ĠTC so openly (Tunçay, 2002:18). As Bayar told 
in an interview, the years he spent at the ĠTC were “his university training” and he 
called himself an ĠTC member (İtt’hatçı) before everything else (Barlas, 16 May 
1982, Milliyet daily).
24
 
For Bayar, ĠTC membership was a serious commitment that also regulated 
other aspects of his life. He stated that the night he made his vow to the ĠTC at the 
age of 25, he slept the most peaceful sleep of his life (Bozdağ, 1986: 13). After 
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 Bayar did not have a university education.  
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taking his vow, he told his wife that they had to get a divorce because he had 
become involved in a risky political pursuit and did not want to put his family in 
danger (Barlas, May 19, 1982, Milliyet daily). Such a divorce did not, however, 
materialize.
25
 Bayar‟s commitment to politics remained strong in later years. In an 
interview after his withdrawal from active politics, he was asked about his private 
life with his family. In his reply he stated that he did not make a separation among 
his private and public life. He said he had one life and he devoted it completely to 
the Turkish nation.
26
 
3.1.2.1 Bayar’s Engagement in the Committee of Union and Progress 
Bayar first got introduced to the ideals of freedom and nationalism through 
his uncle Mustafa ġevket, an ardent Jeune Turc.27 Mustafa ġevket had fled from 
the capital due to his part in Ali Suavi‟s assault on the Çırağan Palace and taken 
up a position of judge (kadı) in Baghdad.28 When he returned to Umurbey, the 
birth-place and residence of Bayar in his younger years, he introduced his young 
nephew to the works of nationalist writers such as Namık Kemal (1840-1888) 
(Bozdağ, 1986: 6-7).  
Later on Bayar became friends with members of the Bursa ĠTC branch and 
was offered membership in 1907 (Bozdağ, 1986: 10). He accepted it 
                                                          
25
 Bayar‟s wife ReĢide Bayar, stayed on his side until she passed away in 1962 during a train ride 
to visit her husband  in the Kayseri prison (Ağaoglu, 1982: 12). After the military intervention in 
1960, Bayar received a lifetime prison sentence and spent three years in the Kayseri Prison until 
his release due to health reasons in 1964. 
26
 Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous. 
27
JeuneTurcs started as a group of  intellectuals reacting against Sultan Abdülhamit II‟s 
authoritarian way of ruling the country. This group established the Association for the Union of  
Ottomans in 1889, which later evolved into the Committee of Union and Progress, see Heper and  
Criss, 2009:337.  
28
 This was a coup attempt which aimed to replace Sultan Abdülhamit II with Murad V (Heper and 
Criss, 2009:11). 
 78 
 
enthusiastically. He thought this was the way to work for the survival of the 
Ottoman state and prevent its dissolution (Bozdağ, 1986: 11-12). When senior 
ĠTC members from Bursa took posts in the capital after the 1908 restoration of the 
constitutional system, Bayar became the head of the Bursa branch (ġenĢekerci, 
2000: 30).  
In 1914, Bayar was assigned as the head of the ĠTC Ġzmir branch. The 
decision for this assignment was taken in a high-level ĠTC meeting participated by 
Enver Pasha (1881-1922) and Talat Pasha (1874-1921) in July 1914 (Bayar 1997: 
104-105, 108, Volume 5).
29
 This indicates that Bayar was a senior member of the 
ĠTC and decisions related to him were taken on a senior level.  Bayar defined his 
objectives in Ġzmir as implementing political measures that included the 
inspection of the local administration and the prevention of “harmful activities” 
(Bayar 1997: 104-105, 108, Volume 5). In practice, Bayar‟s task was mainly 
confined to the field of economy and he sought to nationalize the local economy 
in favor of the Turkish population vis à vis the non-Muslim communities 
(Kocatürk, 1986). This assignment was also in line with the macroeconomic 
policy pursued by the ĠTC, which had the objective of supporting the Ottoman 
industry and local products by Muslim Turks over foreign ones even when the 
local prices were higher (Zürcher, 2004: 125-126).
30
   
Although Bayar‟s Ġzmir assignment was mainly related to economic tasks, 
he also implemented policies that were not strictly related to economics.  For 
instance, in line with the ĠTC directives he forcefully drove 130.000 Greeks away 
                                                          
29
 Enver Pasha was the Minister of War. With the Minister of Public Works and  Navy Cemal 
Pasha (1872-1922), these  three  pashas controlled the Ottoman state and the ĠTC during the 
Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918).  
30
 For a detailed analysis of the ĠTC‟s vision of national economy, see Toprak, 1982.  
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from Ġzmir, to Greece (Zürcher, 2004: 125-126; ġenĢekerci, 2000: 35). Bayar 
sought to employ Muslim Turkish personnel for the railroads as the railroads were 
staffed by non-Muslims whom Bayar did not want to rely upon during the 
wartime. Thus, he headed the efforts to establish a school for training railroad 
staff (ġenĢekerci, 2000: 37-38). That school, İzmir Şömendifer Mektebi started 
operating from June 1915 onwards.  
Bayar‟s Ġzmir assignment ended when the ĠTC dissolved itself in its ninth 
Congress on November 1, 1918.
31
 After the ĠTC‟s dissolution, Bayar maintained 
his respect for the ĠTC heritage. He continued his friendship with some of the 
former ĠTC members in Turkey and abroad (Tunçay, 2002: 19). He thought that 
the former ĠTC members were honest men who placed the welfare of the country 
before their own gains. He did not blame them for the state‟s participation in the 
First World War because he thought the Ottoman Empire had already been “rotten 
to its roots” and the ĠTC was merely attempting to restore it (Barlas, May 21, 
1982, Milliyet daily). 
However, Bayar‟s respect for the ĠTC did not have any political 
implications once the Party was dissolved. Bayar read the changes in the political 
context right and reacted accordingly. He considered the ĠTC as a thing of the past 
under the current republican regime established in 1923. Thus for him being a 
former İtt’hatçı was not in contradiction to his CHP affiliation in the Republican 
phase. He legitimized his ĠTC membership by saying that Atatürk was also an 
İtt’hatçı. He also said that once Atatürk had scolded him and asked “do you think 
                                                          
31
 A new party with the name Reform Party (Teceddüt Fırkası) was established in 1918 in ĠTC‟s 
place. Bayar declined the offers of membership to this new party (Kutay, 1982: 27-8). 
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you are the only İtt’hatçı” (Barlas, May 21, 1982, Milliyet daily), implying that he  
himself was also once affiliated with that group. 
Bayar did not hesitate to stand against his former colleagues in the new 
political settlement when the political circumstances forced him to do so. For 
instance, when asked about the executions of certain former ĠTC members such as 
Cavit Bey and Doctor Nazım on the allegations that they were involved in the 
assassination attempt on Atatürk‟s life in 1926, Bayar compared those times to the 
French Revolution and said that strict measures were necessary (Barlas, May 16,  
1982, Milliyet daily). Upon hearing of the incident, Bayar travelled to Ġzmir at 
once and promised Atatürk that violence in politics should disappear completely 
from the Republican political scene (Barlas, May 21, 1982, Milliyet daily). All 
this confirms that Bayar considered the ĠTC to be a thing of the past.  
3.1.3 The Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) 
Bayar devoted most of his memoirs to the Turkish War of Independence. 
This is a sign of the importance he attributed to the independence struggle. 
Bayar‟s involvement in the war can be explored in two phases: before and after 
joining the Ankara movement. 
Bayar‟s participation in the independence struggle began with the 
dissolution of the ĠTC. Simultaneously, an arrest order for Bayar, who was then 
the ĠTC‟s Ġzmir representative, reached the Aydın Governor Ġzzet Bey. Bayar was 
able to flee from Ġzmir before the arrest could be realized (ġenĢekerci, 2000: 52-
53). By then Bayar had arrived at the conclusion that what cannot be defended 
through intellectual efforts can only be defended through armed struggle (Bozdağ, 
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1986: 25). In other words, he had decided that armed struggle was the only way to 
defeat the occupation forces in Anatolia. The Ottoman State had entered the First 
World War on the side of Axis powers in 1914 and suffered the defeat at the war. 
Following the Armistice of Mudros signed on October 30, 1918 several parts of 
Anatolia had fallen under the Allied forces‟ occupation.  French forces occupied 
Mersin, Adana and its environs in the south, the English forces occupied the area 
from MaraĢ to the east. Later on throughout 1919, the Italian forces landed in 
Antalya and moved inland. The same year Greek forces occupied Ġzmir and they 
also moved to inland (Kayalı, 2008: 116, 120).  There were numerous other 
occupied areas throughout the Ottoman landscape, including Istanbul occupied by 
the Allied forces in 1918. Bayar meant to fight against these assaults.  
After his departure from Ġzmir, Bayar joined the militia forces in Aydın 
and ÖdemiĢ, both in the west of the country, under disguise as a hodja, in other 
words a preacher of Islam. Inspired by his teacher‟s name in Umurbey, he called 
himself Galip Hodja (Victorious Preacher) during these days, as he thought that 
they would defeat the occupation (Kocatürk, 1986). Bayar descended from an 
ulema (clerical) family; he had gotten considerable religious training from his 
father. Under disguise he organized the local population for resistance and served 
as the commander of the forces on the Balıkesir front (ġenĢekerci, 2000: 56).  
In 1919, Bayar was elected to the Ottoman Parliament from the Saruhan 
(currently Manisa) region (Kocatürk, 1986). The Parliament stayed open for only 
four months. During this short phase, Bayar concentrated his efforts to share the 
atrocities he witnessed in the Aegean region with the Parliament. In the 
parliamentary session on January 12, 1920 Bayar told the other parliamentarians 
of the violence inflicted upon the Turkish population by Greek occupation forces. 
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He defined the task of the Parliament as putting pressure on the government to 
fight against these atrocities and make them known in the international domain 
(Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, Term: 4, Volume 23: 463-465). He recalled 
this speech as one of the most exciting speeches he delivered during his entire 
political career (Bozdağ, 1986: 28). This speech must have been found quite 
influential also by the occupation forces in Istanbul as its publication was banned 
by the central administration (Bozdağ, 1986: 30). The political chaos in the 
Ottoman capital increased and on April 21, 1920 Sultan Vahdettin (1861-1926) 
dissolved the Parliament. Bayar fled to Bursa to avoid imprisonment.  
Upon his arrival in Bursa, he received a telegram from Mustafa Kemal, 
asking him to counter the Anzavur forces marching toward the city.
32
 The 
encounter with Anzavur‟s forces did not materialize (Bozdağ, 1986: 30) but Bayar 
was able to form a group of soldiers from the army reserves (ġenĢekerci, 2000: 
75). At the same time he organized a counter fatwa movement against the Istanbul 
sheikh-ul-islam‟s (the religious authority based in Istanbul) denouncement of the 
independence movement organized from Ankara. This counter fatwa movement, 
contributed to by certain scholars of religion in Bursa declared that the Istanbul 
fatwa was invalid because the capital was under occupation (Bozdağ, 1986: 31).  
The first phase of Bayar‟s role in the Turkish War of Independence ended 
when Bayar joined the national movement in Ankara in April 1920 (ġenĢekerci, 
2000: 333). In Ankara Bayar initially served as Minister of Economics (August 
10, 1920-January 14, 1922).
33
  He was charged with the task of financing the 
                                                          
32
 The Anzavur uprising led by Anzavur Ahmed broke in October 1919 and was suppressed by  
April 1920. For a detailed history of this uprising, see  Hülagü, 1998.  
33
 In August 1920, he was assigned as the acting Minister of Economics in place of Yusuf Kemal 
TengirĢenk, who had to leave to Moscow on official business. On February 27, 1921 he was fully  
assigned to this office (ġenĢekerci, 2000:333-4).  
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Turkish War of Independence. As a part of his efforts to raise revenues, he 
reinstalled coal extraction in the Zonguldak mines, and in the absence of a 
ministry of agriculture, he organized agricultural production (ġenĢekerci, 
200:100-101). In the Lausanne negotiations (November 1922-July 1924) which 
were conducted to arrive at an agreement on a peace treaty, Bayar also played a 
role.
34
 He drew attention to the risks of repayment on gold basis and insisted that 
repayment should be in terms of paper francs (Bozdağ, 1986: 33). Repayment in 
gold at that time would have been detrimental to the finances of the new Republic 
(ġenĢekerci, 2000: 110). Bayar‟s insistence on the repayment issue was also 
appreciated by the chief Lausanne negotiator Ġsmet Ġnönü who later became 
Bayar‟s rival in politics (Kutay, 1982: 162). A deal on the terms of repayment 
could not be reached during the Lausanne negotiations. The issue was settled with 
another agreement in 1928, which required repayment in gold pounds (Barlas, 
1998:123). 
There was one major exception to Bayar‟s mainly economy-oriented 
activities during his time in office as minister of economics. In 1920, Bayar 
submitted a draft bill to Parliament for the establishment of Independence 
Tribunals to suppress uprisings in Anatolia and prosecute deserters from the army. 
The two other signatories to this proposal were Tevfik RüĢtü (Aras) and Refik 
ġevket (Ġnce). The proposal went through and tribunals were established. 
                                                          
34
 The issues discussed during the Conference included the debts of the Ottoman state, the 
Turkish-Greek border, Mosul, the Capitulations, occupied status of Istanbul, status of the Aegean 
islands, status of non-Muslim minorities under the new Turkish regime, the straits, compensation 
for  war damages and status of the patriarchy in Istanbul. Among these matters, only the Mosul 
issue could not be resolved in the conference in terms of core political issues. 
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Decisions taken by these bodies later became a major target for criticism.
35
 
Nevertheless, Bayar considered the Independence Tribunals as necessary. He 
compared this period with the French revolution and found the existence of such 
courts indispensable for the survival of the Parliament (ġenĢekerci, 2000:82).  
In sum, the Turkish War of Independence years had an important impact 
on Bayar in two ways. First, he earned recognition in the political circles that 
established the Republic. Second, as this struggle was about the survival of the 
Turkish nation, Bayar developed a security-oriented approach that he maintained 
in later years. This orientation often dominated his policies, as shown through 
several examples below.  
It should also be noted that for Bayar the struggle for national 
independence had also a very personal aspect. There was one early lifetime 
experience were pointed out by his relatives and colleagues and brought up also 
by Bayar himself several times.
 36
 That experience left a deep mark in his vision. 
Bayar‟s family had fled to the town of Umurbey in Bursa from Pleven, currently 
in Bulgaria, due to the Ottoman defeat by Imperial Russia in the War of 93 (1877-
1878). In other words, Bayar belonged to a generation of Turks whose native 
lands were lost due to wars that eventually destroyed the Ottoman state. Bayar 
feared that this could also be the case in Anatolia, and the Turkish population 
there might have to leave a substantial part of its homeland. Therefore, for Bayar 
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 The Independence Tribunals remained in force for a while and took decisions on a number of 
critical events such as the Shaik Said revolt in 1925 and the assassination attempt against Atatürk  
in 1926. Six hundred sixty people were executed on charges related  to the revolt. As for the 
assassination attempt, four high-ranking former ĠTC members were executed due to their alleged 
participation in the assassination attempt (Zürcher, 2004: 173-174). The courts were abrogated in 
1927.  
36
 The trauma of territorial losses and their impact on Bayar have been brought up in the interviews 
with Tülay Duran, Üner Kırdar and DemirtaĢ Bayar.  
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the Turkish War of Independence was an endeavor to avoid the repetition of the 
same tragedy he experienced in his own family. 
3.2 Celal Bayar’s Views on Major Political Issues and Concepts 
As part of the study of Bayar‟s internal resources of leadership, this 
section examines Bayar‟s interpretation of certain political concepts that he 
emphasized. Before moving on to this part, Bayar‟s understanding of politics in 
general is discussed. The first characteristic of Bayar‟s conceptualization of 
politics was his appreciation of the political context. He always considered the 
political context and realities of his time before taking any political action. For 
instance, as the founder of the first successful opposition party Bayar was 
certainly in favor of a multiparty system. Nevertheless, he did not think that the 
political context prior to 1945 was suitable for a multiparty regime (Bayar, 2009: 
114-115). Thus, he did not participate in the two former opposition parties.  
For that reason, he also disliked ideologies. Bayar considered ideologies to 
be inflexible and incapable of adapting to the realities of time and changing 
conditions. He argued that policies should be determined by prevailing conditions 
in society rather than rigid ideologies. In this respect, Bayar said that if he were 
living in a society where the working class was suppressed by the bourgeoisie, he 
would turn out to be a Marxist revolutionary (Bayar, 2009: 188). In line with his 
dislike of ideologies, when referring to Atatürk‟s political legacy Bayar preferred 
the term methodology (Bayar, 2009: 50). 
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Second, Bayar was in favor of strong leaders for an effective political 
regime. For him the concentration of power in one person in a political party was 
a crucial prerequisite for a functioning political system. He believed that having 
many different opinions flowing from various sources of authority within the 
parties would result in conflict. Menderes‟ appointment both as the party leader 
and as prime minister was a decision taken with this idea in mind. Bayar thought 
that the possibility of conflict between the government and the party‟s 
administration, a condition suffered by the ĠTC in 1908-1918, could be prevented 
with Menderes‟ strong leadership (Ahmad, 1977: 78). 
Lastly, Bayar defined the legitimate actors in politics quite narrowly. He 
thought that only political parties and the elected representatives of the nation 
could engage in political activity. In that respect, associations (dernekler), for 
instance, should have social and professional rather than political focus. Trade 
unions also fall into a similar category with associations. Bayar did not consider 
trade unions to have a right to comment on the status of, for instance, state 
security courts (devlet güvenlik mahkemeleri) or to call a general strike to prevent 
the legislation on the courts in 1973 (Bayar, 2009: 14). Similarly, Bayar thought 
that the business community should also refrain from supporting particular 
political movements through financial means (Bayar, 2009: 15). In Bayar‟s 
understanding, civil society organizations should not act as pressure groups on the 
Parliament because he considered this a violation of the sovereignty of that 
institution (Bayar, 2009: 150). Last but not least, Bayar also criticized the press, 
which in his opinion should limit itself to reporting news rather than forming 
public opinion (Bayar, 2009: 193). 
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3.2.1 Bayar’s Interpretation of Democracy  
 In this section, Bayar‟s understanding of democracy is examined with 
regard to three particular phases in his political career: 1946-1950, 1950-1960, 
and 1960 and beyond. In these phases, Bayar placed emphasis on different aspects 
of democracy. In a section that follows this discussion, broader observations that 
combine the common patterns from Bayar‟s perspective in these phases will be 
shared and his understanding of democracy will be conceptualized.  
3.2.1.1  1946-1950: Fair Elections and Individual Rights 
In 1946-1950, Bayar employed a two dimensional political discourse 
which emphasized free and fair elections on the one hand and individual rights 
and freedoms on the other. In order to draw attention to these priorities, Bayar 
brought up issues related to these matters in his public discourse. He also took up 
these matters in his negotiations with the members of the government and state. 
Especially his dialogue with Ġsmet Ġnönü was a crucial part of Bayar‟s efforts to 
work for these ends. Bayar‟s dialogue with Ġnönü on these and other matters is 
detailed in Chapter V.   
The first aspect of Bayar‟s political discourse on free and fair elections 
developed mainly in response to the structural shortcomings in the election laws. 
Bayar thought the two-tiered elections, open voting, secret counting of votes and 
lack of independent electoral supervision were the main flaws in the electoral 
regime (ġahingiray, 1999b: 47). He felt that his party had to engage in an unfair 
struggle against the government as long as electoral guarantees were missing. He 
also thought that in a democratic setting, his party would normally have to engage 
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in a struggle against another political party (ġahingiray, 1999b: 95-96). These 
demands were partially addressed after the CHP congress of 1946 decided in 
favor of direct elections and the Parliament partially changed the electoral law. 
Yet contrary to Bayar‟s and the DP‟s demands the plurality system and the secret 
counting of votes were still maintained (Koçak, 1990: 142).  
The DP entered national elections in July 1946 without sufficient 
guarantees for free and fair elections. The elections were thought to have been 
rigged but the DP‟s protests did not lead to the reconsideration of the results 
(Koçak, 1990: 143). The problems encountered in the 1946 elections further 
enhanced Bayar‟s and the DP‟s emphasis on free and fair elections.  
Bayar‟s demands for free and fair elections were addressed completely by 
the time the May 1950 national elections were held. The electoral law was revised 
comprehensively in February 1950. Secret ballot, open counting of votes and 
judicial supervision of elections were introduced (Özbudun, 2000: 17). Bayar 
appreciated these changes in his Bolu and Düzce speeches, on April 29, 1950 and 
April 30, 1950 respectively (ġahingiray, 1999c: 48, 50). 
The second aspect of Bayar‟s discourse in 1946-1950 was his emphasis on 
the promotion of individual rights and liberties. This focus was mainly in response 
to the difficulties faced by DP members while engaging in political activities. 
Members of local DP branches often complained about the arbitrary behavior of 
the security forces. Bayar regularly mentioned these abuse of rights in political 
speeches and interviews. He interpreted the restrictions implemented by the 
security forces and the state administration as violations of individual rights and 
liberties. Bayar also thought that these arbitrary acts of the state officers could 
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cause people to lose their attachment to the state (ġahingiray, 1999b: 166-167, 
169). To address the problems related to the practice of rights and freedoms, 
Bayar advocated for the removal of all anti-democratic laws that limited personal 
freedoms (ġahingiray, 1999b: 88-89). 
In response to Bayar‟s and the DP‟s demands and criticisms on personal 
freedoms, the government issued a partial amnesty for convicted journalists and 
revised some of the more restrictive articles of the press code. The law on 
associations was also revised. The authority to ban associations was taken from 
the government and was given to the courts (Karpat, 1967: 139-140).  
 There were two exceptions to Bayar‟s critical discourse in 1946-1950 and 
his demands for democracy.  First, he focused his criticism on current political 
issues and refrained from referring to earlier legislations and policies. For 
instance, in an interview published in the Tasvir Daily on April 29, 1946, he 
pointed out that the laws his party objected to were legislated and put into force in 
extra-ordinary times that required such measures. However now it was the right 
moment to revise them according to the needs of the time (ġahingiray, 1999b: 49). 
He also shared similar thoughts with the journalist Cihad Baban, to whom he said 
that he accepted the past, with its mistakes and successes because he thought all 
past policies were implemented with good will and to protect the Republic. 
However, as the times had changed, there was an urgent need to adopt a new 
approach (Baban, 1970: 30). 
Second, Bayar paid attention to containing the conflict between his party 
and the government to the political realm. He wanted to avoid any polarization in 
the society, for instance between the state‟s security forces and DP members. For 
 90 
 
this end, he kept the DP party organization under control. He was in close 
communication with the local branches on how to respond to the arbitrary acts of 
state security forces. For instance in a note he sent to local DP branches he asked 
the DP members who had been restricted from taking part in political activities  to 
inform the DP Central Committee, provide proof of violations and refute the 
accusations posed by the security officers in a calm manner (ġahingiray, 1999b: 
425).
37
 He advised the party members to refrain from reacting strongly and to 
avoid damages to the nation‟s unity and the peace in society.38 
Bayar also advised senior DP members to act in a similar way and avoid 
dramatic responses to verbal attacks by the government. For instance, after the 
disputed 1946 national elections, certain DP members considered not taking their 
seats in Parliament. It was Bayar who convinced them to remain in the 
mainstream framework of politics, take seats in Parliament and use it as a venue 
to voice their opposition.
39
 
3.2.1.2   1950-1960: Will of the Nation  
During 1950-1960, Bayar placed primary importance on the concept of the 
will of the nation (milli irade) as the driving force of Turkish democracy. This 
meant that Bayar considered the legislative body as the legitimate representative 
of the nation. In practice, during those years it was the executive, i.e. the 
government rather than the legislative body that held all political power. As the 
government was, according to Bayar, the embodiment of the nation‟s will, he 
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 The date for this note has not been mentioned. 
38
 For instance, see Bayar‟s Kastamonu electoral speech  on April 30, 1950 (ġahingiray, 1999b:  
53). 
39
 Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous. 
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considered any criticism of the government as an attack against the legitimacy of 
the executive and against the will of the nation. Consequently, during that phase 
Bayar considered opposition parties‟ criticism of the government inconsequential 
and at times illegitimate. He thought that the criticism of opposition parties and 
mainly the CHP harmed national unity and peace in the society.  
This understanding made Bayar take an unfavorable attitude toward the 
opposition. For instance in 1960, he advised the government to take extraordinary 
measures and follow a courageous and dynamic policy against the opposition 
parties. He did not articulate the details of such a policy to the government 
members (Burçak, 1976: 28-29) but his remarks implied that he was in favor of 
strict measures. For that reason when the government tightened the press code, 
used the state radio in a unilateral manner for its own propaganda, forced civil 
servants into early retirement and prevented the opposition from forming electoral 
alliances, Bayar found these measures justified (Ahmad, 1977: 30).  
Bayar‟s support to the Investigation Committee (Tahkikat Komisyonu) in 
1960 was another example of this understanding. This Committee has been 
criticized as a major attack against the opposition‟s existence and has been 
pointed out as a primary example of the DP‟s poor track record in democracy. 
Bayar did not consider it this way. He thought that the Parliament had a right to 
establish such committees and exercise the state‟s judiciary function on behalf of 
the nation (Bozdağ 1991: 40-41).  Further examples of Bayar‟s relations with 
opposition parties in 1950-1960 is provided in Chapter V throughout the 
discussion on his impartiality as president.  
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3.2.1.3  1960 and Onwards 
After 1960, Bayar returned to the individual rights and freedoms discourse 
he had employed earlier in 1946-1950.  In 1946-1950, the objective of this 
discourse was to achieve guarantees for the political activities of the DP members. 
After 1960, the driving motive of this discourse became to address the 
consequences of the Yassıada Tribunal‟s decisions. Five hundred fifty two DP 
members and affiliates were tried in the course of eleven months on Yassıada. 
Fifteen senior DP members were condemned to death sentences and three of these 
sentences were carried out. The rest of the death sentences were converted into 
lifetime imprisonment. Besides the twelve DP members sentenced to life in 
prison, other senior DP affiliates were also sentenced to varying prison terms. 
Under article 68 of the 1961 Constitution former DP members were also deprived 
of their rights to stand for  election.  
Bayar‟s prison sentence was pardoned in 1964 due to his failing health. 
However, like all former DP members, Bayar was not allowed to stand for 
elections (Karpat, 2004a:59). He raised his last major political struggle to regain 
this right for himself and the remaining DP members. In 1973, he campaigned 
with the recently established Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti) under the 
leadership of Ferruh Bozbeyli because that party had promised to support his 
struggle to regain political rights. At the advanced age of 90, he traversed the 
entire country from Edirne in the west to Adana in the south to raise support for 
the Democratic Party.
40
 Bayar did not see this struggle as party politics because he 
thought that political rights were actually human rights. He defined the major 
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 Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous. 
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objective of this struggle as getting equal rights with other citizens in the country 
(KiriĢçioğlu, 1975: 31). 
In this phase, Bayar continued to emphasize the will of the nation to justify 
his and the former DP governments‟ policies and acts. He did not approve of the 
1961 Constitution, which he considered as a devaluation of the nation‟s will. The 
new constitution, according to Bayar, replaced the strong executive of the 1924 
Constitution with a weak executive, and subjected the government to the will of 
the civil bureaucracy whereas the reverse was the ideal situation under 
democracies (Bayar, 2009: 87). Bayar counted the institutions such as the 
National Security Council, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (Türk 
Radyo Televizyon Kurumu-TRT), the State Planning Agency (Devlet Planlama 
Teşkilatı-DPT) and non-elected members of the Senate among these bureaucratic 
partners (Bayar, 1997: 173 Volume 8).  
In line with his resistance to non-elected bodies in the political structure, 
Bayar declined the offer to become a member of the Republican Senate. 
According to the 1961 Constitution, as a former President Bayar had the right to 
join the Senate when his political rights were returned in 1974. In his letter dated 
April 28, 1974 and addressed to Tekin Arıburun, President of the Senate, Bayar 
wrote that he considered “...institutions such as the Senate to be in contrast with 
the rule of democracy” (Hüsman, 1982:107).  
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3.2.1.4 Bayar’s Conceptualization of Democracy 
Bayar‟s understanding of democracy introduced above through examples 
can be conceptualized as a majoritarian understanding of democracy.
41
 The 
defining characteristic of majoritarian democracy is its emphasis on a strong 
executive (Karpat 2004f: 310). In line with this majoritarian interpretation Bayar 
identified three ideal characteristics of Turkish democracy: (1) sovereignty 
belongs to the nation, (2) a plurality system is the ideal electoral system,
42
 (3) 
sovereignty should only be exercised by the Parliament, not by intermediary 
institutions such as those introduced through the 1961 Constitution (Bayar, 2009: 
84).  
Bayar opposed the pluralist understanding of democracy introduced with 
the 1961 Constitution (Mazıcı, 1996: 151). There were two reasons for this. First 
for Bayar democracy meant that majority was always more intelligent, moral and 
capable than the minority (Bayar, 1991:42). Thus, he found it unacceptable that 
the mandates of governments elected through national elections would be limited 
by the bureaucracy and institutions. Second, Bayar thought that the notion of 
pluralist democracy was born out of circumstances specific to Western Europe. 
Such democracies, according to Bayar, sought the coexistence of different 
political and economic classes and deliberation among these different classes was 
vital for the survival of these systems. Bayar thought that Turkish society was 
classless and for that reason he found the pluralist model of democracy to be 
irrelevant for Turkey (Bayar, 2009: 84).  
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 For a study on the DP‟s interpretation of democracy with particular reference to Celal Bayar and 
Adnan Menderes, see Sütçü, 2011. 
42
 In this system, candidates who obtain the most votes get elected to parliament. In the Turkish 
case, the multinomial constituency was employed until 1960. For a detailed explanation of this and 
other electoral systems and their implementations in the Turkish case, see Özbudun, 1995. 
 95 
 
Bayar interpreted political opposition also in line with his majoritarian 
understanding. His prerequisite for the opposition and opposition parties‟ presence 
was that they should work toward maintaining peace and order in society and 
refrain from acts, which might harm these principles. He thought that the 
opposition should primarily concern itself with the protection of domestic peace. 
Accordingly if the opposition party loses its respect for the government and if its 
activities lead to unrest in society, then it loses its legitimacy. Opinions of the 
opposition would also be taken into consideration as a custom of democracy; 
however, this did not necessarily imply that the government would act according 
to the opposition‟s preferences (Bozdağ, 1991: 42-43). Bayar defined the 
opposition parties that followed these principles as “constructive” opposition 
parties (Kemal, 1980: 65-66).  
Bayar also placed emphasis on the freedom of expression in certain phases 
of his political career, for instance in 1946-1950. Bayar did not interpret freedom 
of expression broadly. He thought that political movements that were “harmful to 
the unity of the nation and safety of the regime” were not entitled to promote their 
views publicly and to form political parties.  For instance, according to Bayar 
Marxists in Turkey should not have the freedom of expression because he thought 
that freedom of expression can only be granted if the demanding party is ready to 
give the same rights to other political movements. A Marxist state, he thought, 
would not provide such a right to other political views-thus Marxists in Turkey 
were not eligible for the freedom of expression. For this reason, Bayar was in 
favor of restrictions on the freedom of expression under certain conditions and he 
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was against the removal of article 141 and 142 of the Criminal Code.
43
 He thought 
that the removal of these and similar regulations would be like “asking for 
gasoline to burn one‟s own house (Bayar, 2009: 29)”. 
3.2.2 Nationalism and Different Groups  
In certain phases of his political life, as part of the political agenda Bayar 
had to address matters related to ethnic and religious groups in Turkey and in the 
Ottoman state. Below first examples of Bayar‟s policies and activities related to 
these groups are taken up and second a general framework for the evaluation of 
these policies is presented.  
3.2.2.1 Non-Muslim Communities  
3.2.2.1.1 1914-1918 İzmir Mission 
Bayar thought that non-Muslim communities, particularly Ottoman 
citizens of Greek origin, enjoyed a higher position in the social life and local 
economics of Ġzmir in comparison to Muslim Turks who lacked similar resources 
(Kutay, 1982: 42). He also blamed the Greek population of Ġzmir for collaborating 
with the allied powers and “repaying hundreds of years of tolerance with 
ungratefulness” (Kutay, 1982: 307).  
                                                          
43
 Article 141 and 142 of the Criminal Code vaguely regulated the prosecution of groups in the 
society that wanted to establish superiority on other groups, even in the absence of any violent 
acts. In practice, these articles were often invoked for leftist groups. Over the years, they have 
been viewed as major obstacles against the realization of free speech and were annulled in 1991. 
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Bayar had similar views for the Armenian community. He thought that in 
the nineteenth century Armenians became the “tool of European imperialist 
states” that sought to destroy the Ottoman state. He also thought that the mutual 
trust between Turks and Armenians had been destroyed due to incidents such as 
the 1905 assassination attempt against Sultan Abdülhamit II by an Armenian gang 
and the 1896 Armenian raid of the Ottoman Bank in the Galata district of Istanbul 
(Bayar, 1997: 41, Volume 5). Bayar considered the forcible deportation of the 
Armenians in 1915 as a necessary step to protect the state‟s integrity (Bayar, 
1997: 51, Volume 5). Bayar, as an ĠTC member, was also interrogated by a 
tribunal in Ġzmir convened to investigate the Armenian population‟s forcible 
deportation. In this session, he said that he did not receive orders from the central 
ĠTC administration to deport the Armenian population of Ġzmir, but he pointed out 
that had he received such orders he would not have hesitated to implement them 
(Bayar, 1997: 36, Volume 5). 
In sum during those years, Bayar viewed non-Muslim citizens of the 
Ottoman state as an impediment against the formation of a Turkish-Muslim 
bourgeoisie and as a security threat against the state. He did not believe in the 
possibility of Turkish-Muslim‟s and non-Muslims‟ co-existence under the 
Ottoman state anymore. He thought that the First World War and the Turkish War 
of Independence had shown that the efforts to unite different ethnic groups as 
Ottoman citizens were futile because these ethnic groups had fundamentally 
different objectives. They had different histories, languages and traditions and 
were seeking joy in one another‟s fall (Bayar 1997: 24, Volume 5). 
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3.2.2.1.2   The Capital Levy    
Bayar had a different approach under the Republican rule. This was 
mainly because the Republic‟s borders had been secured with the internationally 
recognized Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and the non-Muslim population had 
considerably declined due to population exchanges and forcible deportations. 
Besides, the formation of a Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie was in order and the 
ownership of capital was changing hands. Consequently, non-Muslims were no 
longer seen as a serious security threat. Bayar updated his perspective and policies 
according to this new context. This change was visible in his criticism of the 
Capital Levy. 
Despite the change in the political context and lack of any obvious  threat 
to state‟s security from non-Muslim citizens, certain state policies caused injustice 
toward these groups. The most well-known example in the 1940s was the Capital 
Levy issued in 1942.
44
 This was a wealth tax introduced to generate revenue for 
the state during the Second World War. Although the intention was to tax large 
property owners, big farmers and businessmen alike, in practice 65 percent of the 
total tax collected came from non-Muslims. Often a non-Muslim taxpayer paid ten 
times more tax than a Muslim Turkish taxpayer (Lewis, 1974: 135).  The taxation 
commission unilaterally decided on the amount to be demanded and there were no 
recourse or appeal mechanisms against these decisions. The amount demanded 
could be many times more than the assets owned by the taxpayer (Findley, 2010: 
266).  The Capital Levy was put to an end with a law introduced on March 15, 
1944. The 1944 regulation wrote off the remaining debt and ended the forced 
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 For an analysis of the Capital Levy from the perspective of British diplomats, see Bali 2012.  
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labor service in AĢkale for those who could not afford to pay their taxes (Lewis, 
1974: 135). 
When the Capital Levy bill was voted upon in the Parliament on 
November 11, 1942, Bayar was absent and thus, he did not vote in favor or 
against it (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Term: 5, Vol: 28: 35). However, being absent 
from the Parliament during a voting session was considered a no vote in those 
days.
45
 Seventy six deputies were absent from the Parliament during that day 
(TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Term: 5, Vol: 28: 33). On December 23, 1943 Bayar 
submitted a proposal to the CHP Parliamentary Assembly to end this taxation 
(Koçak, 1990: 131-132). In a speech defending his proposal, Bayar pointed out 
that taxation based on wealth was an outdated approach. It was not in accordance 
with an understanding of modern state and the principle of just taxation. Bayar 
concluded his speech by saying that the Capital Levy was unconstitutional and 
would be a cause of shame in the days to come (Bozdağ, 2005: 104).  Later in 
1946, Bayar criticized the consequences of the Capital Levy and argued that 
citizens should not be imprisoned due to tax debts and that they should be treated 
equally in sharing the tax burden. Even under extraordinary circumstances such as 
war, the tax burden, Bayar argued, should be distributed in a just manner 
(ġahingiray, 1999b: 73). However, Bayar did not refer to different ethnicities in 
any of his criticisms against the Capital Levy. Even if he might have thought that 
the taxation caused injustice against the non-Muslims, he did not reflect this 
thought explicitly in his public criticism.  
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 Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous. 
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3.2.2.1.3 The 1954  United States Visit 
The DP often maintained close ties with the non-Muslim citizens in 
Turkey and the communities abroad that migrated from Turkey or from the 
Ottoman state earlier. In return non-Muslim Turkish citizens widely became DP 
supporters (Bali, 2004: 14). Ten non-Muslim Turkish citizens were elected to the 
Parliament from the DP list in 1950-1960 (Bali, 2009: 63).
46
 
These close ties were evident during Bayar‟s visit to the United States in 
1954. In this visit, he received a warm welcome from Armenian, Greek and 
Jewish communities that organized dinners and meetings in his honor (Bali, 2004: 
16). These communities had high hopes from the DP government on a number of 
issues such as the repayment of Capital Lexy funds. In the case of the Jewish 
community, they wished to make a contribution in the improvement of the 
relations between Israel and Turkey (Bali, 2004:16).  
In the meeting organized by the Jewish American Committee on January 
31, 1954, Bayar praised the Turkish Jews as “good” citizens of Turkey and said 
that “..regardless of religious and ethnic differences, we count each citizen as a 
Turk and give [him/her all the benefits] of Turkish citizenship” (ġahingiray, 
1999d:114).    
In the meeting organized by the Greek American community on January 
30, 1954, Bayar did not refer to the ethnic Greeks, in other words, Rum citizens of 
Turkey. Instead he emphasized that all the citizens of Turkey enjoyed equal rights. 
He highlighted the close relations between Greece and Turkey and their common 
interests as the “children of the Mediterranean” (ġahingiray, 1999d: 113).  
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 Only two non-Muslim deputies were elected to the Parliament from the CHP lists during the 
single party  years (Bali, 2009: 63).  
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Bayar‟s 1954 visit also complements the observation that he updated his 
approach toward non-Muslim citizens of Turkey and stopped defining them as 
security threats or as obstacles against the formation of a Muslim Turkish 
bourgeoisie.  
3.2.2.1.4  September 6-7, 1955 Events 
The outbreak of the September 6-7, 1955 troubles leading to lootings of 
non-Muslim property in Turkey‟s major cities constituted an exception to the 
harmonious relations between non-Muslim Turkish citizens and the DP 
governments. Cyprus had become a major issue for the Turkish government from 
1954 onwards. Greece had raised its voice to end the British rule on the island and 
started advocating the island‟s unification with Athens (Findley, 2010: 310). The 
First London Conference was convened during August 20 - September 7, 1955 to 
discuss the status of the island.
47
 In order to create public pressure on the London 
conference, the Turkish government secretly encouraged rallies against the Greek 
ambitions (Karpat, 2004a: 42-43; Ahmad, 1977: 54). However, on September 6 
initially peaceful demonstration of high school and university students soon 
degenerated into a mob riot. Non-Muslims suffered considerable financial losses 
due to this rampage that came about in September  6-7, 1955.  
Bayar‟s role in the organization of the initial protests has been widely 
disputed. According to the reports of the French and British consulates in Istanbul, 
Bayar was among the conspirators of these incidents (Güven, 2005: 73). Reports 
also mentioned Deputy Prime Minister Fatih RüĢtü Zorlu, Minister of Interior 
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 The conference dissolved without any significant achievements.   
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Affairs Namık Gedik, and Governor of Istanbul Fahrettin Kerim Gökay among 
other conspirators (Güven, 2005: 73). Bayar himself did not comment on this 
issue and provide any explanations for his role.  
The legal jurisdiction that followed the incident remained insufficient to 
prosecute the looters. A number of “communists” including Aziz Nesin, Kemal 
Tahir and Asım Bezirci were arrested for their alleged role in the riots but they 
were released soon (Çandar, 1995: 53). There were also others tried by courts. In 
all cases the decisions were taken in favor of the defendants (Güven, 2005: 56). 
Due to the troubles that the riots provoked within the DP group, several ministers 
and eventually the third Menderes cabinet as a whole resigned, with the exception 
of the Prime Minister himself (Albayrak, 2004: 2).  
The government‟s and president‟s role in these circumstances became an 
issue of the Yassıada trials too. In the end, a non-prosecution (takipsizlik kararı) 
decision was taken for Bayar as it could not be proved that he was linked to the 
riots (Demirer, 1995: 342).
48
 
Bayar expressed his disappointment and frustration about the riots on 
many occasions. He was deeply moved when he witnessed the damage caused by 
these attacks.
49
 In a press conference held at the governor‟s office after the 
attacks, he pointed out that Turkey owed its place among European and other 
world nations to its “civilized” character. These incidents were “uncivilized” and 
they did not suit the Turkish nation (Erer, 1963: 255). In the Parliament opening 
speech he delivered on November 1, 1955 Bayar defined these riots as the worst 
incident of the previous year and said that the aggressors would receive the 
                                                          
48
 Adnan Menderes, Fatih RüĢtü Zorlu and Governor of Ġzmir Kemal Hadımlı were found guilty 
for planning the riots.  
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 Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous. 
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appropriate sentences (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Term: 10, Vol: 8: 7). On 
September 10, 1955 an aid committee was established under Bayar‟s patronage. 
The committee aimed to increase the flow of aid for those who had suffered from 
the attacks and make immediate payments to the affected lower income groups 
(Güven, 2005:41). 
3.2.2.2 Muslim Communities  
3.2.2.2.1 The Kurdish Population 
Bayar did not use the word Kurd in any of his writings or public speeches. 
He referred to Kurdish origined citizens Turkey as “Turkish people living in the 
Eastern parts of Turkey (ToktaĢ, 2007: 136)”. He maintained this approach 
throughout his political career.  
This preference also reveals Bayar‟s overall approach to the Kurdish issue. 
He did not consider the revolts in the east of the country from 1925 onwards, such 
as the Sheik Said (1925) and Dersim (1937-1938) uprisings, as ethnically 
motivated. He thought that these revolts had been triggered by the economic and 
social backwardness of the region and the hardships that such backwardness 
caused.  
His remedy to what he interpreted as the problems of economic and social 
backwardness and the revolts these problems triggered was a two-tiered strategy. 
The first aspect was related to addressing the developmental and economic 
shortcomings through governmental policies. The second aspect of this strategy 
was related to the immediate security concerns that revolts caused. 
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The economy and development oriented approach of this strategy could 
best be observed in the Eastern Report that Bayar wrote as Minister of Economics 
in 1936. In the first part of this report, Bayar provided his interpretation of the 
problems in the east of the country.
50
 He observed that the Republican regime had 
not been fully consolidated in these regions (Mazıcı, 1996: 159-160). Bayar 
pointed out that maintaining the support and allegiance of people in the east 
would require considerable state investment. The way to consolidate the 
Republican regime was to work for the economic and social development of the 
region through supporting education and investment as well as by providing the 
citizens in the east of the country with proper land and the means to cultivate the 
lands. He was opposed to the views that excluded the Kurdish origined citizens 
from state employment and education (Mazıcı, 1996: 159-162). Highlighting the 
ethnic differences and alienating people in the east on ethnic grounds would only 
make matters worse for the consolidation of the republican regime.  
Elsewhere, Bayar summarized his analysis of the Dersim revolt as follows: 
..As prime minister I followed the Tunceli incidents 
closely.
51
 My observations affirmed my former opinions. 
Most of these troubles can be solved through the 
introduction of employment opportunities. On the 
surface, these [Dersim] incidents might appear of a 
different nature [than economic]. I decided that the state 
should do everything to rehabilitate the surroundings of 
Dersim. We shall not abandon  these people living in 
mountainous regions. We shall find lands that will make 
them happy in our spacious Turkey. There are industrial 
regions where thousands of workers can be employed 
(Millet weekly, December 19, 1946). 
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 Complete text of this report has been published as an appendix to NurĢen Mazıcı‟s Celal Bayar, 
Başbakanlık Dönemi: 1937-1939. The references to this report are taken from Mazıcı‟s appendix.  
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Bayar uses Dersim and Tunceli interchangeably.  
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Here Bayar identified the main problem in Dersim as lack of employment 
opportunities. The solution was to introduce these opportunities through 
investments in the region. If these investments would fail, Bayar supported the 
relocation of people from Dersim to other areas of the country as a way to 
increase employment.  
The second aspect of his strategy was toward pressing security concerns 
during revolts. Bayar defended the repression of the revolts by military means and 
without compromises. For instance in his address to the Parliament on June 29, 
1938 as prime minister, Bayar mentioned the necessity of further military 
operations to suppress the ongoing Dersim revolt (1937-1939). He defined the 
Dersim rebels as enemies of the Republican regime. He also stated that the 
military would continue its operations until the rebels gave up their pursuits 
(ġahingiray, 1999a:355). Nevertheless Bayar was against sustaining this militarist 
approach during peacetime. He emphasized that military measures should be 
abandoned once the uprising was over (Mazıcı, 1996: 159-160). 
Bayar‟s approach to the Kurdish issue and Kurds did not change 
substantially in the multiparty phase. In his election campaign speeches, he did 
not make any references to Kurdish ethnicity but he highlighted the individual 
rights and freedom abuses that took place in the eastern regions. These rights 
abuses were often results of the arbitrary behavior of state officers in the eastern 
regions.
52
 Bayar also promised to end the extraordinary legislations and 
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administrative decisions implemented particularly in this region (ġahingiray, 
1999b: 178).
53
 
During the election campaigns, Bayar also praised the people from the 
East for certain characteristics. For instance on October 5, 1947 in his Erzurum 
speech Bayar praised the people of the Eastern region as “courageous and heroic 
defenders of the borders” (ġahingiray, 1999b: 171). In another Erzurum speech, 
he further highlighted the issue of defending the borders and said that all citizens 
were “carved out of the same wood” and that they were all equally patriotic 
(ġahingiray, 1999b: 177). In his Diyarbakır speech on May 6, 1950, Bayar 
expressed his fascination with the fact that the people from this region had 
converted to Islam at its inception. As such, they represented Islam and Turkish 
identity in the states that had previously been established in that region 
(ġahingiray, 1999b: 58). It can be argued that Bayar emphasized common religion 
to avoid issues related to different ethnicities. For this reason he made frequent 
references to Islam and to the religiosity of the “Eastern people”. 
3.2.2.2.2 The Alevi Community 
Issues related to the Alevi community did not occupy the mainstream 
political agenda during Bayar‟s active time in politics. Consequently, Bayar rarely 
referred to the Alevi community in his public discourse and writings. His only 
firsthand contact with the Alevi community had been during the Turkish War of 
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Eastern regions in 1927, following the lifting of the martial law imposed after the Shaikh Said 
revolt. Their main objective was to provide order in the region. In 1927 and 1934, two laws were 
legislated to resettle certain residents of the eastern regions who were  thought to be involved in 
the revolts. See Heper and Yiğit, 2012 and Koçak, 2003.  
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Independence while he was serving as the commander of the Akhisar front in 
1919. When he noticed the lack of volunteers from among Alevis on the front, he 
elaborated on its reasons and visited Alevi villages to motivate them to send 
volunteers. When he asked why they did not have volunteers joining the national 
fight, the villagers replied that they would have joined the struggle had they been 
asked before. Bayar understood that the Alevi community‟s hesitation was due to 
the Sunni-Alevi tension, which he found  to be meaningless. The next day, 
volunteers from the village joined the independence forces (Bayar 1997: 27, 
Volume 8). While commenting on this matter in his memoirs, Bayar wrote that 
Alevis had “pure Turkish blood” (Bayar 1997: 27, Volume 8). In this case, he 
followed a similar discourse to the one when he referred to Kurds but he reversed 
it and highlighted ethnicity as the common denominator instead.  
3.2.2.3  Bayar’s Conceptualization of Nationalism 
Bayar was an ardent nationalist. As the examples provided above support, 
Bayar depended on forms of civic and to a lesser extent cultural nationalism 
(Heper, 2007: 126). His description of nationalism shows how he combined civic 
and cultural elements in his understanding: 
“..accepting all the citizens living within the borders of 
the Republic as Turks regardless of their sectarian and 
ethnic differences, giving them equal rights as Turkish 
citizens, viewing each citizen who fulfills the 
requirements of the law with good  intentions, also 
watching these principles in practice, rejecting all the 
separatist movements and depending on common 
culture and common goals” (Bayar, 1997:80, Volume 
2).  
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In the first part, Bayar pointed out that sectarian and ethnic differences do not 
matter. However, he ended his description with an emphasis on common culture, 
which can be interpreted to refer to common religion as well.  
Despite the fact that he referred to culture and ethnicity/race occasionally, 
Bayar did not have a radical approach. He thought that under the republican rule 
religious and ethnic bonds among the people had been replaced with the bonds of 
being a nation and he considered racist movements such as Turanism detrimental 
to that unity, which he placed before anything else. (Bayar, 2009: 94). Common 
denominators, i.e. common religion in the case of Kurds and common ethnicity in 
the case of Alevis, were nevertheless important for Bayar because he thought they 
also were instrumental in keeping the population together. In the case of non-
Muslim Turkish citizens, the common denominator was citizenship which Bayar 
expressed through a discourse of equal rights and freedoms in the Republican era. 
If these denominators for any of the mentioned groups were lost or forgotten, 
Bayar feared that it would disrupt peace and harmony in society.  
Bayar‟s understanding of nationalism also had a strong economic 
component. He defined his objective as bringing the achievements of economic 
nationalism to the level of the achievements of political nationalism.
54
 The central 
achievement of political nationalism was the establishment of the Republic 
following the victory in the Turkish War of Independence. The economic aspect 
of nationalism would be the formation of a Muslim and Turkish business class.  
However, Bayar thought that the economic base of the Republic was not yet 
strong enough. As explained earlier in this chapter and elsewhere in this study, he 
had specific methods to promote economic growth. Beyond these policy-oriented 
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methods, Bayar considered believing in the capacities of Turkish people as a way 
to bring about growth. For instance while recruiting employees for the ĠĢ Bank he 
paid particular attention to make his choices from among the Muslim Turks rather 
than the non-Muslim Turkish citizens who already had considerable experience in 
the banking sector (Kocatürk, 1986). Bayar thought that the Turkish people had to 
be given chances to increase their capacities in several fields.  
Lastly, there was an emotional component in Bayar‟s interpretation of 
nationalism. He considered protecting the “honor” and the reputation of his nation 
against foreigners also as nationalism. Once while he was working at the Bursa 
Deutsche Orient Bank, two police officers came to take him for an interrogation 
on his activities at the ĠTC. When the German manager of the bank stopped the 
police officers, saying that the bank was working under the German flag and that 
it was thus German territory, Bayar felt offended. He arrived at the conclusion 
that it was among his duties to save the country from the capitulations that  gave 
birth to such privileges. He did not accept the manager‟s offer to help and left 
with the police officers (Barlas, May 19, 1982, Milliyet daily).  
3.2.3 Secularism  
Bayar valued the principle of secularism and he interpreted it, simply put, 
as the separation of religious and political affairs (ġahingiray, 1999c: 53). He 
considered the principle of secularism compatible with Turkish society and 
customs. According to him, all the Turkish states established earlier in Anatolia 
and Central Asia were secular and religion was excluded from state affairs. 
Contrary to theocratic regimes where the state was subjected to religion, Bayar 
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thought religion had been under state control in the Turkish case (Bayar, 2009: 
97-98). Besides its conceptual political meaning, for Bayar secularism also meant 
commitment to Atatürk and his political legacy.
55
 
Bayar expressed his commitment to secularism, but he was often not in a 
position to pursue policies on matters related to the practice of secularism. During 
his time as prime minister there had been no controversial domestic incidents that 
would have led to a manifestation of his interpretation of secularism. On the other 
hand as president he had no executive powers to devise policies on political 
matters. As Chapter V of this study discusses, contrary to the constitutional 
arrangement Bayar was in fact involved in governmental affairs. However, his 
involvement was not on the issues related to secularism. Yet irrespective of his 
position, Bayar commented on issues and policies related to secularism on many 
occasions. Some of them are exemplified below.  
During the founding days of the DP, one of the issues that President Ġnönü 
considered important was the opposition party‟s commitment to secularism. In 
that regard, Bayar was able to convince Ġnönü that the DP would maintain and 
protect the principle of secularism (Heper, 1998: 185). In line with this 
understanding with Ġnönü, Bayar emphasized the risks of the exploitation of 
religion for political purposes. Bayar respected the religion of people and their 
rights to exercise their religious beliefs, but as he pointed out in the 1949 Second 
DP Grand Party Congress, religious fundamentalist movements could cause 
disastrous outcomes for the country (Bayar in Aysal, 2004: 449). 
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Bayar‟s cautious approach to religion had been criticized in 1946-1950 by 
certain intellectuals who expected him to be more accommodating. For instance, 
an Islamist intellectual and an acquaintance of Bayar, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek 
(1904-1983) criticized Bayar for grounding his opposition to the CHP on matters 
of individual freedoms and the rule of democracy and for being distant to the 
cause of Islam (1970: 56). In a similar vein, novelist Halide Edip Adıvar (1884-
1964) also implored Bayar to clarify his position on issues such as including 
further religion classes in the curriculum and turning the Directorate for Religious 
Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) into an independent body.56 Adıvar criticized 
Bayar for keeping quiet on these issues as she expected him to adopt a welcoming 
approach (Nal, 2005: 144).  
Bayar‟s cautious approach continued in 1950-1960. As detailed in Chapter 
II of this study, the DP had an instrumental approach to religion in 1950-1960. 
Bayar interpreted certain policies adopted in that phase as a necessity and he did 
not think that they were in contradiction to secularism. For instance on the 
conversion of the call to prayer (ezan) from Turkish to Arabic Bayar thought that 
there was already a contradiction in the previous practice as the prayers in the 
mosque were cited in Arabic and yet it was forbidden to have the call to prayer in 
Arabic (Atay et al., November 12, 2007).
57
According to Bayar, the DP merely put 
an end to this contradiction.  
Besides, Bayar did not refrain from voicing his criticism when he thought 
that the DP or Menderes did not pay enough attention to protect secularism 
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  She was elected to the Parliament from the DP list in 1950 and remained a parliamentarian until 
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 On June 16, 1950, the article 526 of the Criminal Code was revised and the ban was lifted by the 
votes of both the CHP and the DP deputies (Albayrak, 2004:197).    
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(Karpat, 2011: 135). For instance in 1951, dozens of Atatürk busts and sculptures 
were damaged by the members of a religious fundamentalist group. A draft law 
criminalizing these attacks was prepared. However, it was taking some time for 
the DP to bring the legislation to vote in the Parliament. Bayar was troubled with 
the delay in the legislation of this draft and said that if the Parliament did not act 
immediately, he would resign from office and from DP membership.
58
 In the end, 
the law numbered 5816 and titled Assaults against Atatürk‟s Personality was 
legislated in 1951. This law was not related particularly to secularism but as 
already mentioned Bayar often used Atatürk and secularism interchangeably in his 
political discourse. In other words, whenever he referred to secularism, he also 
meant Atatürk‟s political legacy. 
In another case during a 1954 election campaign speech in Konya, 
Menderes criticized the single party governments‟ approach to religion. He 
thought that there were still certain restrictions remaining from that period and 
promised to lift them.
59
 When it was Bayar‟s turn to speak, he gave a speech in 
the opposite direction and said that no one should oppose any of Atatürk‟s 
principles. He concluded that Muslims in Turkey were free to practice their 
religion. However, concessions from the principle of secularism would be 
disastrous. Menderes was offended and he left Konya without waiting for the 
President (Bağlum, 1991:190). 
Bayar maintained his emphasis on secularism after his executive 
leadership position ended in 1960. For instance, one of the reasons for his 
criticism of the 1961 Constitution was due to the freedom of expression that the 
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new constitution provided for religious sects. He thought that Islamists exploited 
this opportunity and religion became a matter of everyday politics (Bayar, 200: 
102).  
3.2.4 The Army’s Role in National Politics 
As a former ĠTC member, Bayar was aware of the army‟s potential to get 
involved in political affairs.  The ĠTC cadres, on both senior and junior levels had 
been filled with officers from various ranks. Their membership in the ĠTC resulted 
in the military‟s involvement in the Ottoman politics and government, as the ĠTC 
controlled the Ottoman state in 1908-1918.
60
  Bayar considered the ĠTC‟s 
involvement in government affairs through its officer members as an outcome of 
the political context and he approved of it to keep the state united and to reform it 
(Bayar, 2009: 46). 
However, he did not see the Republican context in a similar light. He 
thought that the military did not have a role to play in Republican politics beyond 
its task to protect the regime and the borders against threats (Altuğ, June 16, 1981, 
Tercüman daily; Bayar, 2009: 164). The army should by all means be subject to 
the Parliament‟s will and control (Altuğ, June 16, 1981, Tercüman daily; Bayar, 
2009: 164).  
Bayar expressed his trust in the army as a state organ, yet he was alert to 
the threats of its politicization. His reaction to the nine officers incident detailed in 
Chapter II of this study is one example of his caution. When the conspirators of 
this plot against the government were uncovered in 1957, Bayar tried hard to 
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convince the government members to investigate the matter closely. He warned 
Minister of Justice Celal Yardımcı that this plot was likely to be rooted in the 
army beyond the nine officers (Yardımcı, 1982: 209). But Bayar could not 
convince the government of the scale of this threat (Ağaoglu, 1972:143). When 
these officers were acquitted due to lack of evidence Bayar found it unacceptable 
(Lewis, 1974:151; Bozdağ 1991: 55) but as president, there was not much he 
could do against it.  
As a politician overthrown by military intervention, Bayar was in principle 
against the military‟s involvement in politics. However in practice he interpreted 
the interventions (1960, 1971, 1980) according to the nature of the political 
context. It was his political principles that dictated him to consider unity and 
peace in society above anything else. Thus, there is need to elaborate on his 
approach to military interventions in Turkey separately.  
Bayar was entirely against the 1960 intervention. He blamed three sets of 
forces for it (Atay et al., November 10, 2007). The first one was the USSR. In his 
opinion Turkish policy toward the USSR had shifted with DP rule and NATO 
membership.
61
 Bayar thought that the USSR plotted to reverse this relation 
between Turkey and NATO. The second force was what Bayar called the Ġsmet 
Ġnönü factor. Bayar thought that Ġnönü always regretted the DP victory and had 
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1960. Interview with Mehmet Arif Demirer, phone interview, February 28, 2012. 
 115 
 
difficulty in accepting it.
62
 Thirdly, he held the military conspirators, junta 
responsible. He thought that the presence of these forces made it impossible for 
him to prevent the intervention from occurring (Barlas, May 18, 1982, Milliyet 
daily). 
Bayar also raised his voice against the March 12, 1971 Memorandum, 
which forced the government into resignation. He compared the officers who 
planned and implemented this intervention to the Ottoman janissaries who 
overthrew viziers and grand viziers. The difference was that the conspirators of 
March 12 relied upon the National Security Council to impose the army‟s will on 
the elected government, whereas the janissaries depended on brute force to 
displace viziers and grand viziers (Bayar, 2009: 89-90).  
Bayar had a different opinion of the 1980 military intervention. The day 
that the intervention took place his grandson DemirtaĢ Bayar was with him. Bayar 
told his grandson that a military intervention is the worst thing to happen in a 
county. However, he also pointed out that it put an end to the anarchy in society, 
which could not be overcome otherwise.
63
 He also thought that the 1980 
intervention was different from the 1960 intervention because the military‟s line 
of command was not broken. The intervention was planned and carried out by 
senior officers in contrast to the 1960 intervention, which had been planned and 
carried out by junior officers.
64
 Because of these factors, Bayar supported the 
1980 intervention.   
                                                          
62
 This view also does not stand viable when Ġnönü‟s leading role in the transformation to the 
multiparty system is considered. Yet it is true that the CHP was taken by surprise by the DP‟s 
electoral victory in 1950.  
63
 Interview with DemirtaĢ Bayar, Istanbul, June 19, 2012. 
64
 Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous. 
 116 
 
Yet, he also stood against certain practices of the military that he 
considered undemocratic. He wrote a letter to Chief of Staff Kenan Evren, before 
the referendum in 1982 took place. In this letter, Bayar asked Evren to reconsider 
the referendum because in it the electorate was asked to vote for the new 
constitution and the presidential candidate Kenan Evren simultaneously.
65
 
3.2.5 (Anti) Communism 
Anti-communism occupied an important place in Bayar‟s political 
discourse. Especially during the later years of his life, he perceived Communism 
as the greatest threat the country was facing. Bayar had different encounters with 
Communism and communist circles in his political life. Below some of these 
encounters are discussed and the reasons for Bayar‟s emphasis on Communism 
are highlighted.  
It has been claimed that Bayar was a member of the Green Army (YeĢil 
Ordu Cemiyeti), a resistance movement against the Allied occupation of Anatolia 
with communist and Islamist inclinations alike (ġenĢekerci, 2000: 84-85).66 
However Bayar denied this claim and argued that he had close friends who were 
members of the Green Army and he often visited them. He thought his visits 
might have caused rumors of membership (Kocatürk, 1986). 
It has also been claimed that Bayar was a member of the Communist 
Party. The Communist Party was established in 1920 on Atatürk‟s demands to 
increase the flow of aid from the Russians to the Turkish War of Independence 
(Mazıcı, 1996: 6) and to decrease the influence of the Green Army movement 
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(ġenĢekerci, 2000: 86). Bayar denied such an affiliation.  He explained that 
Atatürk had asked him to become a member of the Communist Party but that he 
did not act according to Atatürk‟s wish at that point. His new assignment as 
Minister of Economics in 1921, Bayar thought, would not leave time for other 
activities (Mazıcı, 1996: 7-8). Allegations of Bayar‟s membership in the Green 
Army or the Communist movement could not so far be proved through proper 
documentation.  
 In the 1920s and the 1930s Bayar did not have the anti-communist 
emphasis that later became so predominant in his political discourse. During these 
years, as already evaluated in Chapter II of this study, Turkey and the USSR had 
friendly relations. In line with the overall state policy, Bayar was also 
emphasizing ties with the USSR. For instance as the minister of economics he 
announced the signing of a new credit agreement worth 8 million dollars to the 
Parliament on May 12, 1934 referring to “our Russian friends” (ġahingiray, 
1999a: 206). In those years, besides these technical cooperation issues, he rarely 
referred to communism and the USSR. 
It can be argued that until 1946, Bayar maintained this position. He did not 
define Communism as a threat to Turkey and he even had some contacts with 
leftist circles. For instance, leftist publisher and political activist Sabiha Sertel 
(1895-1968) noted having discussed matters of foreign policy and domestic 
politics  with Celal Bayar in 1942 (Sertel, 1966: 254). Likewise in 1945 during the 
founding days of the DP, Bayar and certain other affiliates such as Tevfik RüĢtü 
Aras and Adnan Menderes got in contact with both Sabiha Sertel and her husband, 
Zekeriya Sertel, also a publisher and political activist. They wanted to discuss the 
possibilities of publishing a magazine for the presentation of the new party‟s 
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opinions. These contacts are confirmed in both Sertels‟ memoirs.67 It was decided 
that the Görüşler (Opinions) magazine that the couple launched on December 1, 
1945 could be a good venue for the expression of the new party‟s agenda. Bayar, 
Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü decided to contribute to the second issue. 
Bayar had promised to grant an interview, Köprülü and Menderes would write 
articles.  
When the first issue of the Görüşler was published, the tone of criticism in 
the magazine caused uproar in the government. On December 4, 1945 the Tan 
Press House, owned by the Sertels became the target of a mob attack and was 
completely burnt down.
68
 Bayar and his colleagues put an immediate end to their 
cooperation and publicly declared that contrary to the announcements made by the 
publishers in the first issue they did not intend to contribute to the GörüĢler 
magazine (Kabacalı, 1994: 186-188; Sertel, 1968: 266; Sertel, 1966: 332).  
Bayar did not refer to the content or framework of this initial cooperation 
between the Sertels and the DP founders in any of his writings or interviews. He 
only pointed out that the “rumors” of cooperation between the DP and the Sertels 
were exaggerated and that the “allegations” of these initial talks were of no 
consequence (ġahingiray, 1999b: 470). Also in rather vague terms, he claimed 
that during the establishment of the DP, communists tried to infiltrate the DP 
organization without any success (Bozdağ, 1991: 29). He did not mention the 
Sertels in this remark but he was most likely referring to them as this cooperation 
was heavily criticized later.  
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was a mixed crowd of university students and mostly rightwing protestors. None of the aggressors 
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After the Tan incident and also with the Cold War becoming the defining 
reality of the international context, Bayar‟s emphasis on anti-Communism started 
to build up. In 1950-1960 as president he defined Communism as one of the 
greatest domestic and international threats to the Turkish nation, the state and the 
regime. Bayar did not identify separate communist groups. He viewed the 
communist movement in Turkey as a unified bloc and at times identified the press 
and the opposition as members of this bloc (ġenĢekerci, 2000: 242). For instance 
in 1978 he accused the CHP of being used by the communists (Bayar, 2009: 199-
205).  
Bayar was aware that his emphasis might seem an exaggeration but he 
defended his views by saying that although there was only a handful communists 
in Turkey, their influence extended beyond their numbers. He thought that the 
significance of communists and Communism in Turkey was due to the USSR‟s 
support behind them (Bozdağ, 1991: 52).  
Bayar maintained the same approach  in the 1970s and the 1980s. During 
those years he viewed some of the topics discussed in the society as communist 
manipulation. For instance, he considered the attempts of purification the Turkish 
language in the 1970s as a communist plot to destabilize the bonds among 
members society and to damage the relations between people in the Turkish 
speaking Soviet Republics and Turkey (Bozdağ, 1991: 108).  
He also feared physical Soviet aggression against Turkey. When the USSR 
invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Bayar sent a letter to the Shah of Iran and warned 
him that the next target of a Soviet assault could be Iran. He was also worried that 
after Iran, Turkey might also become a victim of Soviet pursuits. Bayar thought 
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that the source of this threat was the USSR‟s ambition to take over the Turkish 
straits as a gateway to the Mediterranean and beyond.
69
 
In the last analysis, Bayar‟s approach to Communism in Turkey resulted 
from his interpretation of the international political context. For Bayar, the USSR 
was the greatest threat to the regime and to the unity of the nation.
70
 To what 
extent did his interpretation match with the actual political situation? It can be 
argued that Bayar‟s interpretation of the Soviet threat and his fear of a communist 
takeover in Turkey was an exaggeration. Turkey had certain political left or even 
communist movements but none of these transformed into major political 
movements with a wide support base in society.
71
 
3.3 Final Remarks: An Assessment of Bayar’s Political Views and Political 
Experience 
Depending on the discussion introduced above, two overarching principles 
that shaped Bayar‟s political decisions and acts can be mentioned. These 
principles were his emphasis on the unity of the nation on the one hand and the 
domestic as well as the international security of the state on the other. Bayar 
interpreted political circumstances that he had to react to or comment upon 
through the lenses of these two principles. He was willing to disregard a number 
of other ideals, such as pluralism in politics, in order to ensure these objectives. 
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 121 
 
The section on Bayar‟s interpretation of democracy provides an extensive 
discussion of the ideals Bayar was ready to overlook.  
The next question is why Bayar adopted these specific principles; in other 
words from where these principles originated. It can be argued that Bayar‟s 
personal and political experience rendered these principles important to him. 
Particularly, his family‟s flight from Pleven and their resettling in Umurbey, 
Bursa might have had a crucial impact in shaping Bayar‟s political perspective. 
Other similar land losses of the Ottoman state might have also further highlighted 
Bayar‟s sensitivities in this matter. The theme of loss of homelands was a 
common trauma for Bayar‟s generation. It has been documented that almost half 
of the Republic‟s core political leaders came from the lands that were recently lost 
due to wars (Zürcher, 2005: 383). 
Later on this common trait evolved into what came to be referred as the 
“Sèvres Syndrome”. The Sèvres Treaty (1920) was signed following the Ottoman 
defeat at the First World War between the Ottoman State and the Allied powers. It 
distributed the remaining Ottoman lands among different ethnicities living 
previously under the Ottoman state and left to ethnic Turks only a small homeland 
in the heart of Anatolia. Although the Treaty was never ratified, it is believed that 
it further strenghtened the republican leaders‟ emphasis on territorial unity 
enchanced their sensitivities against land losses. This is believed to affect later 
policy actions and choices. The combination of thje Ottoman State‟s land losses, 
personal tragedies that these losses inflicted upon the republican elites and the 
Sèvres Treaty led the founders of the Republic to assume that there were external 
and internal enemies that could pose threats to the Republic‟s existence. Second 
World War and the Cold War also contributed to increasing the state‟s threat 
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perceptions. Nevertheless their sensitivities were not addressed at reclaiming the 
lost lands. They were more interested in protecting the new homeland Anatolia 
(Zürcher, 2005: 388). 
Such a focus helps to understand, for instance, how Bayar‟s fears of the 
Soviet aggression transformed into extreme anti-Communism and why he 
preferred a majoritarian rather than a pluralist democracy. Likewise it also 
explains why he supported the 1980 military intervention. 
Where did this particular perception of politics situate Bayar among the 
Turkish political actors? The latter actors can be categorized as state elites and 
political elites. The state elites, including bureaucratic and military elites and the 
leading members of the single-party establishment (1923-1946), had been the 
non-elected actors decisive in a number of vital affairs of the state. This group had 
been most influential in undertaking major Westernizing reforms in the early 
years of the Republic and later established itself as the guardians of the reforms 
and what they considered to be the long-term interests of the country (Heper and 
Keyman, 1998: 259; Heper, 2002:140; Heper, 1985).  
The political elites emerged on a major scale after the state elites 
introduced multiparty rule and they were the victors of the elections. As opposed 
to state elites who described themselves as defenders of the long-term interests of 
the nation and state, the political elites considered their role as defending more 
particularistic interests (Heper, 2002: 140). In political practice, after 1950 the 
political elites adopted the motto of “national will against the state‟s will” (Heper 
and Keyman, 1998: 260). It can be suggested that the political elites‟ objective 
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was promoting the interests of various groups in the society, sometimes at the 
expense of other groups. 
These two factions antagonized each other during the 1950s due to 
disagreements on a number of topics. The major political conflicts of the 1950s 
have already been detailed above and it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
study these conflicts from the perspectives of the state elites and the political 
elites. Here it should only be stated that the state elites became critical of the DP‟s 
economic policy of providing incentives to foreign investors and became 
suspicious of certain other DP policies that they considered to be anti-secularist 
(Heper and Keyman, 1998: 264). The political elites for their part recognized this 
challenge from the state elite and responded with a number of measures, such as 
introducing restrictions on the channels that made the bureaucracy‟s political 
engagement possible. The DP‟s attacks against the CHP throughout the 1950s can 
also be considered in association with the DP‟s stance against the state elites, 
because within the DP discourse the CHP was perceived as state elites.  
In his political career from 1937 to 1960 Bayar was associated with both 
the state elites and the political elites. Although Bayar challenged established 
views on the economy during the single -party period, on more substantive 
political issues, such as nationalism and secularism, he did not oppose the state 
elites. Besides, Bayar was not only a long time CHP member but he was also 
emotionally attached to that party to a considerable extent. When the 
disagreements among the CHP members surfaced on the question of the 
Memorandum of the Four (Dörtlü Takrir) in 1945 and eventually led to the 
establishment of the DP, Bayar did not immediately resign from the party. He 
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resigned from Parliament instead. He went through a considerable pain before 
resigning from the CHP. 
In the later part of his career, Bayar maintained certain characteristics of 
the state elites in his political thinking, although he was categorically a member of 
the political elite during the multi-party period. Bayar‟s in between position was 
especially obvious in his understanding of the role of the state. Bayar, like the 
state elites, placed the state at the center of his political thinking. In his 
interpretation, Turkish society was “classless,” and the state occupied the central 
place in these “classless societies”. Similar to the state elites, he considered the 
state as the only “motor of modernization and progress” (Zürcher, 1992: 246).  
However, Bayar‟s understanding of the state‟s role resembled to that of the 
political elites. His emphasis on the state did not mean a strong bureaucracy that 
controls the state; rather, he maintained that the bureaucracy should be subject to 
the government‟s will. In his opinion, if there was no harmony between the 
bureaucracy and the state in terms of objectives and ideals, there would be chaos, 
as in the last years of the Ottoman state (Bayar, 2009: 90). In that matter, i.e. how 
to bring about a powerful state, Bayar diverged from the state elites. For him, the 
way to achieve this was to have a strong parliament, not a strong bureaucracy. 
Consequently, Bayar also diverged from the state elites in his take to the question 
of who would exercise state power, the bureaucracy or the elected political elite? 
Bayar supported the latter option. 
Bayar‟s understanding of democracy provides additional grounds for 
placing him among the political elites. He was against institutions such as the 
Senate or the Constitutional Court that limited the powers of the executive and of 
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the legislative, because in his view non-elected elites should have had less power 
than the elected ones.  
It should nevertheless once again be highlighted that Bayar did not qualify 
completely as a political elite because he did not side with state elites on all 
issues.  As noted above, he did support the 1980 military intervention. This is a 
rather strong contradiction for a politician who placed the will of the nation before 
anything else. In matters such as secularism, nationalism and perceptions of the 
security of the state, Bayar‟s thoughts were not unlike to those of the state elites. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CELAL BAYAR AS PRIME MINISTER, 1937-1939 
 
4.1 Institutional  Background: Prime Minister According to the Constitution 
and in Practice 
The 1924 Constitution established a regime that resembled a parliamentary 
system where political responsibility was held mainly by the prime minister and 
the council of ministers. Article 46 appointed the council of ministers as the 
responsible body for government policies. As the head of the council of ministers, 
the prime minister had considerable weight in this system although the 
Constitution did not describe the powers and duties of the prime minister in detail. 
According to article 44 of the Constitution, the president designated the prime 
minister from among the members of Parliament. Upon this appointment; the 
prime minister formed the council of ministers and submitted it for the president‟s 
approval. Following president‟s approval of the cabinet, it was up to the 
Parliament to give a vote of confidence to the newly established government. 
Under this arrangement, the president had functioned as the head of state, as 
further examined in the next chapter. The constitutional description of the powers 
and duties of president and prime minister was not strictly followed in practice 
during the single party era. So far, a structural analysis of the relationship between 
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prime ministers and presidents in the Turkish political context has not been 
carried out systematically. Such a task also exceeds the purposes of this section. 
Nevertheless, observing the manner of prime ministers‟ selection and removal 
from office may provide some valuable insight into the practice followed until 
Bayar‟s designation as prime minister. The prime ministers were designated 
according to Atatürk‟s preferences from within the Parliament as dictated by the 
Constitution. According to constitutional terms, prime ministers were responsible 
to the Parliament, but in practice they had to justify their political actions and 
policies to President Atatürk. When they failed to do so, they were removed from 
office. Atatürk worked with three different prime ministers: Ġsmet Ġnönü (October 
30, 1923-November 22, 1924 and March 3, 1925-November 1, 1937); Fethi 
Okyar (November 22, 1924-March 3, 1925); Celal Bayar (November 1, 1937-
November 11, 1938).  
On October 29, 1923 Atatürk designated Ġsmet Ġnönü as prime minister 
and Ġnönü consequently formed the first republican government. On November 
22, 1923 he resigned on his own will, giving his deteriorating health as the official 
excuse (Mango, 1999:599). However, it has been suggested that replacing the 
hardliner Ġsmet Ġnönü with the liberal Fethi Okyar was a maneuver by Atatürk to 
contain the liberal wave that rose following the establishment of the Progressive 
Republican Party (Ahmad, 2003: 58). Liberalism mentioned here mostly 
concerned economic matters, as further detailed in Chapter II.  
When the Shaikh Said Rebellion broke out in the East from February 1925 
onwards, Atatürk invited Ġnönü to the Presidential Palace at once to discuss these 
developments. Prime Minister Fethi Okyar had already denied excessive use of 
force in addressing the rebellion. Atatürk made it clear that he was against 
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Okyar‟s moderate approach in this matter. Okyar‟s approach was also discredited 
by the CHP Assembly and consequently he had to resign. In the end, Atatürk 
appointed Ġsmet Ġnönü in Okyar‟s place (Mango, 1999: 606). It is suggested that 
Atatürk favored Ġnönü and did not take sides with Fethi Okyar because Ġnönü took 
the Shaikh Said rebellion more seriously than Okyar (Heper, 1998: 66).  
Following this replacement, Ġnönü stayed in office for 12 consecutive 
years. The causes for Atatürk‟s and Ġnönü‟s falling-out in 1937 are detailed below 
but here it should be stated that one of the main reasons was Atatürk‟s insistence 
on controlling governmental affairs closer than Ġnönü was willing to accept. In his 
memoirs, Ġnönü stated that during his last years Atatürk preferred the government 
members to be attached to him in their work and that he was ready to use arbitrary 
measures to guarantee such attachment (Ġnönü, 2008: 251, Volume 1). Ġnönü also 
mentioned his discontent with Atatürk‟s habit of changing and humiliating certain 
ministers in public (Ġnönü, 1998: 68).  
When it was Ġnönü‟s time in office as president, he also followed a similar 
suit to Atatürk‟s. For instance, as will be further detailed below, he asked Bayar to 
resign from office in 1939. Thus it can be argued that during the single party rule, 
the presidents had power that extended well beyond constitutional terms (Koçak, 
1990: 96-97). Atatürk and Ġnönü were the actual rulers of the country regarding 
the most significant policy issues. The prime ministers were assigned the task of 
implementing policies envisaged by the presidents (YeĢilbursa, 1999: 185). When 
there was no way of aligning government policies with their own preferences, 
Atatürk and later Ġnönü preferred to dismiss their prime ministers.  
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4.2 Celal Bayar in Office 
4.2.1 Celal Bayar’s Designation  
Atatürk replaced Prime Minister Ġsmet Ġnönü with Minister of Economy 
Celal Bayar on November 1, 1937. Bayar thus became the first Republican prime 
minister with a civilian background. Contrary to the previous time when Ġnönü 
resigned from office in 1924 and still retained his position of deputy chairman in 
the party, this time he was stripped from that title (Tunçay, 1981: 105). Bayar was 
appointed the deputy chairman of the CHP.  
The official explanation provided to the public for this change was that 
Prime Minister Ġnönü had been granted 45 days of leave on his own request 
(Ahmad, 2003: 68). At the end of these 45 days, acting Prime Minister Bayar was 
given the task to form a new government. Bayar recalled his appointment in the 
following words: “Atatürk summoned me and told that he was going to designate 
me prime minister. I replied, „on your orders‟, because we owed everything to this 
great man. I considered his wishes as orders” (Altuğ, June 16, 1981, Tercüman 
daily).  
Atatürk‟s decision to replace Ġnönü with Bayar was due to a number of 
differences between Ġnönü and himself. These differences were either in practical 
and daily political issues or in approaches to the resolution of certain major 
political conflicts. It is important to examine these differences because they give a 
background to what would be expected from Bayar as prime minister. These 
differences can be summed up as follows:   
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(1) Differences in foreign policy: Although Ġnönü and Atatürk did not have 
major differences on the founding principles of Turkish foreign policy and its 
objectives, there was nevertheless a difference in the way that they reacted to 
certain foreign policy questions. While discussing Ġnönü‟s resignation on the train 
from Ankara to Istanbul on September 20, 1937,
72
 Atatürk mentioned the matters 
of Hatay and Nyon among the reasons for his decision to ask for Ġnönü‟s 
withdrawal (Ġnönü, 2008: 252, Volume 1).  
The Nyon Conference, indeed, provided an occasion for the differences to 
surface. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), pirate submarines in the 
Mediterranean Sea were attacking ships carrying supplies to Spanish Republicans. 
The USSR was blaming Italy for these assaults. In order to find a solution to the 
attacks, the Nyon conference was convened on Britain‟s initiative on September 
14, 1937. Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik RüĢtü Aras represented the Ankara 
government in this conference. An agreement implying that in case of need 
Britain and France could seek Turkey‟s military aid was reached. Atatürk 
considered this as a necessary co-operation and thought it highly unlikely that the 
British and French would actually ask for aid considering their advanced military 
and technical capacities (Atay, 1969: 495, 497). Ġnönü however was alarmed that 
this commitment might threaten Turkish impartiality in the eyes of Italy (Birlik, 
2010: 266). In the end, on Ġnönü‟s orders Aras was able to obtain a written 
guarantee that Turkey would not be called upon to get involved in an armed 
conflict (Mango, 1999: 726).  
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 This date is not mentioned in Ġnönü‟s memoirs. It is extracted from Altuğ, June 15, 1981, 
Milliyet daily. 
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Atatürk and Ġnönü had different opinions also on how to address the Hatay 
matter. This was among the main foreign policy challenges encountered during 
the Republic‟s early years. Details regarding this matter have already been 
presented in Chapter II. Atatürk argued in favor of insisting on Hatay‟s inclusion 
within Turkish borders. In his memoirs, Ġnönü mentioned being worried about the 
possibility that Atatürk might be considering a surprise military intervention in 
Hatay to solve the matter at once (Ġnönü, 1998: 58). Ġnönü had a different opinion. 
He thought that insisting on Hatay‟s inclusion to Turkey might put the French-
Turkish relations under strain at a critical time when Europe was heading toward 
another war (Mazıcı, 1996: 92). Ġnönü also thought that insisting on making 
Turkish the official language in Hatay was offensive, whereas Atatürk did not 
accept any compromise on the language issue either (Kinross, 1999: 560).  
(2) Differences in economic policy: In his memoirs, Ġnönü mentioned that 
while discussing the reasons for his withdrawal, Atatürk complained about 
Ġnönü‟s habit to administer the state budget “like a bank” (Ġnönü, 2008: 251-252, 
Volume 1). The problem Atatürk brought up concerned the financial losses of 
state enterprises, which were covered by the state budget (Karpat, 2004e: 230). 
Such enterprises were established after 1930 according to the étatist approach 
(Karpat, 2004e: 230). In the background Atatürk‟s criticism highlighted a 
difference between the two leaders‟ understanding of étatism. Ġnönü saw it as a 
permanent solution that was preferable to liberal capitalism (Zürcher, 2004: 198). 
Yet, this inflexible understanding of étatism was creating difficulties in making 
effective use of already scarce resources (Koçak, 1990: 117). As a result, Atatürk 
thought that Ġnönü‟s approach to the economy was falling short of providing the 
necessary stimulus for achieving the desired economic growth, as well as creating 
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problems of inefficiency. When Atatürk replaced Minister of Economics Mustafa 
ġeref Özkan with Bayar in 1932, he had already made it known  that he was ready 
to support and try Bayar‟s approach (Mazıcı, 1996: 21), whom he considered to 
be the leading Turkish economist (Barlas, May 21, 1982, Milliyet daily).  By 1937 
Atatürk‟s efforts to introduce a fresh approach to the question of economic 
development intensified. Bayar‟s name came forward as the most reliable 
candidate who could develop this fresh approach. It was thought that Bayar would 
provide a solution to the bureaucratic barriers and inflexibility restricting 
economic growth as he was considered a man of action rather than doctrine, 
sometimes at the expense of bureaucratic procedures (Mazıcı, 1996: 147-148).  
Bayar was also expected to put the statist element in the CHP under control 
(Ahmad, 2003: 90) and decrease the role of the bureaucracy in conduct of the 
economy by providing more room for the private sector (Ahmad, 2003: 68). 
Was Bayar‟s approach to étatism significantly different from Ġnönü‟s? 
Bayar‟s difference lay in his flexible approach with regard to the establishment 
and operation of financial institutions and enterprises. He wanted to decrease 
bureaucratic procedures in order to increase the efficiency of state enterprises and 
sought private sector co-operation whenever possible. This approach had already 
proved successful with the ĠĢ Bank, established by Bayar in 1924. During the 
1930s, the bank contributed to the Turkish economy‟s growth through loans it 
provided for private initiatives and through its own investments in certain sectors. 
In 1924-1947, the Bank took part in the management and establishment of more 
than 20 companies including four insurance companies, four banks, two textile 
factories, one cotton factory and one oil facility (Boztemur, 1996: 77). Whether 
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Bayar achieved to repeat the success of the ĠĢ Bank on a more macro-scale is 
discussed in the next parts of this chapter. 
 (3) Incidental differences: There were a number of issues that did not 
result from Atatürk‟s and Ġnönü‟s different appraches to the economy and foreign 
policy. These issues were purely incidental matters such as the so-called beer 
factory dispute or the disagreement on the Atatürk Forest Farm. The former issue 
concerned the establishment of a new beer factory in Ankara and putting an end to 
the privileges provided to the Bomonti beer factory in Istanbul (Mazıcı, 1996: 38). 
The Farm matter was the story of a tense evening when Atatürk invited Ġnönü to 
dinner in order to discuss the donation of the farmland in Ankara to the Ziraat 
Bankası (Agricultural Bank). Such matters ended up escalating the tension 
between Atatürk and Ġnönü. 
In light of these differences between Atatürk and Ġnönü, it can be argued 
that while Bayar was expected and encouraged to introduce changes and reforms 
in economic policies, there were no such expectations in the area of foreign 
policy. In other words Bayar was favored over Ġnönü in the realm of economics 
but when it came to foreign policy, what was favored was the absence of Ġnönü 
rather than the presence of Bayar. In this case, the government and as the head of 
government, Bayar would simply be counted upon to support and implement 
President Atatürk‟s policies and introduce them to Parliament. Atatürk made this 
clear immediately upon appointing Bayar. On the day of his assignment, Atatürk 
told Bayar, among a number of other things, not to get involved in foreign policy 
issues and that foreign policy was his own responsibility (Barlas, May 18, 1982, 
Milliyet daily). 
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4.2.2 Relations with President Atatürk 
Before moving on to an account of Bayar‟s policies as prime minister, it is 
important to evaluate Bayar‟s relation to President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The 
dynamics of this relation not only inspired Bayar in his political rhetoric, but also 
drew the limits of his policy making as prime minister. In order to achieve the 
mentioned task (1) the formation of this relationship in earlier years (2) relations 
between Prime Minister Bayar and President Atatürk and (3) Bayar‟s thoughts on 
Atatürk will be taken up, in this order.  
Bayar heard Mustafa Kemal‟s name for the first time in Bursa. The ĠTC 
Bursa delegate who participated in the ĠTC Thessalonica Congress in 1909 had 
brought the news of discussions that took place there. Bayar was impressed with 
the Tripoli delegate Mustafa Kemal‟s suggestion to separate the army‟s and the 
party‟s, i.e. the ĠTC‟s affairs and prevent the mingling of these two ideally distinct 
realms (Bayar, 1955:14). Bayar heard of Mustafa Kemal‟s military achievements 
and patriotic character (Bayar, 1955: 14). 
With the prorogation of the last Ottoman Parliament, in which Bayar was a 
deputy from the Saruhan (currently Manisa) region, Bayar fled to Bursa to avoid 
imprisonment or exile in April 1920. A few hours after his arrival in Bursa, he 
received a telegraph from Mustafa Kemal at his home. In that telegraph, Mustafa 
Kemal was asking Bayar to counter the Anzavur forces marching to Bursa and 
defend the city against them with the National Forces (Kuvay-i Milliye) troops that 
were present in the city (Bayar, 1955:76). Atatürk also recalled this telegraph 
incident in later years and said that it was not a coincidence that he asked for such 
a thing from a person he had not even met. He was following Bayar closely and 
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had already built a positive opinion of his worth (Bayar, 1955: 76-77). This was 
probably due to Bayar‟s achievements on the Aegean front before he joined the 
Ankara movement, further explained in Chapter III of this study. 
 The expected Anzavur and Kuvay-i Milliye confrontation did not occur 
and in 15-20 days Bayar left Bursa for Ankara. In EskiĢehir, while on his way to 
Ankara Bayar received an invitation from Demirci Efe, a local fighter against the 
Greek occupation to join his forces in Aydın. Bayar was indecisive and sent a 
telegraph to Mustafa Kemal, asking whether he should go to Aydın or come to 
Ankara. Mustafa Kemal asked Bayar to come to Ankara and once there Bayar 
went to the Parliament to meet Mustafa Kemal in person (Bayar, 1955: 76-77). 
After that meeting, Bayar and Atatürk worked together on several 
occasions. In most cases, it was Atatürk who asked Bayar to take up an office or a 
task. For instance, in 1924 he asked Bayar to set up a new national bank.  
Likewise in 1932 he asked Bayar to take office as minister of economics. This 
appointment was also the outcome of a dispute in which Atatürk supported Bayar. 
In 1932, the then ĠĢ Bank Chairman Bayar and Minister of Economics Mustafa 
ġeref Özkan had a disagreement about a pulp factory, to be established in Ġzmit. ĠĢ 
Bank would be responsible for setting up of this facility and would raise funds for 
the construction. Bayar had shared the plans with the Ministry of Economics and 
was waiting for their confirmation. However, Minister Özkan instead prioritized 
the establishment of a clock factory in Yozgat and delayed the approval for the 
pulp facility. When Atatürk found out about the problem, he had Özkan replaced 
with Bayar despite Prime Minister Ġnönü‟s protests (Altuğ, June, 14-15 1981, 
Tercüman daily). As mentioned above, when Bayar became Prime Minister in 
1937, it was again on Atatürk‟s wishes. Atatürk encouraged Bayar to take office 
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as prime minister and when the latter hesitated about his ability to control the 
army, Atatürk assured him that he would provide the necessary support to Bayar 
in this matter as well (Mazıcı, 1996: 41).  
Thus when Bayar was appointed prime minister, he already had a well-
established relationship with Atatürk, was used to working under his command 
and had a great deal of respect and admiration for him. Bayar showed his 
appreciation of Atatürk in the government program he introduced to Parliament 
on November 8, 1937. In the program, Atatürk was referred to 45 times and the 
Kemalist regime five times (Demirer, 2006: 31). The manner of his assignment, 
the government program and the background of this relationship all implied that 
Bayar was most likely to follow Atatürk‟s policy preferences and most unlikely to 
challenge him on fundamental political matters.  
Bayar worked with Atatürk for a little more than over a year until the latter 
passed away on November 10, 1938. During that time Bayar always sought 
Atatürk‟s approval before putting government‟s plans to work. As a matter of fact, 
the government program was also drawn up on Atatürk‟s directives (Mazıcı, 
1996: 44). In return, Atatürk closely supervised and followed Bayar‟s policies and 
acts. In his memoirs, Bayar wrote that after a few months of his inauguration as 
prime minister, Atatürk asked a prominent CHP member‟s opinion on Bayar‟s 
work. The member, whose name is not revealed in the memoirs, replied that 
Bayar was mostly concerned with daily issues. On a following night, Bayar was 
invited to president‟s residence and Atatürk welcomed Bayar to sit next to him. 
Then he informed Bayar of this observation. In return, Bayar gave an account of 
the deeds that the government had been engaged in and also said that they were 
preparing a long-term plan. The person who made the initial comment on daily 
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issues was also seated at the table and Atatürk told that person to focus on major 
matters rather than daily ones (Bayar, 1955: 105-106). This anecdote illustrates 
that Bayar was under the supervision of the President and that he had Atatürk‟s 
support.  
This state of affairs might have changed with Atatürk‟s deteriorating 
health.  Bayar started paying weekly visits to Istanbul in order to follow Atatürk‟s 
health and give him information on government activities. In those visits, Bayar 
attempted to include Atatürk in the decision-making but Atatürk‟s poor health 
must have limited this co-operation. His disease restricted him to bed and long 
hours of rest and comas. Yet he continued to supervise Bayar as much as he 
could. For instance, Bayar sought Atatürk‟s approval for the second five-year 
plan, which was negotiated and agreed upon in principle during a council of 
ministers meeting.
73
 The plan envisaged a number of investments including the 
purchase of new boats, construction of a power plant in Kütahya and of irrigation 
infrastructure in Sakarya among many others. Bayar felt the need to share the plan 
with Atatürk before putting it into action. In his regular weekend visit, he brought 
up the issue (Bayar, 1955: 85). Atatürk listened carefully, said that the 
approaching war in Europe might restrain Turkey‟s economic growth efforts and 
that the government should be quick in the implementation of the suggested plan 
(Bayar, 1955: 87). 
Another time, Atatürk was not able participate in the fifteenth year 
celebrations of the Republic in Ankara due to poor health and could not deliver 
his speech in Parliament as he used to do each year. Atatürk and Bayar compiled a 
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speech together and Bayar read it in Parliament (Bayar, 1955: 94). When the 
celebrations were over, Bayar reported extensively to Atatürk (Bayar, 1955:96).  
These anecdotes support the view that Bayar worked closely with 
President Atatürk. It seems likely that in 1937-1939 Atatürk devised the major 
policy lines in cooperation with Bayar and that the government as a whole was 
responsible for converting the major policy lines into executive plans and 
implement them. As proof of this observation, the word Bayar used most 
commonly during his time in office was directive. He considered each word of 
Atatürk as a directive and based all of his policies on these directives (Aydemir, 
2010: 156). Bayar referred to this short time he worked with President Atatürk as 
his most industrious and effective term.
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The next question is how Atatürk came to exert such influence on Bayar. 
Firstly, Bayar appreciated Atatürk‟s role in the Turkish War of Independence. 
Bayar thought that before Mustafa Kemal took the initiative and organized the 
national independence movement from one center in Ankara, the efforts of 
numerous individuals throughout occupied Anatolia were good-willed but futile.
75
 
Bayar believed that it was due to Atatürk that these individuals united in their 
struggle and that the Turkish homeland was saved from occupation.  
  Secondly, Atatürk had a wide influence on Bayar‟s political thinking. In 
1973, Bayar wrote a book titled To Think like Atatürk in which he sought to create 
a methodology following Atatürk‟s thinking to address political difficulties 
irrespective of time. Atatürk‟s thinking, or rather Bayar‟s interpretation of 
Atatürk‟s thinking had a central place in his conceptualization of politics. 
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Consequently, Bayar presented Atatürk as a reference point in his political 
thinking and advised the Turkish nation to do the same. On November 16, 1938, 
the date Ġnönü became President, Bayar spoke the following words in his 
parliamentary speech:  “Atatürk, to love and honor you is the national duty and 
virtue of each Turkish patriot” (ġahingiray, 1954: 357). When he came to the 
conclusion that Atatürk was not understood well enough among the Turkish 
people, he updated his line to “Atatürk, to comprehend you is national worship” 
(Bozdağ, 2009: 29). That was the task he undertook in writing his 1973 book, to 
teach people the ways of thinking like Atatürk.  
As for Bayar‟s interpretation of Atatürk‟s political thinking, Bayar thought 
that Atatürk was well aware of the ideological and dogmatic currents of his time 
yet he was neither a positivist nor a pragmatist although at times he appeared as 
both. “He was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk” (Bozdağ, 2009: 31). For Bayar, Atatürk 
represented a unique political approach embodied in a unique personality. When 
an advisor to the American president asked Bayar which historical/political leader 
Atatürk was looking up to, Bayar replied that Atatürk was unique in every way 
and that he never took any political figure as role-model (Kocatürk, 1986: 18).
76
  
Bayar considered Atatürk‟s political views and decisions to be always 
accurate. When he first arrived in Ankara and got to know Atatürk during the War 
of Independence years, there had been instances when they had disagreements. 
However, such differences of opinion ended in six months and Bayar arrived at 
the conclusion that Atatürk had always been right in matters they disagreed on 
and he began trusting Atatürk in all matters (Kocatürk, 1986: 17-18). Bayar 
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 Bayar did not specify the date for this chat with the advisor from the USA. Thus it is not 
possible to identify the president nor the identity of the advisor.  
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thought that Atatürk was superior to him in terms of judgment (Atay, et al., 
CoĢkun, November 10, 2007).  
Bayar did not refrain from defending his opinions on Atatürk in later 
years, even against his associates in the DP. One of the biggest disputes Bayar had 
with the DP was on damage inflicted upon a number of Atatürk sculptures in 
1950-1 by a religious fundamentalist group. President Bayar condemned these 
assaults and threatened that if the government did not find a way to fight 
effectively against them, he would resign from office, from Parliament and from 
the DP (Erkmen, 1982: 77). Also, as detailed in Chapter V Bayar took personal 
interest in the completion of the Anıtkabir (Atatürk‟s mausoleum) and spent effort 
in order to convert Atatürk‟s house in Thessaloniki into a museum. 
Bayar‟s admiration of Atatürk was often not one sided. Atatürk returned 
Bayar‟s admiration with certain gestures and he appreciated Bayar. For instance 
when Atatürk listened to Bayar for the first time in Parliament addressing the 
assembly, he thought that Bayar was a decent man but that he was also a 
revolutionary (Bayar, 1955: 82).
77
  In another instance, Atatürk said that if there is 
going to be a peaceful revolution in Turkey some day, Bayar was likely to be the 
leader of that movement (ġahingiray, 1999b: 38). Atatürk in these instances 
expressed his belief in Bayar‟s capacity to lead substantial political transitions 
wisely without bloodshed.  
Another instance of Atatürk expressing his support for Bayar was during 
the establishment days of the ĠĢ Bank in 1924. Fethi Okyar was then Turkey‟s 
ambassador to France. Henri Stegg, formerly General Director of the Ottoman 
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 The date for this remark is not mentioned. The exact expression Mustafa Kemal used is as 
follows: Dikkat edin bu adama, efendi adamdır, fakat ihtilalcidir.  
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Bank for 17 years, had paid a visit to Okyar in Paris to warn him about this new 
banking initiative. Okyar passed Stegg‟s warnings to Atatürk, who replied in the 
following manner: “I know Celal Bayar who is in charge of the ĠĢ Bank initiative. 
He handled more difficult affairs without leaving any gaps. I fully trust in his 
experience and knowledge” (YeĢilyurt, 1997: 68). Later on, while referring to the 
ĠĢ Bank, Atatürk said that he gave Bayar a sack of gold and Bayar in return 
delivered a national bank (Kinross, 1999: 527). 
In his Great Speech (Nutuk) in 1927, Atatürk praised Bayar‟s contributions 
to the independence struggle in the following words: “Following Ġzmir‟s 
occupation by Greek forces, certain army members and patriotic people from the 
local population were working in Aydın to unite the people against the 
occupation. In this respect, Celal Bey who left Ġzmir and joined them in disguise 
showed great efforts and sacrifice” (Atatürk, 1969:451, Volume 2). In 1936 
Atatürk made a voice record for Bayar where he praised Bayar‟s accomplishments 
as minister of economics (Bozdağ, 2005:78-79).78 As already mentioned, Atatürk 
considered Bayar to be the leading economist in Turkey.  
Their relations were also warm on a personal level. Bayar‟s last name was 
suggested by Atatürk. Bayar meant a noble person in Northern Turkish dialects 
and Atatürk considered this to be a suitable name for him (Mazıcı, 1996: 23). In 
another instance, Atatürk asked Bayar if Bayar‟s children would love him. Bayar 
replied that they most certainly would.
79
 Atatürk himself did not have any 
children besides his adopted daughters. When Bayar wrote his memoirs of the 
Turkish War of Independence in eight volumes in later years, it was also due to 
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 Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous. 
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Atatürk‟s request. The question Atatürk addressed to Bayar when Bayar gave an 
account of his memoirs of the war was “Have you written all these?” That is also 
why Bayar named his volumes Ben de Yazdım (I Also Wrote), in reply to 
Atatürk‟s question (Bayar, 1955: 80).  
4.2.3 Policies and Activities in Office 
The fifteen months Bayar stayed in office is a rather insufficient period of 
time to make an assessment of Bayar‟s policies- not only due to the briefness of 
this term but also for three other reasons: 
(1) President Atatürk was severely ill and so this was not an ordinary period. 
Bayar found himself under the consuming tasks of following the condition of 
Atatürk‟s health, coordinating government policies with Atatürk as much as the 
latter‟s health allowed and defying scenarios and plots that were discussed for the 
post-Atatürk transition in various circles. As a result, Bayar was regularly 
spending three days, from Friday to Sunday, in Istanbul each week for the last six 
months of Atatürk‟s life (Mazıcı, 1996: 44). When he was not in Istanbul, Bayar 
was following Atatürk‟s health through daily reports submitted to him (Altuğ, 
June 16, 1981, Tercüman daily). Therefore, it is quite likely that Bayar was 
preoccupied with the urgencies of this extraordinary phase and as a result, he had 
less time left for other policy matters, such as reform in the bureaucracy or the 
economy. This observation does not mean that Bayar chose to deal with these 
issues rather than pursuing a reform agenda. It was the context that put him face to 
face with these challenges and he could not have ignored them. 
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(2) Besides being extraordinary, this was a very short period to undertake any 
transformative reforms, observe outcomes of these reforms and make further 
adjustments depending on outcomes.  For instance, Bayar was expected to reform 
the bureaucracy but such reforms would have demanded a much longer time 
commitment for any considerable outcome as the bureaucracy was deeply 
entrenched in the state structure (Ahmad, 2003: 69). From the 17
th
 and the 18
th
 
century onwards, the bureaucracy had eventually expanded its share in the control 
of the state (Heper and Criss, 2009: 54) and thus the Republic of Turkey took over 
a pattern of a strong bureaucracy. In the 1930s, “the Republican version of the 
bureaucratic ruling tradition” was already well in place (Heper and Criss, 2009: 
55).  
(3) Bayar‟s field of activity had already been restrained to certain areas by 
President Atatürk, as elaborated above. Bayar was not in charge of a considerable 
extent in policy issues.  
The Bayar government certainly had an agenda and Bayar was expected to 
bring forward some changes, as explained in the reasons for his assignment. He 
provided a comprehensive government program, twenty times longer than the last 
Ġnönü government‟s program. It had the widest scope on matters related to the 
economy and the least on foreign policy. Investment in transportation 
infrastructure, reform in financial structures and trade policies, as well further 
planning mining policy, among many other issues, was promised in this plan. 
However, the context was so unfavorable that his initial agenda soon became 
irrelevant.  A different outcome might have been likely had the political context 
been different (Koçak, 1990: 119). 
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Beyond all impediments that the context presented for him, Bayar had 
substantial success as prime minister. He administered the post-Atatürk transition 
and election of Ġsmet Ġnönü to the presidency most skillfully. Consequently, he 
earned the respect and confidence of Ġnönü. This confidence later resulted in 
Ġnönü‟s approval and support of Celal Bayar as the opposition party‟s chairman 
(Mazıcı, 1996: 151). His policies and his role in the transition to Ġnönü‟s 
presidency are detailed below. 
4.2.3.1  Economics 
In this section, Bayar‟s impact in the formulation and implementation of 
economic policies are taken up. Here there is a deviation from the time scale 
followed in this chapter because Bayar was appointed minister of economics in 
1932 and so he already had an ongoing agenda and an impact in the field of 
economy when he was appointed prime minister. It should also be indicated that 
when Atatürk replaced the former Minister of Economics with Celal Bayar, the 
initiative in the planning and implementation of economic policies shifted from 
the prime ministry to the ministry of economics (Mazıcı, 1996: 23). Bayar thus 
already had a prominent position in the macro-economic planning from 1932 
onwards. For this reason 1932 is taken as the start for this section. This section 
includes three subsections: Bayar‟s views on the conduct of macro-economic 
policy and the concept of étatism,
80 
the importance of institution building in 
Bayar‟s policies, and international economic agreements.  
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 Bayar‟s political views have been taken up in Chapter III. However, in order to avoid repetition 
and provide a smoother flow of narration, his views on the economy are taken up in this section.  
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The context should be reminded briefly. Before Bayar was appointed 
minister of economics, Turkey was suffering from the consequences of the Great 
Depression that hit the world economy in 1929. Although Turkey could not have 
been considered as deeply integrated into the capitalist world market at that time, 
the national economy suffered from the fall of agricultural product prices as these 
were the main export items. A major source of revenue was thus shaken and the 
country faced difficulties in financing its imports with its declining export 
revenues (Lewis, 1968: 281). In order to address these difficulties, étatism was 
officially introduced in the 1931 CHP congress (Zürcher, 2004: 197; Karpat, 
2004e: 226) and Bayar undertook its implementation according to his own 
interpretation.  
4.2.3.1.1 On Etatism and the Economy 
Bayar placed emphasis on both the private sector and the state as engines 
of economic growth, complementary to one another. He likened the economy to a 
“delicate mimosa that reacts to all kinds of external influences”. For it to function 
smoothly, the economy had to “flow in the channels” that are prepared in 
advance. One of the state‟s main functions was to provide these channels and 
intervene to regulate and fix whenever their function was impaired (Bozdağ, 
2009: 188-189; Karpat, 1967: 257).  
Although Bayar is mentioned as liberal in some resources due to his 
emphasis on private enterprise, this is a misleading statement as he defined his 
task as prime minister and minister of economics to eliminate liberalism from the 
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Turkish economy.
81
 Liberalism had already been discredited by 1932 due to the 
lingering effects of the Great Depression and Bayar had been summoned to 
manage an economic program shaped around étatism. Bayar was a proponent of 
the étatist rhetoric. He referred to liberalism in the following terms: “Liberalism, I 
cannot even pronounce it properly, is an alien notion to me” (Kuruç, 2009: 312). 82 
Bayar‟s strong dislike of liberalism was related to his dislike of ideologies, as 
discussed in Chapter III. Bayar‟s accommodating approach toward the private 
sector and his methods to increase efficiency in the economy did not mean that he 
was a liberal. He was in favor of a combination of state involvement in the 
economy and the promotion of private enterprise through state incentives (Mazıcı, 
1996: 103). 
Bayar was aware that his understanding, which designated an equally 
pivotal role for private enterprise, was relevant only under normal economic 
conditions and could not be exercised in times of crises. Bayar agreed that  the 
Turkish economy was in a state of crisis in 1932-1939, and intensified state 
intervention was crucial for a temporary period (Ahmad, 2003: 90). He embraced 
étatism, developing and eventually implementing his own interpretation. He 
thought that the short-term objective of Turkish economic planning and policies 
should be a quick recovery from the effects of the Great Depression and capital 
accumulation. These objectives called for the state‟s substantial intervention in the 
economy. Turkey, in Bayar‟s words, did not have the financial capital and the 
human capital to realize these objectives through private sector activity alone 
(Karpat, 1967: 256). Bayar estimated that if the task was left in the hands of the 
private sector, it would take at least 200 years for the economy to recover (Hale, 
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1980: 107). From 1932 to 1939, the weight of the state in the country‟s economy 
increased considerably. In 1932, the state‟s overall share in the country‟s 
industrial establishments was 2.1 percent. By 1939, the percentage rose to 9.7 
(Boztemur, 1996: 78).  
Bayar considered étatism as a policy implemented on a global scale. He 
thought that the consequences of the Great Depression made most nations follow 
statist policies (ġahingiray, 1999a: 282-283). He defended the state‟s undertaking 
of major industrial and financial investments by giving examples from Germany, 
France and the Unites States that adopted statist policies. Yet Bayar saw étatism 
employed in Turkey to be born out of the country‟s specific needs and considered 
it to be unique to Turkey (Bozdağ,1986: 44). It is likely that Bayar made this point 
on the authenticity of Turkish étatism with a motivation to differentiate Turkish 
étatism from statist policies of socialist economies such as the USSR. Bayar was 
also opposed to state capitalism, highlighting that the objective of étatism was not 
the creation and retention of profitable state monopolies in certain economic 
sectors (Bayar, 1946:2). 
For Bayar, étatism was not a strictly defined thinking that had the same 
policy solutions for different challenges nor was it limited to state‟s undertaking 
of certain economic investments. Bayar had a much broader interpretation of 
étatism: “étatism is the struggle to realize a nation‟s highest potential in terms of 
culture, social issues and economy and the core of this struggle is to minimize the 
time required to make achievements in this pursuit” (Bayar, 1946:2). Thus 
Bayar‟s étatism was not strictly economy centered. Since the necessities of his 
time as minister of economics and prime minister presented economic challenges, 
it was in this  field, on which the state focused its energies. Had another policy 
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field required state‟s attention, the same interest would be shown in that field too 
(Bayar, 1946:2).  
Beyond time and context specific policy approaches, Bayar defined the 
objective of any economic activity and planning as being the creation of a national 
economy (Bayar, 1946:2). The emphasis on the national aspect of the economy 
can be seen in most of Bayar‟s speeches and comments because he thought that 
being an independent state did not necessarily mean full independence unless 
supported by a well functioning economy (Bozdağ, 1986: 17).83 Bayar even 
referred to the ministry of economy as ministry of national economy until he was 
warned by his legal advisors that the latter title was in contradiction with the legal 
title (Kutay, 1982: 11). 
4.2.3.1.2 Etatism in Practice: Institution Building, Planning and 
Nationalization 
Bayar laid the framework of his policies in the two industrialization plans 
and the government program he introduced in Parliament. The first industrial plan 
covered 1934-1938 and the second plan covered 1939-1943. These plans were not 
developed on the basis of sophisticated economic calculations or future economic 
projections. They consisted of a number of objectives in distinct sectors of the 
economy (Hale, 1980: 101). The scope was broad and the objectives raised in the 
plans were numerous. National industrial development rather than agricultural 
production was prioritized among the objectives. The plans focused on the 
chemical, earthenware, iron, paper, sulfur, sponge, cotton textile, worsted and 
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hemp sectors. It was hoped that an increase in the output of these sectors would 
decrease the amount of imports and help to achieve trade balance (Shaw and 
Shaw, 1977: 391). The government program repeated the objectives set out in the 
first industrial plan.
84
  
The most significant method Bayar employed to reach the mentioned 
objectives as minister of economics and as prime minister was institution 
building. Bayar‟s skills of institution building had already been recognized by the 
state elites earlier in his Ġzmir and Bursa years, as detailed in Chapter III. His 
success at the ĠĢ Bank drew further attention to these skills. In the governmental 
posts he took Bayar continued institution building, now on a larger scale. 
As minister of economics, he contributed to the establishment of 
Sümerbank (Sumerbank) in 1933 and Etibank (Hittite Bank) in 1935. Both these 
banks brought state owned enterprises under a single umbrella and presented these 
enterprises certain advantages, such as the right to borrow from the Central Bank 
with a low rate of interest (Zürcher, 2004: 198). Sümerbank undertook a 
substantial role in the establishment of light and heavy industrial estates, operated 
state owned factories, often co-operated with private capital by participating in 
other operations and provided borrowing facilities for private business like a 
regular bank (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:391). Etibank focused on mineral and gas 
extraction and exploitation, coal mining, setting up power plants and marketing 
these products to domestic as well as international markets (Shaw and Shaw, 
1977:392).  
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Another bank established in 1933 was the İller Bankası (Bank of 
Provinces). This bank sought to invest in provincial, municipal and more local 
development projects (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:392). Bayar also set up the 
Denizbank (Maritime Bank) in 1938. The bank‟s objective was to operate the 
recently nationalized merchant fleet, conduct freight operations and build port 
facilities, among other things (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:392). In 1933 the Halk 
Bankası (People‟s Bank) was established to provide loans that would be used in 
the establishment of small scale industries, which would provide spare parts for 
large scale industrial operations (Bozdağ, 2005: 64-65). Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi 
(The Office of Soil Products) was established in 1938 to establish minimum prices 
for agricultural products on the market and provide a certain amount of stocks for 
scarce years (Hale, 1980: 109). Bayar had a role in the establishment of all these 
banks and institutions.  
As mentioned, the overarching goal of Bayar‟s economic policies was to 
enhance the national aspects of the economy. Besides supporting national industry 
and production by lowering imports, the most straightforward way to nationalize 
the economy was to take over foreign owned companies mostly established during 
the Ottoman era. In 1933-1938, the following companies were nationalized and 
put under state management: the Mudanya-Bursa railroad, the Ġzmir-Afyon 
railroad, the Manisa-Bandırma railroad, the Turkish Water Company, the Ġzmir 
Dock Company, the Istanbul Dock and Warehouse, the Istanbul Phone Company, 
the Ereğli Dock, the Zonguldak railroad and coal mines, the Eastern Railroads, the 
Aydın Railroad, the Ġzmir Phone Company, the Istanbul Phone Company, and the 
Istanbul Lighthouses Company (Mazıcı, 1996: 24).  
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In retrospect, Bayar‟s policies had certain positive outcomes. New 
industrial sectors such as pulp, mining, ceramics and textile were introduced to the 
country and economic growth reached a yearly average of nine percent and 
industrial enterprises grew at a rate of 10.2 percent from 1932 to 1939 (Mazıcı, 
1996: 24). Favorable conditions were established for the smooth functioning of 
the domestic market, production related matters were organized in a modern way 
and necessary steps to realize price standardization were taken. Credit options for 
business were expanded and interest rates were decreased. On an international 
trade level, domestic production was organized in line with foreign demand and 
international trade started to be treated in an institutional and professional manner. 
The cost of living decreased, especially with regard to certain items, for example 
meat products (Mazıcı, 1996: 105).  
As a result, the economy gradually recovered from the state of crisis. As 
Turkey‟s strategic importance was acknowledged more due to the approaching 
world war, major international actors also began to contribute to Turkey‟s 
finances. Turkey was able to secure a 16 million sterling loan from Britain and 
immediately after the British loan, it was offered a 150 million mark loan by 
Germany (Mango, 1999: 742). On the negative side, the fiscal discipline that 
marked the period before 1932 was loosened and there emerged an imbalance in 
the budget by 1938 due to the high growth rates and less emphasis on fiscal 
discipline (Kuruç, 2009: 307-308).  
Regarding the objectives laid out in the first and second industrialization 
plans, most of the sectors mentioned in the first plan could never be taken up 
through policies (Aydemir, 1999: 354-355). The broad scope and the unrealistic 
nature of the objectives laid out must have brought about such an end result.  As 
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for the objectives of the second plan, they could never be truly pursued due to the 
outbreak of the Second World War (Aydemir, 1999: 354-355). 
4.2.3.1.3  International Economic Agreements 
As minister of economics and later on as prime minister, Bayar worked to 
conclude a number of trade and economic co-operation treaties with foreign 
nations. These agreements were not in contrast or an alternative to Atatürk‟s 
foreign policy. They were complementary to President Atatürk‟s policy as he was 
also involved in the planning of these agreements. Yet Bayar‟s role and input 
were also substantial.  
International economic agreements were important because they laid the 
ground for future political co-operation with the signatory states. One example is 
the agreements signed with certain Balkan states. Bayar stated that Atatürk 
assigned him the task to prepare the economic and financial background of the 
Balkan Pact.
85
 For that purpose, Bayar concluded financial agreements with the 
future Balkan Pact countries (Bozdağ, 2005: 57). The Sadabat Pact also developed 
as a result of a similar process where economic co-operation was followed by 
political co-operation. 
86
 
The following economic agreements were signed during Bayar‟s prime 
ministry: the Turkey-Japan Trade Agreement (1937), the Turkey-Romania Trade 
Agreement, the Turkey-Latvia Trade and Clearing Agreement, the Turkey-
Sweden Trade and Clearing Agreement, the Turkey-Germany Financial 
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Agreement,
87
 the Turkey-United Kingdom Financial Agreement, the Turkey-
USSR Trade Agreement (all in 1938), and the Turkey-Afghanistan Trade 
Agreement extension (1939) (Mazıcı, 1996: 86-87).  
4.2.3.2 Domestic Political Issues 
For reasons already mentioned, an ambitious agenda in domestic politics 
could not be expected from the Bayar governments. Yet this should not imply that 
Bayar and his government were totally passive. As prime minister, Bayar 
communicated with Atatürk in the decision making process, took his policy 
preferences into consideration and devised the government‟s policies accordingly. 
When it came to major issues such as the Dersim uprisings and its suppression, it 
was President Atatürk‟s choices that determined the policies to be implemented.  
In the government program, Bayar provided a picture of how he 
interpreted the political context in 1937. According to him, there were no 
domestic political conflicts in Turkey, in contrast to certain other countries where 
domestic political violence was a major concern. Thus, he added, the context 
provided a favorable background for the planning and implementation of a wide 
variety of policies and activities in various economic sectors (TBMM, 2011b: 2). 
Despite the extensiveness of the government program, Bayar did not include any 
references to press freedom, academic research matters and labor issues (Özoral, 
2004: 44). It can thus be said that matters related to core political issues such as 
the freedom of the press, the academia or workers‟ rights were not problematized 
in the government program. It was made clear from the outset that the Bayar 
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government did not have the intention to address core political matters. The 
program focused on economic development. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the 
following parts, the political context posed certain challenges to the Bayar 
government besides economic matters and Bayar had to implement policies to 
address these challenges.  
In terms of the laws legislated during Bayar‟s term in office, two 
seemingly opposite trends in relation to state control are observed. On one hand, 
there were signs of loosening the grip on political expression. The annulment of 
political undersecretaries in 1937 and the 1938 Amnesty Law were two signs of 
this change. The Amnesty Law promulgated in the fifteenth year of the Republic 
on June 29, 1938, allowed for the return of 150 dissidents whom the Kemalist 
regime had earlier exiled. The amnesty decision was taken by Atatürk himself and 
the procedure was implemented by Bayar (Mango, 1999: 742). Bayar mentioned 
two reasons for declaring an amnesty. Firstly, among elites of the regime it was 
agreed that the Republic and the Kemalist regime had been consolidated and “the 
unfortunate who betrayed the regime or fought against it” should be shown the 
Republic‟s accomplishments. Secondly, Bayar mentioned that they wanted to 
prove to the world that the regime had become consolidated and had nothing to 
fear for its stability (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Term: 5, Volume 26: 507).  
Annulment of the political undersecretary positions in November 1937, 
almost immediately after their introduction in March 1937, was also a sign that 
the regime was not willing to introduce a firmer grasp on political actors. The 
officially stated justification for the establishment of political undersecretaries had 
been raising statesmen and facilitating the relations between the ministries and 
Parliament (Birlik, 2010:256). In practice, it meant putting ministries under the 
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control of the party in an indirect manner. According to a new article placed in the 
1924 Constitution, political undersecretaries were chosen by the prime minister 
from among parliament members and their final appointment was subject to the 
president‟s approval (TBMM, 2011a).  
Atatürk thought this was an unnecessary practice, that it intervened in the 
usual functioning of ministries and that it was a tool employed by totalitarian 
governments (Mazıcı, 1996: 49, 52). Atatürk also thought that if the politicians in 
undersecretary positions had anything to say regarding the ministries or other 
political matters, they should do this in Parliament. He wrote a letter to Prime 
Minister Celal Bayar in which he summarized his views on undersecretaries and 
said that if Bayar also shared his point of view, he intended to put an end to the 
office of political undersecretaries (Birlik, 2010: 284). Bayar supported Atatürk‟s 
opinion and the office of political undersecretaries was thus annulled (Bozdağ, 
1986: 55).  
On the other hand, the Bayar government undertook certain policies and 
measures that limited the freedom of expression. The Law on the Unity of Press 
(Basın Birliği Yasası) and the Law on Associations (Cemiyetler Kanunu) both 
legislated on June 28, 1938 were examples of such restrictions (Mazıcı, 1996: 66). 
With the former law, the press was put under the close surveillance of government 
and permits to issue new publications were made more difficult to acquire. 
Consequently, freedom of press was considerably curtailed (Mazıcı, 1996: 66). 
The Law on Associations defined barriers for activities of the associations. New 
regulations included restrictions on associations‟ rights to attain real estate and 
bans on student clubs‟ political agendas. Limitations on the usage of the terms 
“republic” and “national” in associations‟ names were also introduced (Mazıcı, 
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1996: 67). Setting up associations was also made harder. Before this law, setting 
up associations was not subject to any legal constraints. However, in practice even 
before the law was legislated the founders of associations had to acquire the 
permit of state authorities.  With this law, the obligation to obtain a permit was 
legally codified (Tanör, 2011: 319). 
Although at first instance the amnesty decision and the abandonment of 
political undersecretaries on one side and restrictions brought upon the freedom of 
press and associations on the other might seem to be contradictory, they were all 
responses to certain domestic and foreign developments. The removal of political 
undersecretaries was Atatürk‟s decision. Atatürk thought such institutions would 
make the Turkish regime resemble certain totalitarian regimes of Europe and he 
did not want such an association on an institutional level. The amnesty law was 
also contextual as the regime was thought to have been consolidated. On the other 
hand, increased control of the press was likewise contextual, probably prompted 
by growing nationalism, inspired by but not modeled after Italian and German 
examples as well as the impact caused by the Dersim uprising (Mazıcı, 1996: 
150). 
Besides these major legislations, the Bayar government had to address a 
number of policy issues that emerged during 1937-1939. One such matter was 
Hatay. The details of the matter have already been shared in Chapter II. Here it 
should be restated that Atatürk, rather than Bayar, was influential in the conduct 
of affairs on Hatay. Bayar did not devise his own policy line in this matter and 
followed Atatürk. Bayar mainly informed the parliament of the progress that was 
achieved throughout the negotiations. For instance, in his address to parliament on 
June 29, 1938, in rather vague terms he mentioned that the negotiations with 
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France on Hatay were continuing and that a settlement with the French 
government was due in weeks (ġahingiray, 1954: 352-353). Bayar also tried to 
raise awareness in favor of the Turkish cause in Hatay and encourage the people 
of Hatay to seek their rights. He publicy accused the French of provoking chaos in 
Hatay through inflicting violence upon groups that demonstrated in support of 
Turkey‟s cause throughout the city and advised the people of Hatay to maintain 
their stand against the French (Shields, 2011: 190). 
Another substantial issue was the Dersim revolt that had been continuing 
since March 1937. Like most major policy issues, Dersim was also in President 
Atatürk‟s domain. Bayar emphasized that the decision to engage in military 
operations in Dersim was taken by Atatürk and that he witnessed one of the 
moments when one such decision was arrived. Chief of Staff Fevzi Çakmak 
(1924-1944), Bayar and Atatürk were following the army‟s maneuvers in Dersim 
and discussing the strategy to be adopted. Bayar considered himself as an 
observer in this conversation rather than a participant because he thought Atatürk 
and Çakmak were experienced soldiers and that they were more qualified to speak 
on that matter. As this conversation was continuing, they were informed that some  
gendarmerie stations in Dersim had been attacked by rebels. Upon these news, 
Atatürk declared that he took all the responsibility and that there would be a major 
military operation in Dersim (Altuğ, September 17, 1986, Tercüman daily).  
Bayar informed the Parliament on the incidents taking place in Dersim. He 
also worked on long and mid-term socio-economic development plans for Dersim. 
For instance in his address to the Parliament on June 29, 1938 he mentioned that 
the army was going to conduct “maneuvers” in Dersim and that the government 
was already implementing a rehabilitation program there which focused on the 
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construction of roads, bridges, police and gendarmerie stations as well as schools. 
(ġahingiray, 1954: 352).   
4.2.4 İnönü’s Election and Bayar’s Role 
Bayar was closely following Atatürk‟s deteriorating health and all the 
discussions related to the post-Atatürk period to act against possible conspiracies 
(Koçak, 1990: 120). Falih Rıfkı Atay recognized Bayar‟s cautious approach when 
the latter uttered the following words: “..how can I tell Atatürk to hold a new 
[presidential] election. After Lenin‟s death, [Leon] Trotsky was the natural 
candidate for the new Russian leadership. In order to eliminate Trotsky in favor of 
Stalin, millions of people were killed. We have no room for such tragedies” (Atay, 
1969: 499).
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Bayar highlighted the significance of the transition process in the 
following words: “..[for me] this was a question of the regime. It was so important 
to me that if I had sensed a threat, I would first get the conspirators executed and 
get the court hearing only later”. Bayar was aware that this meant disregarding the 
constitution but in such a time of crisis he found guaranteeing the unity and peace 
of the nation and the state more important than observing legal procedures. He 
also mentioned that this was the only time that he dared to ignore the word of the 
constitution. He thought in case of such emergency, insistence on usual 
procedures and rules might result in a violent civil war and open the way to 
discussions of the restoration of the caliphate and the abolition of the Republic 
(Bozdağ, 1986: 60-61).  
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Bayar also followed the press closely regarding the news of Atatürk‟s 
health condition. For instance in August 1938 when Ahmet Emin Yalman wrote 
about Atatürk‟s failing health in the Tan daily, Bayar declared such articles to be 
detrimental to the peace in the country. Upon Bayar‟s directives, Minister of 
Interior ġükrü Kaya had the Tan daily banned for three months (Mazıcı, 1996: 
113-114). Bayar feared that any public discussion and speculation on this issue 
could result in severe political conflict. 
Bayar not only prevented the emergence of any major conspiracy, but he 
also made Ġnönü‟s election to the presidency easier. For instance, he refused to 
engage in dialogue with Ġnönü‟s adversaries and maintained contact with Ġnönü 
during Atatürk‟s illness (Zürcher, 2004:  184). In his memoirs Ġnönü wrote that as 
Atatürk‟s illness became more severe, Bayar began to inform him of Atatürk‟s 
condition regularly (Ġnönü, 2008: 255, Volume 1). Besides, Bayar had not 
engaged in any acts that would marginalize Ġnönü in 1937-1939 and alienate him 
from the political scene. Thus, Bayar had already helped Ġnönü to maintain a 
political base for his future political activities (Koçak, 1990: 121). Lastly, Bayar 
refused to seek the presidency for himself.  
News of Atatürk‟s death came when Bayar was in Ankara. He learnt that 
the regular health report would this time be sent coded in the evening. Bayar 
understood the gravity of the situation and summoned the council of ministers to 
his home. He also thought Ġnönü should be present at such a critical moment and 
picked up Ġnönü from the latter‟s home himself (Altuğ, June 17, 1981, Tercüman 
daily).  
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Bayar skillfully negotiated with several stakeholders before the 
presidential election in Parliament. For instance he paid a visit to Chief of Staff 
Fevzi Çakmak to ask about the military‟s candidate for the presidency and found 
out that the military was not willing to be involved in this process. Çakmak stated 
that he would not seek the office for himself and that the military would recognize 
the Parliament as the only authority for the next president‟s election (Barlas, May 
17, 1982, Milliyet daily).  
In November 1938, the CHP group was summoned under Bayar‟s 
chairmanship to discuss the presidential candidate. Bayar asked the group 
members to write down their preferred candidate on a piece of paper and said that 
whoever got the most votes would be elected president in Parliament. During the 
election held in Parliament on the same day, Ġnönü obtained 322 votes out of 323 
and was elected president (Bozdağ, 1986: 62). One vote was cast for Bayar by 
Hikmet Bayur (Mazıcı, 1996: 120).89 
 4.2.5 The End of Bayar’s Term as Prime Minister 
Bayar resigned from office following Ġnönü‟s election on November 16, 
1938. He was re-appointed by President Ġnönü and served until his second 
resignation on January 25, 1939. Just like Atatürk used to be, Ġnönü also became 
the most decisive influence on Bayar. Bayar considered Atatürk‟s impact to be 
purely positive and he referred to the short period they worked together as very 
efficient.
90
 Bayar did not expect to have a similar experience with Ġnönü, 
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 Hikmet Bayur (1891-1980) was a member of Parliament in 5th, 6th, 7th and 10th as well as 11th 
terms. He was also minister of education from 1933 to 1934.  
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 Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.  
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nevertheless he accepted  the latter‟s offer to stay in office for two  reasons. 
Firstly, Bayar considered this as a part of his duties as a statesman. Ġnönü had told 
him that this was an obligation he could not refuse, considering the political 
context (Mazıcı, 1996: 123). Ġnönü must have referred to the necessity of creating 
a sense of continuity with the Atatürk phase when he mentioned the political 
context. Secondly, Bayar also pointed out Atatürk‟s final wishes to have been 
influential in his decision to stay in office. Atatürk had told Bayar that they were 
at the beginning of a radiant road and that they should accomplish the objectives 
set out. Atatürk was talking in broad terms but it is likely that he also referred to 
objectives in the economy. The Bayar government had not yet been able to 
achieve these objectives. For these reasons Bayar thought that he should work 
more for the accomplishment of economic growth.  Nevertheless Bayar was aware 
of the difficulties this new arrangement would bring for himself. The government 
program Bayar presented to parliament on November 16, 1938 was much shorter 
and less detailed than the first Bayar government‟s program (Zürcher, 2004: 185) 
although content wise they were mostly identical (Bozdağ, 1986: 63). This was a 
sign that the government was not going to be long-lived.  
Bayar felt Ġnönü‟s influence from the start of the latter‟s presidency. Bayar 
had to introduce certain changes to his cabinet as per President Ġnönü‟s requests 
(Uran, 1959: 324).  In the second Bayar government, Bayar replaced Minister of 
Interior ġükrü Kaya with Refik Saydam and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik 
RüĢtü Aras with ġükrü Saracoğlu.91 It came as no surprise to Bayar that Ġnönü 
insisted on these changes (Mazıcı, 1996: 123). Ġnönü also confirmed his part in 
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 According to Mazıcı, the reason for this change in the cabinet was Ġnönü‟s wish to appoint 
ministers who were closer to him.  
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these changes writing in his memoirs that he requested changes in the cabinet and 
that Bayar agreed after a slight hesitation (Ġnönü, 2008: 255, Volume 1).  
On January 25, 1939, after the CHP assembly took the decision to hold 
national elections on March 26, 1939, Bayar declared his resignation from office 
(Bozdağ, 1986: 64). Ġnönü accepted Bayar‟s withdrawal and thanked him for his 
services in a letter (Ġnönü, 2008: 257, Volume 1). The second Bayar government 
had remained in office for only 74 days. The official reasons provided for the 
government‟s withdrawal were the approaching elections and the necessity to 
enter the elections under a new government. In his letter of resignation, Bayar 
explained that the reason for his resignation was to “..take our party to elections 
with a new and fresh force” (Mazıcı, 1996:143). Bayar repeated the same reason 
in his interviews.
92
 Refik Saydam succeeded Bayar as prime minister and stayed 
in office until his death in July 1942 (Zürcher, 2004: 185). 
In reality there were other reasons for this break-up:  
(1) The second Bayar government was in a fragile position. Ġnönü mentioned 
corruption allegations around the Impex company, Denizbank and a plane 
smuggling issue that made him lose his trust in the government (Ġnönü, 2008: 256, 
Volume 1).
93
 Thus the government found itself under the close scrutiny of 
President Ġnönü who was conducting an investigation of the activities undertaken 
by the first Bayar government. Essentially the second Bayar government was on 
an unpleasant ground where it was asked to assist the inspection on the activities 
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 See for instance Kutay, 1982: 164. 
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 An export and import company, Impex had been working with English companies and promised 
to get these companies government tenders in return for a commission. Denizbank allegations 
concerned alleged misconduct involved in the purchase of boats from Germany. The plane 
smuggling issue was related to the allegations that an international smuggling network was selling 
aircraft to Spain in Turkey‟s name during the Spanish Civil War. For a detailed account of these 
incidents, see Mazıcı, 1996: 129-142. 
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of the first Bayar government (Koçak, 1990: 125). The government‟s prestige and 
standing was impaired during the investigation of the allegations (Koçak, 1990: 
125) because certain government members were thought to be associated with 
these corruption cases.
94
 Although none of the investigations followed by court 
cases convicted any government member guilty for corruption, Ġnönü was 
nevertheless not happy with the results of these investigations. He noted that he 
called Prime Minister Bayar to discuss these allegations and then a “necessity for 
Bayar‟s withdrawal occurred” (Ġnönü, 2008: 256, Volume 1). Upon Bayar‟s 
resignation, Ġnönü wrote in his journal that he had been relieved after the 
government‟s resignation because he had thought that it would have been difficult 
to work with the “discredited” government until the elections (Ġnönü, 2008: 256, 
Volume 1).  
For his part Bayar expressed that he was aware of the investigation that 
Ġnönü was conducting. Bayar remembered the moment when he incidentally 
found out about this investigation. While visiting Ġnönü in his office, Bayar 
overheard Ġnönü‟s conversation with ĠĢ Bank manager Muammer EriĢ. EriĢ was 
telling Ġnönü that Bayar owed 45.000 Turkish Liras to the Bank. Upon hearing 
this, Ġnönü commented that this was proof of Bayar‟s honesty, because it showed 
Bayar‟s ability to expand the bank‟s operations without getting any benefits for 
himself otherwise he would not need any loans from the Bank. This was the loan 
that Bayar owed to the bank for an apartment he bought (Bozdağ, 2005:100). Yet, 
despite his appreciation of Bayar in this matter, Ġnönü thought that the 
government as a whole was discredited.  
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(2) The conduct of the economy continued to be a source of friction between 
Bayar and Ġnönü. In his memoirs, Ġnönü stated that he would have ideally wanted 
to work longer with Bayar because he considered Bayar to be an honest man. But 
Ġnönü also wrote that he had no hopes of diverting Bayar‟s economic policies to a 
different path, and thus gave up on Bayar (Ġnönü, 2008: 257, Volume 1). Ġnönü 
thought Bayar‟s current economy management left too much room for 
“demagogy” and that his policies were destroying the state‟s fiscal condition, the 
currency and the trade balance (Ġnönü, 2008: 256, Volume 1). In return, Bayar 
thought that Ġnönü did not have a wide grasp of economic issues, due to his 
military background, and sought to protect the status quo and the bureaucracy 
rather than pursue reforms (Mazıcı, 1996: 144). This major policy difference 
between Bayar and Ġnönü made it impossible for them to work together in the 
long run.  
(3) Ġnönü also mentioned conflicts among cabinet members as a reason for his 
criticism of the government. Before asking Bayar to withdraw, Ġnönü had 
informed a senior CHP member, Hasan Saka, and Minister of Justice in the 
second Bayar government, Hilmi Uran, about his decision to ask for the 
government‟s withdrawal. Ġnönü thought that the cabinet members could not get 
along well and this created chaos (Uran, 1959: 346). However, this observation 
about conflicts among the government members cannot be substantiated from 
other accounts.  
Following his resignation from office, Bayar remained as a deputy from 
Ġzmir and did not take part in major political disputes until 1945, when the 
decision to establish the opposition party DP was taken.  
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CHAPTER V 
CELAL BAYAR AS PRESIDENT, 1950-1960 
 
5.1 The Presidency According to the Constitution and in Practice 
According to the 1924 Turkish Constitution the president lacked 
institutional mechanisms to be involved in government‟s affairs (Gönenç, 2008: 
492; Arsel, 1954: 9). The most considerable powers of the president were to 
designate the prime minister from among the members of Parliament and return 
the laws to the Parliament for reconsideration within ten days following the day 
of legislation.
95
 However, the latter was not an effective veto tool as it could be 
overrun by a simple majority vote. The president did not have a right to return 
the same law to the Parliament for further reconsideration (Sevinç, 2002: 115).  
The president was not in a position to determine and execute government 
policies. However he had the right to preside over the council of ministers 
meetings whenever he found it necessary (Arsel, 1961: 45). The president was 
                                                          
95
 During the single party years, presidents did not return any law to Parliament for reconsideration 
(GüneĢ, 1964: 175).  
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also not allowed to take part in parliamentary discussions or vote although, he 
was, by definition, a member of Parliament (Arsel, 1961: 46).  
The only exceptions to president‟s enforced absence from parliamentary 
discussions were his annual addresses to the Parliament each November. 
According to article 36, in these speeches the president was entitled to speak 
about the government‟s activities in the previous year and point out the measures 
that should be taken in the coming year regarding several policy issues. If the 
president was not in a position to deliver the speech him/herself, he could 
appoint the prime minister to read it in his place.  
The president also had the obligation to represent the Republic of Turkey 
in dealings with representatives of foreign nations. Finally, the president also 
acted as commander in chief of the Turkish armed forces on behalf of the 
Parliament. As for the manner of election, presidential candidates had to be 
members of Parliament in order to run for the office. The president was elected 
for a term of four years by Parliament and there were no restrictions on his re-
election. 
It is often stated that the 1924 Constitutional arrangement sought to 
create an impartial presidency (Arsel, 1954:9; Özbudun, 2012: 48). This 
argument is raised on three grounds. First, it is pointed out that the president‟s 
exemption from parliamentary vote  and dissociation from government affairs 
showed that the makers of the 1924 Constitution wanted to dissacociate the 
president from everyday politics (Arsel, 1954: 9). Second, it is emphasized that 
the regime created by the 1924 Constitution resembled that of a parliamentary 
regime (Özbudun, 2012: 37) and it did not bear any resemblance to a 
 167 
 
presidential regime. Under a parliamentary regime, it is the prime minister who 
holds the political power and the initiative. Third, the powers granted to the 
president by the 1924 Constitution, such as the power to chair the council of 
ministers meetings whenever necessary, are also attributed to a search for an 
impartial presidency. It was thought that these powers would enable the 
president to act as an impartial negotiator above daily political conflicts 
(Özbudun, 2012: 46) and make necessary interventions in the conflicts without 
having to be politically engaged with a certain group or party. Neverthless the 
impartiality principle is not openly mentioned in the text of the 1924 
Constitution. This absence and the lack of mechanisms to ensure such 
impartiality caused political conflict during 1950-1960 as further detailed below. 
The drafters of 1961 and 1982 constitutions paid attention to including the 
impartiality principle explicitly. 
The drafters of the 1924 Constitution paid attention not to create a 
powerful presidency. In order to avoid this, the original draft of the 1924 
Constitution, proposing a seven-year term and considerable veto powers that 
could be overrun only by at least two thirds of the parliamentary votes, was 
revised. Consequently the powers of the president were curtailed (Özbudun and 
Gençkaya, 2009: 12).  
Nevertheless during the single party years, presidents were in practice the 
most powerful figures of the political regime and they exercised more power 
than stated in the Constitution (Gönenç, 2008: 492). They were strong political 
leaders who placed the domestic and international consolidation of the new 
regime before anything else. In order to realize this objective they kept the 
political regime under their personal control. They were not ready to consider 
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abandoning their positions before they were convinced that the regime and its 
main tenets were safe. 
 The de facto influence of the first two presidents was also the outcome 
of the single party discipline that aligned the government and the Parliament 
under the leadership of one person. The presidents, being also the chairpersons 
of the CHP, took their place at the highest level of the political hierarchy 
(Gönenç, 2008: 492). Consequently, it was considered normal for the first two 
presidents to make policy recommendations, express their opinions or even issue 
directives as the chairpersons of the governing party (Koçak, 2009: 120). This 
understanding was rarely challenged during the single party years. As a rare 
exception to this observation, Ġnönü attempted to formalize the government in 
the 1920s and the 1930s because Atatürk frequently bypassed Ġnönü‟s 
regulations and insisted that ministers report to him directly (Heper, 2000:67). 
However Ġnönü did not have any success in changing this practice.  During his 
own presidency, he also established a personalized style that very much 
depended on him as the “national chief” (Heper, 2000:67). 
The 1924 Constitution posed certain challenges for presidents to assume 
an impartial position. Firstly, the requirement to be a deputy in order to run for 
office often implied affiliation with a political party, unless the presidential 
candidate was elected to the Parliament independently. This requirement also 
implied that politicians seeking office would first have to campaign for their 
election to Parliament.  
This obligation did not raise any controversies during the single party 
years. After 1946, however, it became a matter of dispute.  During the multi-
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party era it has been observed that the obligation to have a seat in Parliament to 
run for office put the president in a difficult position. It raised concerns over the 
question of how a president who, supposedly, spent the former four years 
arbitrating between different political parties could campaign for his election as 
a deputy from a particular political party (Forum bi-weekly, May 15, 1954). As 
will be further taken up below, as a consequence of this constitutional 
arrangement Bayar was involved in the DP‟s election campaigns in 1950-1960 
and this caused some observers to conclude that he was not impartial.  
Secondly, the constitutional obligation to deliver an annual parliamentary 
speech on the policies of the government also created an awkward situation. This 
speech was, on paper, an overview of the previous year‟s activities followed by a 
set of recommendations. It mainly reflected the president‟s opinions. The 
content of this speech in practice could be partisan and lead to the association of 
the president with the government. Bayar was criticized for adopting a non-
critical and partisan approach in these parliamentary speeches. This non-critical 
stance led to the allegations that was not impartial. Such allegations are further 
detailed below.  
These two stipulations in the Constitution were not changed during the 
transition to the multi-party era. The 1924 Constitution did not include specific 
references to a single party system and thus it was in theory compatible with a 
multi-party system (Koçak, 1990: 96-97). Consequently, the institutions of the 
single party phase and the Constitution were not revised. In practice, political 
conditions had changed with the transition to multiparty politics and these 
stipulations on the presidency posed certain problems. After 1945, the 
presidents‟ impartiality became a matter of dispute regarding the terms of both 
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Ġnönü and Bayar. A revision of the Constitution on the president‟s position and 
enhancing the impartiality principle began to be debated.
96
  
5.2 Bayar’s Term as President  
As will be taken up in the following sections, scholarly as well as popular 
writings on the DP period often emphasize the role of Menderes rather than 
Bayar in substantial political matters. Typically a limited number of incidents 
and quotes are repeated in lieu of discussing Bayar‟s role in the 1950-1960 
period.  
Bayar‟s memoirs and interviews between 1950-1960 do not provide an 
extensive resource for examining his impact in this phase. These resources are 
often comments or observations about the governments‟ activities or the 
opposition‟s pursuits, rather than an elaboration of his own role and input. In his 
memoirs on his time as prime minister, minister of economics and chairman of 
the DP, Bayar used a different approach-here he provided information on his 
input, activities and views. Despite the lack of reliable resources to discuss his 
presidency, Bayar is best remembered as the third president of the Republic and 
most criticized for the failures of the party he founded (Tunçay, 2002: 22).  
Before moving on to an account of Bayar‟s presidency, his understanding 
and interpretation of this position should be mentioned. Bayar thought that each 
president should bring his own interpretation to the office. For instance, he 
disliked the police escorts that accompanied the president‟s car and consequently 
put an end to this practice (Bayar 2010: 168).  He did not want his portrait 
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painted on stamps and money or for it to be hung on the walls of official 
buildings (Harris, 2002: 57). 
Regarding the president‟s constitutional role, Bayar thought that the 
president did not have the power and authority to interfere in governmental 
affairs (Atay et al., November 10, 2007; Bozdağ, 1986: 91). Bayar was aware 
that as the president he had to maintain his impartiality toward political parties 
and that he might have to tolerate political views that he had earlier opposed. 
However, although Bayar subscribed to this interpretation in his discourse, he 
has been criticized for not being impartial as will be discussed in the following 
sections.  
5.2.1 Bayar’s Election 
In the aftermath of the DP‟s electoral victory in 1950, several names 
were considered within the DP leadership for the presidency. These names 
included the retired General Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Chairman of the Court of Appeal 
Halil Özyörük jurist and academician, and politician Sadri Maksudi Arsal 
(Albayrak, 2004: 181). Bayar was also considered among the candidates and 
there were different opinions on his prospects as the president. The debate on 
Bayar‟s candidacy did not result from doubts over his suitability for office. Since 
the establishment of the DP, Bayar‟s presence in the party had been perceived as 
a guarantee that the party was not going to challenge the basic tenets of the 
Republic. He was the least controversial figure among the DP members and 
there was little doubt that he was acceptable to all political segments of society 
either as president or as prime minister (Ahmad, 1977: 77; Zürcher, 2004: 221).  
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The debate was more related to practical issues and concerns. Those who 
supported Bayar‟s presidency saw the office as a position of prestige and pointed 
out that it had to be filled with someone who could represent the state. Bayar had 
such experience.
97
 On the other hand, those who advocated that he should 
remain the chairman of the party and take office as prime minister considered 
Bayar‟s political skills vital for the multi-party system until democracy was 
consolidated.
98
 
Bayar himself was also indecisive for a while. In his memoirs he 
mentioned that prior to the DP‟s electoral victory, he had not made plans and 
had not considered suitable candidates among the DP ranks for major 
governmental positions and the presidency (Bayar, 2010: 143). He also told 
Cihad Baban that he did not have the intention of becoming president even if his 
party wins the elections (Baban, 1970: 48, 50-51).  
Bayar changed his mind and was elected to office on May 22, 1950, 
earning the votes of 387 out of 453 parliamentarians (Albayrak, 2004: 181). He 
accepted the candidacy that was nominated by the DP parliamentary group on 
the grounds that he never refrained from responsibility and serving the Turkish 
nation when it was asked of him (Bayar, 2010: 146). He did not comment on the 
reasons for his change of mind. Bayar might have refrained from voicing his 
thoughts on the presidency because he wanted to wait for the maturation of the 
political context and wanted to take a clear view of the circumstances he faced to 
understand whether they were favorable for his presidency or not.  
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For the rest of the DP period, Bayar‟s presidency did not become a 
matter of any debate. Parliament re-elected him as president in 1954 and in 
1957. Bayar got 486 votes from 513 deputies in the former election and got 413 
votes out of 413 deputies in the latter. He was also the DP deputy from Istanbul 
in the ninth, tenth and eleventh legislative years.  
5.2.2 Relations with Key Political Figures 
Leaders‟ relations with their close circles and opponents form an 
important part of leadership analyses. Institutions define the framework of 
relations between political party leaders, prime ministers and presidents. Yet, 
addressing these relations on an entirely institutional level is not sufficient, as 
practice may divert from the institutional framework. Individual relations 
between leaders are also decisive. For instance, in certain cases, like Menderes 
and Bayar, there might be a background of common struggle and this 
background might influence the relations between political figures. Likewise, if 
leaders have different interpretations of basic political notions, such as Ġnönü 
and Bayar did, and if they have difficulties in reconciling disagreements deriving 
from these different interpretations, this might also affect the course of relations. 
For this reason, Bayar‟s relations with two key political figures during his 
presidency, Adnan Menderes and Ġsmet Ġnönü, are taken up in the light of 
personal and institutional contexts.  
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5.2.2.1 Relations with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
Bayar and Menderes met for the first time in Ġzmir in 1913. At the time 
Bayar was serving as the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki 
Cemiyeti-ĠTC) Ġzmir representative. Menderes, then a student at the Kızılçullu 
American College, had visited him to make a complaint about missionary 
activities taking place in their school.  
Their next encounter was in 1930 during Bayar‟s visit to the Aegean 
region as a state representative conducted in order to make an assessment of the 
failed Free Party (Serbest Fırka-SF) experience. During this visit Bayar got in 
contact with the former SF members. He also met with Adnan Menderes who 
used to be head of the SF Aydın branch. Bayar was instantly impressed with 
Menderes‟ candid manners and in-depth analysis of the macroeconomic 
conditions (Kutay, 1982:102). On his return to Ankara, he mentioned Menderes 
to Atatürk and expressed that he was positively impressed with him (Bayar, 
2010: 33). Bayar did not directly recommend Menderes for a seat in Parliament, 
but it can be argued that his words created a positive image of Menderes in the 
eyes of Atatürk, who was quite decisive in choosing the candidates to run in 
elections.
99
 Consequently, Menderes got elected to the Parliament in 1931.  
Eventually, as they became the co-founders of the DP, Bayar and 
Menderes began to share a common path (Baban, 1970: 52). It has been stated 
that Bayar became an elder brother for Menderes, balancing and supporting him 
in his initiatives throughout the latter‟s political career.100 Menderes proved his 
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political skills to Bayar during the party‟s formation and opposition years. When 
it was time to designate the prime minister in 1950, Bayar thought Menderes to 
be the most eligible person for the office (Bayar, 2010: 148). Menderes, 
according to Bayar, was an appropriate candidate because he proved his capacity 
to understand and appeal to the common people, especially to the peasants, 
among whom he grew up in Aydın (Ahmad, 2003: 114).  In Bayar‟s eyes, 
Menderes‟ closeness to the people, combined with his energy and enthusiasm, 
made him a sound candidate who was likely to be successful as the prime 
minister.  
Between 1950-1960, Bayar appointed Menderes five times to form the 
government, three times following elections and twice following cabinet crises. 
Bayar thought that as time passed Menderes became a better prime minister due 
to experience he earned in office (Bayar, 2010: 232). Bayar never openly 
considered designating any other politician as prime minister even during times 
of crises. For instance, when the government‟s withdrawal was seen as a remedy 
to the political tension that accumulated in 1960, Bayar did not consider 
Menderes‟ resignation as an option (Uyar, 2001: 82).101 When it was mentioned 
to him that Menderes should be replaced by another leading figure from the DP, 
he resisted this by saying that the “horse should not be switched while crossing 
the river (dere geçerken at değiştirilmez)”.102 According to Ali Fuat BaĢgil, this 
was because Bayar did not want to give up on a friend who had been on his side 
for fourteen years (BaĢgil, 1966: 142). 
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Their last encounter was in the Yassıada trial hall where they were 
forbidden to speak to each other. On the day of Menderes‟ execution, Bayar 
organized a religious ceremony in Menderes‟ and the other executed government 
members‟ memory. Upon the prison administration‟s attempt to prevent the 
ceremony, Bayar expressed his feelings in the following words:  “We lost a 
person very dear to us. Can we not pray for him?” (Ilıcak, 1989: 234). Bayar, 
who was at the time in Kayseri prison, felt so upset on the first anniversary of 
Menderes‟ death verdict on September 15, 1962, that he decided not to leave his 
cell for three days and refrained from eating warm dishes  during that time 
(Bayar, 1999: 82).  
The most discussed aspect of the Bayar-Menderes relation has been who 
had more control over the other and who had said the last word in cases of 
disagreement. Bayar‟s authority as chairman of the DP was undisputable. He had 
a strong grip over party affairs once the authority of the founders was 
consolidated.
103
 Therefore Bayar had control over Menderes and other figures in 
party affairs during the opposition years (Kabasakal, 1991: 200; Harris, 2002: 
57).  
After 1950, the balance of power in the party shifted in favor of 
Menderes.  As prime minister and chairman of the DP, Menderes had “unlimited 
power” over the party and the government (Karpat, 2011: 134). Bayar 
maintained a certain degree of influence over Menderes mainly due to his 
experience in governmental affairs and his affinity with the structures of the 
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regime, such as the bureaucracy (Karpat, 2011: 133-134). Especially in times of 
crises, Bayar‟s support became crucial. According to Mehmet Arif Demirer, 
with his nerves of steel acquired during the Turkish War of Independence, Bayar 
was capable of giving advice to Menderes at such times.
104
  For instance toward 
the 1960 intervention, Bayar increased his visits to the prime minister‟s office 
(Yavuzalp, 1991: 40-41, 45, Ilıcak 1989: 215; YeĢilbursa, 2005: 124). This was 
also to give advice to Menderes in time of political crisis.  
In the final analysis, Bayar‟s influence on Menderes between 1950-1960 
was nevertheless limited and could not be continuous for a number of reasons. 
First, as already detailed above, on an institutional level Bayar lacked 
mechanisms that could enable his involvement in government affairs. In this 
case, Bayar‟s influence over Prime Minister Menderes had to work through 
behind the scenes channels of influence, which would depend on his personal 
authority.  
Second, and on a more personal level, Bayar‟s authority and influence 
over the party as well as over Menderes shrunk throughout the years. In 
academic resources, there is often a consensus that the main actor in the party 
and government affairs, especially after 1954, was undisputedly Menderes.
105
 
Nineten fifty four is cited as the year that Bayar lost a considerable part of his 
remaining influence. This was mainly due to the success that the party attained 
in the national elections held that year. This success was mostly attributed to  
Menderes and his performance in government (Karpat, 2011: 133-134).  
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115, Karpat, 2011: 133-4.  
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Bayar was aware of the decline of his influence after 1950 and for this 
reason, he did not push forward for the acceptance of his opinions by Menderes. 
Samet Ağaoğlu, a close witness of political circles of the time as a minister in 
the Menderes governments, also made a similar observation and mentioned that 
Bayar did not push for his own opinions on critical issues such as the so called 
“Nine Officers‟ Incident” (Ağaoğlu, 1972: 142).106 
In anecdotes narrated by political figures of the time it is often stated that 
Bayar and Menderes had several disagreements.
107
 Bayar was aware of these 
discussions of his relationship with Menderes. He mentioned that he was seeking 
a relationship with Menderes that was similar to the relations between himself 
and Atatürk. This meant that he did not want to make life difficult for Menderes 
but instead provide him support and advice in his policies (Baban, 1970: 51-53; 
Nutku, 1979: 372).
108
  
Bayar wrote that there had only been two issues that they disagreed upon 
in 1946-1960. The first disagreement was on the CHP and whether it should be 
held liable and charged for its former unconstitutional acts, such as rigging the 
1946 national elections. Bayar was of the opinion that should the DP become 
victorious in the 1950 elections, the CHP should be tried. Likewise Bayar also 
thought that promises of exemption from trial should not be made in the DP 
program or in the election manifesto. Menderes had a contrary view and thought 
that pursuing the former disagreements would harm the harmony of the new 
political era. This approach has been referred to as not to question the past (devr-
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i sabık yaratmamak).  In the end, Bayar did not oppose Menderes‟ view and 
charges based on these former matters were not brought up by the DP after 1950 
(Bayar, 2010: 197-199).  
The second disagreement mentioned in Bayar‟s account took place 
during his presidency. The DP government had decided to issue a law that would 
transfer some of the CHP assets accumulated during the single party years to the 
state treasury. CHP assets were thought to provide that party an unfair source of 
income and damage the competitiveness of other political parties (Tunçay, 1990: 
179).  
Bayar was opposed to this law. He thought that the CHP should not be 
put under such pressure. As president, he had to sign all the laws issued by the 
government and when the law entitled “Transfer of the Unfairly [Acquired] CHP 
Funds to the State Budget” was sent for his approval, he reflected on returning it 
to Parliament for reconsideration. But Bayar was aware that it would not have 
any impact as he surmised the Parliament would keep the content unaltered and 
he would find the same text sent for his signature.  As president, Bayar did not 
have the power to submit the same law for further reconsideration of the 
Parliament (Bayar 2010: 120). Nevertheless he spoke against the legislation of 
this law during his meetings with Prime Minister Menderes and DP deputies to 
convince them to withdraw this proposal (Bayar, 2010: 120). He was not 
unsuccessful in his pursuit, and the mentioned law was passed in December 
1953 (Tunçay, 1990: 179).   
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5.2.2.2 Relations with the CHP Chairman İsmet İnönü 
An elaboration of relations between Ġnönü and Bayar is also essential 
because it has been suggested that the political rivalry between Bayar and Ġnönü 
had a negative impact on politics in 1950-1960 (BaĢgil, 1966: 27; Birand et al., 
1991:22; Kutay, 1982:16; Ağaoğlu, 1972:152; Bilgiç, 1982: 46). The political 
impact of disagreements between Bayar and Ġnönü is examined below. Before 
that, in order to put their relations and disagreements into context, a brief 
overview of their personal relations is provided.  
Bayar and Ġnönü met for the first time in the Parliament during Bayar‟s 
early days in Ankara before the proclamation of the Republic (Altuğ, June 13, 
1981, Tercüman daily).
109
 They started working closely after 1932 when Bayar 
became the Minister of Economics in the Ġnönü cabinet. Bayar and Ġnönü had 
certain disagreements mainly on economic issues at the time and not 
unexpectedly their rivalry intensified during the multiparty years.  
Despite their political disagreements, which will be taken up below, 
Bayar and Ġnönü maintained mutual respect and conducted their affairs in a 
civilized manner.
110
 For instance, when asked about his opinions on the Free 
Party and its leader Fethi Okyar, Bayar said that he would prefer Ġnönü to Okyar 
without any hesitation (Bozdağ, 2003: 70).111 Ġnönü appreciated Bayar‟s 
warnings against paying the Ottoman debt in gold during the Lausanne 
negotiations and acknowledged that he had at the time not realized or grasped 
the importance of that issue (Bozdağ, 1993: 62). Bayar‟s appointment as prime 
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minister in 1937 had caused a number of people to turn their back on Ġnönü but 
Bayar did not take sides with them and always showed respect for Ġnönü (Atay, 
1969:449). When Ġnönü was elected president, Bayar praised him as “the most 
respectable character of the Turkish revolution and Atatürk‟s regime, and the 
greatest son of the Turkish nation” (Uran, 1959:326).  Ġnönü for his part 
acknowledged Bayar‟s role in a smooth transition to the post-Atatürk period and 
noted that if there had been someone with bad intentions in Bayar‟s place, the 
country would have faced a catastrophe (Bozdağ, 1986:64). 
The establishment of the DP without any major problems was also due to 
the harmonious dialogue between Bayar and Ġnönü during the founding days and 
early times of the DP. For instance in 1946 Ġnönü asked Bayar not to open 
branches in the eastern areas and promised that the CHP would dissolve its own 
branches in that region. When Bayar disagreed, Ġnönü did not push the issue 
forward (Heper, 1998: 156).  Likewise, Bayar was able to persuade Ġnönü that 
his party would follow the basic tenets of the Republic in secularism, education 
and foreign policy (Heper, 1998: 185). 
Bayar also appreciated Ġnönü‟s attempts to negotiate the political tension 
in 1946-1950 through arranging meetings between the government and the 
opposition. In these meetings, Ġnönü advised Prime Minister Recep Peker and 
Bayar to put an end to accusing each other and have a common understanding of 
the main issues of dispute. This would eventually lead to a healthy dialogue 
between the government and the opposition (Bayar 2010: 114). Bayar 
considered the Declaration of July 12, 1947 to be a sign of Ġnönü‟s goodwill and 
far-sightedness (Karpat, 1967: 169). The Declaration was issued by Ġnönü to 
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make it known that the opposition was entitled to benefit from the same rights as 
the governing party.  
After becoming president, Bayar asked the staff members at the office of 
the presidency to maintain their ties with Ġnönü and offer their services should he 
require them. Bayar thought Ġnönü was a leader of historical importance and 
ignoring him would be a display of an “eastern attitude” (şark zihniyeti) (Derin, 
1995: 260). Ġnönü congratulated Bayar in Parliament upon his election as 
president and Bayar in turn paid a visit to Ġnönü‟s residence (KiriĢçioğlu, 1975: 
123).  
Despite the mutual respect evident in these instances, several times Ġnönü 
and Bayar found themselves in political conflict and the frequency, as well as 
the intensity of these conflicts escalated after 1950. The ground for dispute was 
already laid from 1946 onwards. According to Bayar, Ġnönü had total control 
over politics during his presidency (1938-1950), consequently he held Ġnönü 
responsible for certain difficulties and restraints that the DP faced during its 
opposition years. Bayar, for instance, thought that the Memorandum of the Four 
(Dörtlü Takrir) was rejected by Parliament because Ġnönü wanted it so (Bayar, 
2010: 44).
112
 In 1947, the tension between the DP and the government further 
escalated as the opposition accused the government of preventing its activities. 
Bayar believed that it was Ġnönü who made the government and Prime Minister 
Recep Peker act in this repressive manner (Müstakil Demokratlar Grubu, 
1949:11; KarakuĢ, 1977:138). 
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In 1950-1960, Bayar thought Ġnönü provoked dissent during his visits to 
different parts of the country (Bozdağ, 1991: 89-90). He wanted to reduce 
Ġnönü‟s influence and prevent the activities that he considered provocative. In 
Bayar‟s thinking the only way to achieve this end was to follow an energetic and 
bold policy; the government had to be decisive and to some extent authoritarian 
(Burçak, 1976: 28-29). Bayar also accused Ġnönü of provoking the military 
intervention in 1960 and thought that Ġnönü was in contact with the conspirators 
of the military intervention (Bozdağ: 1991: 94).  
Bayar was sidelined from mainstream politics after the Yassıada tribunal 
convicted him to a lifetime sentence. He stayed in prison until 1964 and his 
political rights were not returned before 1974. Bayar was not in contact with 
Ġnönü during most of this period with the exception of two meetings in 1969 to 
discuss the situation of former DP members who were seeking political 
amnesty.
113
 It was Bayar himself who brought up the issue of meeting Ġnönü to 
obtain his support for the political rights struggle (Milliyet daily, December 31, 
1969). Turhan Dilligil, journalist and deputy from the Justice Party (Adalet 
Partisi-AP) arranged the initial meeting.  
Even though it was Bayar himself who introduced the idea, he was 
hesitant when it became serious. Bayar mentioned not having slept for two 
nights before giving his final consent to the meeting (Fırat, 1996: 63). During the 
meeting that took place in May 1969, Bayar was more reserved and quiet in 
comparison to Ġnönü (Dilligil, 1969: 62, 106).114 Ġnönü in return paid a visit to 
Bayar‟s residence in Istanbul the following month. In the end, Ġnönü was 
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influential in the granting of political amnesty to the former DP members 
(Heper, 1998: 223).  
In retrospect, the main reason for political conflict between Bayar and 
Ġnönü was their different interpretations of political concepts such as democracy 
and different approaches especially with regard to macro-economic conduct.
115
 
Bayar thought Ġnönü‟s understanding of democracy did not depend on a rule of 
the majority. He described his own understanding of democracy as the absolute 
sovereignty of the nation, exercised only through the representatives of the 
nation. Bayar thought that Ġnönü was in favor of limiting the power of the 
nation‟s elected representatives through institutions that shared political power 
(Altuğ, June 19, 1981, Tercüman daily). Bayar had in mind institutions such as 
the Constitutional Court, Senate or National Security Council introduced by the 
1961 Constitution. Differences regarding their interpretation of macro-economy 
have already been taken up in Chapter IV. Here it should only be repeated that 
Bayar‟s understanding of the economy was more in favor of private enterprise in 
comparison to Ġnönü‟s.  
Politicians‟ different interpretations of political concepts is a natural 
attribute of multiparty systems and it does not necessarily lead to major conflict. 
However, in the case of Turkey, the political culture in the immediate aftermath 
of the single party phase was not well equipped to facilitate the co-existence of 
different political perspectives. As already explained in Chapter II, different 
political views and criticism toward the government was interpreted as 
questioning of the government‟s legitimacy, not as a legitimate criticism of its 
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policies. The relations between Bayar and Ġnönü in 1946-1960 briefly introduced 
above should also be viewed in this context.  
5.2.2.3 Bayar’s Impact on Menderes-İnönü Relations 
Menderes‟ decisive role in politics in 1950-1960 has already been stated. 
Consequently, it is important to examine the relations between the three leading 
politicians of the time: Ġnönü, Menderes and Bayar. Bayar influenced the course 
of relations between Menderes and Ġnönü. In other words, Bayar was partially 
responsible for how the relations between Menderes and Ġnönü evolved. Initially 
Ġnönü and Menderes had warm feelings toward each other, which is likely to 
have contributed to the creation of political dialogue between the government 
and the opposition. Menderes always admired Ġnönü's political and historical 
role (Bağlum, 1991:66) and Ġnönü felt sympathy for Menderes (Toker, 1966:16).  
The maintenance of smooth relations between head of the main 
opposition party Ġnönü and Prime Minister Menderes were crucial because if the 
two maintained a good communication and understanding, they could work 
together to address the crises that arose between the government and the 
opposition. These instances have already been detailed in Chapter II. However, 
Ġnönü and Menderes could not maintain the initial course of their relations. 
Bayar did not make it any easier because he failed to facilitate a dialogue 
between Ġnönü and Menderes.  
In several accounts it is stated that Bayar provoked Menderes against 
Ġnönü and prevented him from getting in contact with the opposition. For 
instance in May 1957, Menderes and Bayar discussed the Cyprus issue during a 
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dinner in the town of Dalaman in Western Turkey in the presence of other 
guests. When Menderes suggested that the opposition should clarify its approach 
to the issue and put forward its policy recommendations, Bayar resisted this idea 
saying that if the government asked the opposition‟s views, it would give the 
impression that these views are valuable (Akis weekly, May 11, 1957). On 
another occasion, upon increased opposition activism in 1959, Bayar asked 
Menderes: “Adnan Bey [Mr. Menderes], why are you waiting to show Ġnönü the 
state‟s power?” (Devir weekly, April 23, 1959; Kılıç, 1973: 48). 
When Ġnönü welcomed Menderes warmly at the Ankara railway station 
following the London plane crash incident in 1959 and Menderes returned his 
welcome with a warm attitude, Bayar disapproved of this (Ilıcak, 1989: 162-163; 
Bağlum, 1991:67-68). 116 When it was time for Menderes to pay a visit in turn 
for this welcome, Bayar opposed it because he thought Ġnönü attempted to 
undermine the DP with his behavior in the train station (Birand et al., 1991: 156) 
and that the CHP could not be trusted (Bulut, 2009: 134). This was typical for 
the DP in 1950-1960 as they feared that Ġnönü would try to bring his party back 
to government through any possible means (Karpat, 2011: 148).  
Bayar had an adverse impact on the development of a harmonious 
opposition-government relationship. He encouraged the government and 
Menderes to appear fully in command and in his understanding harmonious 
relations with Ġnönü were a sign of weakness for the government. Beneath this 
understanding lies a rather limited interpretation of government-opposition 
relations. Yet, it is hard to say that it was only Bayar‟s fault that the opposition-
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government relations did not follow a constructive path under the DP rule. There 
were structural shortcomings, such as the insufficient political guarantees in the 
Constitution and the immature political culture on how to conduct opposition 
and government relations. Besides as already established in a section above, 
Menderes was the main political actor of the era. He could have arguably 
formulated his relations with Ġnönü in a different fashion regardless of what 
Bayar thought.  
5.2.3 Bayar’s Policies and Priorities in Office 
Bayar‟s policies in office should first be viewed in light of the political 
context in 1950-1960. That context was considerably different from the single 
party years, which accommodated strong presidents. The single party structure 
that had rendered a strong presidency possible was absent during Bayar‟s 
presidency. Consequently, it was more difficult for an individual leader to 
acquire political power that was comparable to the single party years. The 
support of the DP group was essential for the success of individual DP leaders 
who wanted to gain superiority against their competitors (Birand et al., 1991:83). 
DP leaders were often able to come to terms with the group, but they could 
never ignore its opinions. This was not the case with the CHP group during the 
single party phase. Besides, Bayar was not the chairperson of the government 
party.  
Second, even when a single leader was able to acquire political power, as 
Menderes eventually did, it was not likely that the president would have 
comparable power. As already mentioned, the constitutional framework did not 
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also allow for a strong presidency and the political context did not present any 
opportunities for the president in 1950-1960. As a result, Bayar did not have the 
necessary mechanisms that could provide him with the channels to develop and 
implement policies and have considerable influence over the government.   
Being in a mostly ceremonial office deprived of any significant powers 
and having a different stature from the former presidents does not imply that 
Bayar lacked a program for his presidency. Bayar naturally had an agenda that 
he pursued as president. He mentioned five priorities for his term in office: 
improving the military‟s infrastructure and enhancing the higher education 
system, the completion of the construction of the Anıtkabir (Atatürk‟s 
mausoleum), full-scale implementation of the 1924 Constitution, ensuring the 
state‟s political security and making Turkey more prosperous through economic 
investments (Bozdağ, 1986: 91). He thought this agenda was an essential 
contribution to the “welfare and the security of the Republic” (Bayar, 2010: 202-
203). 
Among these objectives, the first two were specific and thus it is 
relatively easier to study Bayar‟s impact on these fields. Bayar mentioned 
participating in the government‟s efforts to advance the army‟s technical 
infrastructure and supporting the government throughout the time of DP rule for 
further investment in the army‟s needs (Bayar, 2010: 162-163). The DP 
governments were, indeed, enthusiastic about modernizing the army‟s technical 
infrastructure. Resources allocated for military spending increased from 248 
million USD in 1950 to 381 million USD in 1953 and kept rising in the coming 
years (Ahmad, 2003: 124). The DP governments also improved the economic 
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conditions for the high-ranking officers. These improvements did not, however, 
reach the lower ranks (Ġnan, 2007: 134). 
Bayar contributed to the establishment of four new universities and 
participated in their groundbreaking ceremonies.
117
 These universities were 
Atatürk University in Erzurum, the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, 
the Karadeniz Technical University in Zonguldak and Ege University in Ġzmir. 
Bayar also got in contact with the university professors in order to find out their 
requests and institutional needs. The budget for universities increased 
considerably during the DP phase (Bozdağ, 1982: 372). Although it was mainly 
the government‟s initiative to make investments in the education sector, Bayar 
regularly reminded them of this issue.  
As for the construction of Atatürk‟s mausoleum, in Bayar‟s daily list of 
things to do, tasks related to the Anıtkabir always took first place until its 
completion in 1953 (Bayar 2010: 170). The construction had started in 1944 and 
Bayar thought that the delay in its completion was unacceptable.  
The rest of the objectives Bayar mentioned in his presidential agenda 
were loosely defined and thus it is more difficult to point out Bayar‟s impact on 
these issues. The broad nature of these objectives is understandable as Bayar‟s 
ceremonial position would not allow him to define any specific focus in these 
matters.  So, these three objectives stand rather as an expression of his 
overarching view of politics than as a plan of action. These remaining objectives 
are examined below.  
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On the full implementation of the constitution, Bayar thought that 
Turkish citizens were not enjoying their constitutional rights fully due to a 
number of unconstitutional laws (Bozdağ, 1986: 92-93). These unconstitutional 
laws mentioned by Bayar and Menderes were mostly concerned with basic rights 
and freedoms. Bayar did not specify these laws in his political discourse and he 
referred to them in loose terms.  
In the absence of a Constitutional Court, it was up to political actors to 
advocate and inspect the constitutionality of laws. Bayar and Menderes agreed 
that the way to address the issue of unconstitutional laws was, first, to increase 
the freedom of press in order to find out problems that resulted from 
unconstitutional laws and caused resentment among the people. The second step 
would be to remove these unconstitutional laws (Bozdağ, 1986: 94; Bayar, 2010: 
157).  
Yet in the final analysis, although the DP governments initially put some 
effort into the removal of unconstitutional laws and by extension press 
liberalization, from 1951 onwards the government violated and undermined the 
freedom of press through a number of new regulations (Tunçay, 1990: 179). 
Changes to the press law in 1953, 1954 and 1956 increased the penalties for 
“offences” committed through the press and, for example, introduced penalties 
for humiliating press coverage of ministers. As a result, a considerable number 
of journalists served prison sentences for vaguely defined offences (Ġnan, 2007: 
137). Also, official advertisements, a considerable resource of revenue for the 
press, were channeled to pro-government establishments.  
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Bayar‟s other objective, to ensure the state‟s security was about the 
enhancement of Turkey‟s position in the international arena, mainly vis-à-vis the 
Soviet threat and on a broader level through increasing the country‟s prestige. 
Bayar‟s method to work for these ends was to establish contacts with several 
heads of state and conduct visits to foreign countries (Bozdağ, 1982: 369).118 As 
the discussion in the next section on Bayar‟s foreign policy also shows, Bayar 
was an active foreign policy actor and he saw an assertive foreign policy as vital 
for protecting the Turkish state against external threats. Bayar was involved both 
in the planning and implementation of foreign policy. He did not have any 
foreign policy goals conflicting with those of the government (ġenĢekerci, 2000: 
243).  
Regarding his objective in the field of economy, Bayar considered 
increasing investments as the method to build a prosperous Turkey. As an 
experienced economist Bayar pursued his objective by advising the government 
on economic issues. He gave advice to the government during the council of 
ministers meetings he chaired (Bayar, 2010: 190-191). He especially provided 
insight for the government‟s industrialization plans (Bozdağ, 1986: 104).  
Bayar drew the government‟s attention to the importance of economic 
issues on other occasions than council of ministers meetings as well. For 
instance, during the 1956 annual parliamentary break, he called Parliament into a 
meeting to debate and legislate a law on forestry because he thought this was a 
priority for further economic investments and should be legislated at once 
without delay (Budaklıoğlu, 1982: 56). There are examples of more specific 
cases where he discussed matters related to the economy with individual policy 
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makers and implementers. For instance, he convinced a senior ministry 
bureaucrat on the necessity of building more cement facilities against the 
bureaucrat‟s worries of over-production (Bayar, 2010: 192-194).119  
Sıtkı Yırcalı, Minister of Trade in Menderes‟ governments also observed 
that Bayar advised his ministry‟s staff on economic matters and encouraged 
them to invest further rather than being indecisive or shy about investments 
(Yırcalı, 1982: 229). Bayar also reminded Menderes of the urgency to increase 
the living standards of the citizens through major infrastructure projects (Bayar, 
2010: 190-191). 
Bayar‟s engagement in the planning of the economy should not imply 
that he pursued an agenda of his own in that matter. He approved of and 
supported the DP‟s economic policies (ġenĢekerci, 2000: 242). These policies 
have already been mentioned in Chapter II. To remind of them briefly here, DP 
governments were in favor of supporting the private sector through state aid 
(Tunçay, 1990: 180).  
Bayar‟s presidential agenda, shaped around these five objectives 
introduced here, did not raise any major criticisms as this agenda was loosely 
defined and could be read as an expression of good will. The major source for 
criticism, as is taken up in a section below, was that he went beyond this agenda, 
and took sides with the DP governments on every issue.  
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5.2.3.1 Bayar’s Foreign Policy Activities  
Bayar‟s role in Turkish foreign policy planning and implementation in 
1950-1960 is examined in a separate section because foreign policy is the only 
realm in which Bayar‟s activities and contributions as president can be taken up 
through micro-scale case studies. A similar approach cannot be taken in the 
study of his policies in the economy or in removing unconstitutional laws, 
because as a president with limited institutional tools Bayar could not have any 
visible impact nor implement policies in these realms. Behind the scenes 
influences that he might have exerted in these matters are also difficult to 
determine. Bayar‟s memoirs do not reveal much of his involvement in 
government affairs as president and the memoirs of other political actors are far 
from being consistent with one another. 
120
 
Foreign affairs are, however, of a different nature for a number of 
reasons. It is true that the 1924 Constitution did not give the president a distinct 
focus and mandate on foreign policy but in article 37 of the Constitution it was 
stated that the president appoints Turkish ambassadors to foreign states and 
accepts visits from representatives of foreign states. This statement already gave 
presidents some space to be involved in foreign affairs, albeit on vague terms.  
Second, the Turkish political context presented several foreign policy 
challenges. In the French and American political systems, it is the political 
regime that gives presidents more weight in foreign policy. In the American 
case, Congress has less control over the president in foreign policy matters in 
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comparison to domestic affairs. Thus, in most cases presidents might prefer to 
implement ambitious foreign policy agendas rather than bold domestic agendas 
(Elgie, 1995: 193-194). Faced with the cohabitation situations, where president 
and prime minister are from different political parties, French presidents also 
often focus on foreign policy issues due to the difficulties of taking decisive 
positions in the domestic policy areas (Elgie, 2005: 7).  
Unlike the French and American systems where the political regime 
obliges presidents to be influential in foreign policy rather than domestic 
politics, the first two Turkish presidents were influential in foreign policy due to 
contextual obligations. In Atatürk‟s case, it was the immediate aftermath of the 
Turkish War of Independence and consolidation as well as acceptance of the 
new Turkish regime internationally was essential for the state‟s survival. In 
Ġnönü‟s case, the Second World War was the most serious immediate concern 
and this time the security of the regime was under threat.  As the most powerful 
actors of the political system at the time, both presidents devised and 
implemented policies to address these challenges.  
In these early years, foreign relations attained a non-political character in 
the sense that foreign policy rarely became a topic of political debate. The DP 
also maintained this perspective of foreign relations. During its opposition years, 
it often refrained from criticizing the government‟s foreign policy. Likewise, the 
CHP opposition showed solidarity with the DP governments on most foreign 
policy issues. The CHP embraced NATO membership without any major 
criticism. The only criticism it raised against sending troops to Korea in 1950 
was related to the method that the decision was taken. The government had 
decided to send troops without consulting with the opposition and Parliament 
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(Aydın, 2000:  117). Likewise, the CHP did not turn the Cyprus issue into a 
topic of criticism and domestic politics in 1955 (Ġnan, 2007: 120). 
As was the case with the two previous presidents, Bayar was an 
influential foreign policy actor. Contrary to his impact in domestic politics, 
Bayar‟s contributions to foreign policy can be observed through his foreign 
policy activities as they were neither of behind the scenes nature nor subject to 
the constitutional limitations the way that his domestic political activities were.  
Bayar took several steps to contribute to the government‟s policies. One 
example is the process that ended with the deployment of Turkish troops in 
Korea in 1950. Bayar chaired the council of ministers meeting on July 25, 1950 
in the Presidential Palace during which the decision to send troops to Korea was 
taken (Akkaya, 2012: 5-6). Prior to that, Bayar held meetings with the Turkish 
Ambassador to the United States Feridun Cemal Erkin, Minister of Defense 
Refik ġevket Ġnce, Chief of Staff Mehmet Nuri Yamut, Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes, and Speaker of Parliament Refik Koraltan in order to discuss the 
technical and political aspects of sending troops to Korea.  
Bayar also actively participated in Turkey‟s accession process to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He thought that the international 
context put Turkey in a delicate situation. He considered taking part in an 
international security alliance as essential for the defense of the country against 
the Soviet threat (Bozdağ, 1986:96, Altuğ, June 21, 1981, Tercüman daily).  He 
took the initiative for promoting NATO membership and chaired the council of 
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ministers meeting during which the decision to seek NATO membership was 
taken (Bayar, 2010: 178-179).
121
 
Turkey‟s NATO membership did not come easily. Bayar worked to 
address the difficulties that Turkey encountered in its membership pursuit. 
NATO‟s Defense Committee had initially encouraged Turkey to co-ordinate its 
military planning with the NATO command but it had not offered membership 
to Turkey. Bayar expressed his disappointment with this policy to the American 
Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee who visited Ankara in February 
1951. He told McGhee that nothing less than full NATO membership could 
address Turkey‟s security concerns (Leffler, 1985: 822-823).  
After this declaration, Bayar had another long meeting with the American 
ambassador to Ankara, during which Turkey‟s NATO membership prospects 
were further discussed (Yardımcı, 1982:208). During this negotiation process, 
Bayar also took the opinions of Turkish foreign policy experts into 
consideration. For instance, he invited Turkish ambassadors to main foreign 
capitals to Ankara and sought their opinions on the difficulties that Turkey faced 
in its NATO membership application (Bayar, 2010: 182). 
Bayar‟s and the government‟s decisiveness led the American policy 
makers to think that failing to extend NATO membership to Turkey would cause 
that country to abandon its pro-Western stand in favor of neutrality (Leffler, 
1985: 823). Turkey became a NATO member in 1952 and Bayar was present in 
the parliamentary session during which Turkey‟s NATO membership was 
ratified on February 19, 1952 (Erer, 1963: 100). 
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 Bayar did not specify the date of this meeting.  
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Bayar supported the government in its other foreign policy initiatives as 
well. For instance, he spoke in favor of the Northern Tier, an initiative 
developed by the United States to establish a defense network for certain 
countries in the Middle East and Asia geographically vulnerable to the Soviet 
threat, such as, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Bayar thought Turkey could take 
a leading role in this initiative (Sever, 1998: 74-75). These efforts resulted in the 
signing of the Bagdad Pact in 1955.  
In order to attract other countries in the Middle Eastern region to this 
initiative, Bayar travelled to Amman in 1955 (YeĢilbursa, 2011: 89).  He kept 
frequent contacts with the key American figures such as US Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles during the establishment of the Bagdad Pact (YeĢilbursa, 
2001: 66). Bayar also provided support to the government‟s Cyprus policy 
through his contacts with Greek policy makers and reminded them of the 
Turkish position in the conflict (Kutay, 1982:119-120). 
One of the activities that established Bayar as a major foreign policy 
actor was his long visit to the United States in 1954 (Harris, 2002:57).
122
 Bayar 
considered closer relations with the United States necessary for rendering 
Turkey‟s international position stronger and safer (Bora, 2009: 553) and he 
described his visit as a cornerstone in Turkish-American relations (Kutay, 1982: 
187). He was invited by the American President Dwight Eisenhower as an 
expression of the United States‟ appreciation for Turkey‟s anti-communist 
stance and its participation in the Korean War (1950-1953) (Bali, 2004:15).  
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 This visit started on January 18, 1954 with Bayar‟s departure from Istanbul and ended on 
March 10, 1954 with his return (Erer, 1963: 190, 194). For a detailed account from the perspective 
of Feridun Cemal Erkin,Turkey‟s ambassador to the United States at the time see Erkin, 1987:448-
458. 
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Beyond enhancing relations on a political level, Bayar had two very 
specific requests from President Eisenhower during this visit. The first was for a 
university that would attract Turkish students and students from the Middle 
Eastern countries. The second request was for American guidance in establishing 
a high capacity and advanced technology steel facility to process iron in Turkey 
(Kutay, 1982: 184). The Middle East Technical University is the outcome of the 
former and the Ereğli Iron and Steel facility is the byproduct of co-operation for 
the latter (Kutay, 1982: 186).  
Bayar‟s visit has been criticized for knotting Turkish foreign policy with 
the United States without any preconditions and laying the ground for American 
influence on Turkish domestic politics.
123
 Bayar‟s speeches delivered throughout 
the visit have also been criticized for being too enthusiastic. However, criticism 
on the speeches does not take into consideration the diplomatic language of the 
1950s, which was quite different from the contemporary usage.  
The language of 1950s was much more redundant and it was excessively 
refined or polite in comparison to contemporary usage. Judged according to the 
contemporary usage of Turkish, Bayar‟s speeches would appear overly 
enthusiastic but in the 1950s, such language was the norm. An overall analysis 
of Bayar‟s speeches delivered during his foreign visits and his reception of 
foreign representatives in Ankara show that Bayar used similar formulations 
while talking about Pakistan, Iraq or Iran. As for bringing in continuous 
American influence on Turkish politics, this could hardly have been realized 
with a single visit. Besides, it has been documented that there were different 
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opinions and several disagreements between the DP policy makers and their 
American counterparts on a number of issues and that co-operation did not 
automatically occur on every issue.
124
 
Bayar‟s role in foreign policy was not criticized during his term in office. 
It was also not considered as a breach of the president‟s mandate and power. 
Later however Bayar‟s role in NATO membership and his efforts to increase 
Turkey‟s ties with the United States were criticized.  
5.2.4  The Issue of Impartiality  
Bayar tried to highlight his impartiality through a number of acts and 
statements. He resigned as chairman of the DP once it became clear that he 
would be the DP‟s candidate for office (Birand et al., 1991:74). This was a 
substantial diversion from the earlier practice as the two former presidents 
remained chairmen of the CHP during their term in office (YeĢilbursa, 1999:1-
2). Neverthless Bayar remained a DP member. 
In a message he sent to the DP congress convened in 1951, he said that in 
order to fulfill the requirements of an impartial presidency he completely 
withdrew from the party affairs. In the same message he also mentioned that he 
wanted to begin a tradition of impartial presidents (Milliyet daily, October 10, 
1951).  
As part of his emphasis on impartiality, it has also been observed that he 
wanted to put some distance between himself and party members in the initial 
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 For an analysis of these differences in the light of American and Turkish archives, see Sever, 
1998.  
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days of his presidency. When one of the DP parliamentarians addressed him in 
an informal manner during a dinner he hosted in the presidential palace in 1950, 
Bayar warned him to show respect for the president (Baban, 1970:64). During 
the same dinner, he warned his former colleagues that they should address him 
as beyefendi, rather than Celal Bey (Sır Weekly, October 15, 1960), which 
implied more formality.
125
 However, his acts in the following years caused 
contrary arguments regarding his impartiality.  
Critical accounts of Bayar‟s presidency usually focus on his failure to be 
neutral vis-à-vis the political parties. These critical assessments are raised on 
two grounds. First, Bayar‟s election campaigns and annually delivered 
parliamentary speeches are mentioned as proofs that he was plainly favoring the 
government, speaking on their behalf, acting with them and criticizing the 
opposition for the same reasons that the government criticized them. Second, 
Bayar‟s involvement in the daily political issues are taken as further indication 
of his taking sides. The second category of criticism refers to Bayar‟s 
involvement in the DP‟s internal affairs and his unfavorable attitude toward the 
opposition parties. 
There are methodological difficulties in studying this second category 
scientifically. As already mentioned elsewhere in this study, Bayar could not 
have exerted influence on government through official channels as such 
mechanisms were nonexistent. He could have exercised influence only through 
his individual contacts with key figures in the DP. There is a methodological 
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 Celal Bey is translated into English as Mr Celal. The English translation for Beyefendi is, on the 
other hand, Sir.  
 201 
 
difficulty in establishing to what extent key decision makers of the DP took 
Bayar‟s choices into account.  
Bayar himself did not write about his involvement in the government‟s or 
the DP‟s affairs. There are conflicting anecdotes and observations in memoirs of 
political figures of the time. Popular accounts of the DP period often written by 
journalists are also influenced by the authors‟ own political perspectives. Thus 
such accounts cannot be considered reliable enough to base the discussion upon 
them here. For this reason, the following sections examine Bayar‟s involvement 
through an analysis of his own statements unfortunately which do not touch 
upon his role extensively, anecdotes that are narrated and confirmed in more 
than one resource and press coverage of the incidents in question.  
5.2.4.1 Election and Parliamentary Speeches  
Bayar expressed his approval of DP policies in election speeches he 
delivered as part of the 1954 and 1957 election campaigns. For instance in the 
Diyarbakır speech he delivered on April 18, 1954 Bayar asked the residents of 
Diyarbakır to compare the pre-1950 context to the current one. He mentioned 
that the pre-1950 era was poorer in terms of economic development, education 
opportunities and the exercise of basic rights and freedoms. He asked the voters 
to decide according to the outcome of this judgment (Ayın Tarihi, April 1954). 
Bayar expressed further support for the DP during his Ġzmit speech on April 21, 
1954. He proclaimed that the DP and the Turkish nation were a unified whole 
and that they were inseparable from one another (Ayın Tarihi, April 1954). 
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Likewise on October 17, 1957 in his Urfa speech, he argued that they [the DP] 
did not refrain from hard work and never tires of working (Eroğul, 1970: 143).  
In these and other election speeches he delivered Bayar defined himself 
as president and also as a deputy seeking re-election.
126
 In these speeches he did 
not distinguish himself from the DP or the government. For instance when asked 
in Adana on April 25, 1957 how much longer the current wheat support policies 
for farmers would be in force, Bayar replied that such incentives would continue 
until farmers are able to pay their loans back and accumulate some wealth (Ayın 
Tarihi, April 1954). It can be expected that as president Bayar was not in a 
position to comment on these issues in such a decisive tone.  
Bayar for his part did not see his electoral speeches to be in contradiction 
to and in violation of his impartiality. He thought it was his moral responsibility 
to inform the Turkish people about his policies and activities in office. In his 
Diyarbakır speech on October 18, 1957, he justified his involvement in the 
election campaigns and speeches in the following words: “..Constitutionally I 
am not accountable for my acts however; I have a great deal of moral 
responsibility. Presidents have responsibility regarding the laws legislated in 
their term because they sign these laws. Thus, it is only natural that the president 
explains his acts to [the] people. It is due to this responsibility that I speak to 
you” (Erer, 1963: 311). 
Bayar‟s annual parliamentary speeches also raised criticisms for not 
giving voice to the discontent of opposition parties and for speaking in favor of 
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government policies.
127
 In theory, article 36 of the Constitution stipulated that 
the president‟s annual speech had to cover government activities in the previous 
year and introduce policy recommendations for the next year. An analysis of 
Bayar‟s nine parliamentary speeches delivered in 1950-1960 shows that Bayar 
most of the time followed this description. He often delivered highly technical 
speeches, which mentioned the DP governments‟ policies and achievements in a 
very detailed way. He structured his speeches according to the activities of the 
ministries and he provided extensive statistical details for each ministry. At 
times, he even referred to single ongoing hospital or school constructions.  He 
also mentioned the laws that were legislated in the previous year by Parliament. 
Recommendations he put forward in these speeches were not on the substance of 
governmental activities. They were rather expressions of support voiced in broad 
terms.  
As an example of his support for government policies, Bayar started his 
1958 speech by saying that “as it has been for all the years, in the last year too, a 
considerable amount of work has been realized and our endeavors to carry our 
nation to the level of advanced civilizations and welfare have delivered results in 
each field”. When he drew attention to specific policies that should be adopted 
in macro-economy management, he also said that the government has already 
laid the groundwork for such policies in its program (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
Term 11, Vol 5: 6-7).   
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 See the Akis issues November 6, 1954 and October 27, 1956. In both issues, Bayar is criticized 
for ignoring the restrictive press regulations introduced and failing to take into account the 
opposition‟s point of view. It has even been claimed that Bayar did not write these speeches 
himself and they were delivered to him to by the government (Devir weekly, November 6, 1954). 
However this seems to be a misplaced criticism as Bayar‟s work on these speeches  has been 
confirmed. For instance, see Derin, 1995: 303.  
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Although not as frequently, Bayar also briefly touched upon domestic 
political issues that caused tension between the government and the opposition. 
For instance in his 1950 and 1951 speeches he referred to the government‟s 
efforts to remove undemocratic legislations issued prior to 1950 (TBMM 
Tutanak Dergisi, Term 9, Vol 2: 4, Vol 10: 4 ). Likewise, in 1954  he spoke in 
favor of changes introduced to the press law that the opposition found 
repressive. He said that the change was necessary to maintain the dignity of the 
individuals that the press reported on and to preserve the security of the state 
(TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Term 10, Vol 2: 9). In 1957, he referred to the 
contentious political atmosphere during the election campaign and highlighted 
the need for peace and stability to increase economic growth and welfare. He 
also added that democracy and freedom could not be thought of separately from 
order and stability (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Term 11, Vol 1: 11). In this speech, 
although not openly, he was referring to the opposition‟s activities. 
Bayar did not agree with the criticisms that these speeches were 
violations of his impartiality. He retorted that he provided useful counsel to the 
government and the opposition in his parliamentary speeches. He also thought 
that in these speeches and elsewhere he advised the government to avoid 
engaging in polemics with the opposition parties and concentrate on delivering 
the promises of their government program (Bayar, 2010: 188-189).  
In the final analysis, both Bayar‟s parliamentary and election speeches 
were the outcomes of rather problematic constitutional arrangements. These 
arrangements put the president or presidential candidate in case of election 
speeches in a rather awkward position as they were in contradiction with the 
implicit understanding of impartiality hinted in the Constitution. It required 
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serious commitment from a president to be impartial in these instances. Besides, 
expecting impartiality from a candidate seeking re-election in the national 
elections, would be naïve.  
Bayar certainly could have interpreted his constitutional role differently. 
He could have attempted to neutralize the negative effects of these constitutional 
arrangements, for example by considering the opposition‟s views for his 
parliamentary speeches and having lower profile campaigns for his re-election. 
However, Bayar did not go down that path.  
5.2.4.2  Involvement in the DP Affairs 
Bayar did not truly withdraw from DP affairs in 1950-1960. Although 
not regularly, he participated in or chaired official DP gatherings or meetings, 
such as the party‟s Central Executive Board meetings. Bayar‟s involvement in 
party affairs was most prominent during the crises that the party encountered 
over the years. Bayar often intervened to reconcile the tensions among the DP 
members (Akis weekly, December 10, 1955).  For instance, when the 
government banned the Turkish Nationalists‟ Association (Türk Milliyetçiler 
Derneği) chaired by DP Deputy Sait Bilgiç in 1953, Bilgiç was expelled from 
the party. After 14 months, Menderes requested Bilgiç‟s return. According to 
Bilgiç, Bayar was influential in convincing Menderes to end the conflict (Bilgiç, 
1982: 43).  
Another crisis among the DP members was caused by the so called right 
of proof (ispat hakkı) incident in 1955. The ground for conflict was laid in 1954 
when the government introduced certain changes to the press law and placed 
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press offences under the jurisdiction of criminal courts. In reaction to this new 
regulation, ten DP deputies submitted a law, referred to as the right of proof, for 
the consideration of Parliament in May 1955. The proposed law sought 
guarantees for the press to back up their claims through evidence and thus be 
spared from prosecution (Albayrak, 2010). Parliament‟s rejection of this 
proposal started a considerable opposition movement within the party.  
Bayar worked hard to contain the conflict before it caused break-ups 
from the DP group. He chaired the board meeting on October 14, 1955 during 
which the right of proof was discussed (Albayrak, 2004: 279). He also attempted 
to convince the leading figures of the group in favor of right of proof including 
Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, Minister of Health until May 1954, through his 
individual contacts (Toker, 1966: 141-144). In the end, despite Bayar‟s efforts 
the conflict could not be contained and nineteen DP deputies who supported the 
right of proof were expelled from the party. This group established the Freedom 
Party (Hürriyet Partisi-HP) the same year.  
In another case, Bayar worked actively to help the formation of the fourth 
Menderes cabinet in 1955. The third cabinet had fallen due to the government 
crisis that followed the right of proof incident and the chaos caused by the 
September 6-7 riots. Bayar once again appointed Menderes to form the 
government. However, the party had not yet fully recovered from the right of 
proof clash and it was a challenge to reconcile differences so that a cabinet could 
emerge. Bayar worked hard until a consensus in the party regarding the new 
government was reached. He worked long hours in Parliament, had meetings 
with several DP deputies and senior DP members (Toker, 1966: 133). Once he 
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was able to ease the tension among the DP members to some extent, Menderes 
took over the task of forming the government (Toker, 1966: 135).   
Bayar‟s involvement in DP affairs was not only limited to his occasional 
presence in the DP platforms. He also discussed matters related to the DP in 
official state gatherings such as the council of ministers meetings. For instance, 
in a council of ministers meeting, he agreed upon the 1957 national election 
campaign program with Menderes (Milliyet daily, October 8, 1957). This shows 
that Bayar saw nothing wrong in discussing party related affairs in a council of 
ministers meeting. 
5.2.4.3 Relations with the Opposition  
Bayar‟s close relations with the government party were accompanied by 
his unfavorable position toward opposition parties, especially toward the main 
opposition party CHP. On this matter, he followed a policy close to that of the 
government. Certain policies and acts of the government kept provoking the 
resentment of the opposition in 1950-1960. Resentment rose further after 1957. 
To give examples of the government‟s acts against the opposition, in the 1957 
general elections the opposition parties were banned from access to the state 
radio. In other words, they could not use the state radio for their election 
campaign although the government party could use it. Forming electoral 
alliances between political parties was also banned (Ġnan, 2007: 120). After 1957 
head of the main opposition party CHP Ġnönü came to face several restrictions 
and even physical attacks as detailed in Chapter II. The pro-opposition press also 
suffered from government policies. After the 1957 elections, a number of 
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journalists were imprisoned due to the tightened press law and lowered the 
compulsory age for civil servants‟ retirement. These incidents have also been 
detailed in Chapter II.  
Bayar often expressed his support for such policies against the opposition 
parties and press. He approved them as “putting an end to refined democracy” 
(Ahmad, 1977: 30).
128
 For instance, he spoke in favor of the imprisonment of 
CHP Secretary-General Kasım Gülek in 1955 due to his criticism of the 
government in a speech he delivered in Bilecik (Shaw and Shaw, 2005: 411). 
Bayar pointed out that “our jurists found his speech in violation of the law. If 
their party leader acts the same way, we will also put him on trial” (Derin, 1995: 
300). This was an expression of Bayar‟s open support for the government in a 
highly controversial political matter. 
In 1954 when the Foreign Investment Law became a topic of controversy 
between the government and the CHP, Bayar not only spoke in favor of the 
government‟s position but also attacked the opposition for its criticism. This law 
was hoped to facilitate the procedures of foreign investment in Turkish domestic 
markets and increase the foreign investment flow. In a speech he delivered in 
Istanbul on April 24, 1954, Bayar stated that he did not understand why the 
opposition resisted this law (Ayın Tarihi, April 1954). It is natural that president 
expresses his opinions on matters. However, Bayar‟s self-expression on this 
matter was provocative and dismissive of the opposition‟s concerns. He advised 
the prime minister to pass this law in Parliament at once and disregard the 
opposition‟s concerns (Albayrak, 2004: 257).  
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Another instance in which Bayar spoke in favor of the government and 
against the opposition‟s demands was during the debate on constitutional change 
in 1957. The CHP was promoting certain changes to the 1924 Constitution as a 
part of its 1957 national election campaign. These changes were concerned with 
maintaining the impartiality of public institutions such as the Turkish Radio and 
Television Corporation (Türkiye  Radyo Televizyon Kurumu-TRT) and the 
universities in their decision making and establishment of a constitutional court 
and a second chamber within Parliament (Bayar, 2010: 85-86). Bayar was 
against the opposition‟s views on constitutional change and made this known 
(Bayar, 2010: 86). It is to be expected that as head of state, Bayar would work to 
create a favorable context for debate between the government and opposition on 
this important issue. Instead, he openly took sides with the government and did 
not leave any room for negotiations as far as he was concerned.  
Another speech Bayar delivered on November 28, 1958 on the CHP and 
the HP captures his views on the opposition quite accurately:  “..the 
circumstances and statistics [on the state of economy] tell us that good things are 
happening. What stands against the continuous security that our nation should 
enjoy? If there is a barrier against the realization of such security, the nation‟s 
will is capable of crushing it like an ant” (Eren, 1963: 353). Bayar considered 
the opposition to be a barrier against the realization of the nation‟s security and 
the DP government as the embodiment of the nation‟s will.  
Bayar often discussed matters related to the opposition with members of 
the government. For instance in a meeting with Menderes and Speaker of the 
Parliament Refik Koraltan, Bayar discussed the opposition‟s activities (Milliyet 
daily, October 8, 1958). On November 3, 1958, Bayar chaired a council of 
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ministers meeting during which measures to be taken against the oppositions‟ 
activities were debated. The activities that the council of ministers wanted to 
take measures against were not made public (Milliyet daily, November 4, 1958). 
However, an informed guess can be made considering the political context of 
1957-1958. Ġnönü had headed efforts for the establishment of the National 
Opposition Front (Milli Muhalefet Cephesi) among the opposition parties in 
August 1957. This eventually led the government to blame the opposition for 
planning an unlawful takeover of the government (Albayrak, 2010). It is likely 
that these matters were brought up in the mentioned council of ministers 
meeting.  
Bayar‟s approval and support of the so-called Investigation Committee 
(Tahkikat Komisyonu) in 1960 is the most commonly cited example of his 
unfavorable position toward the opposition. The justification for the 
Committee‟s establishment was to investigate the opposition‟s activities and 
prevent the opposition from provoking the military‟s involvement in political 
affairs. The Committee was composed of fifteen DP deputies and its activities 
were regulated by a law issued on April 27, 1960. As further explained in 
Chapter II, the Committee‟s work resulted in limiting the opposition‟s activities 
and tightening press freedom even further (Karpat, 2004a: 44-45). 
Bayar voiced his opinions on the Committee during a meeting 
participated by some of the main DP figures on April 26, 1960 in the 
Presidential Palace. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Speaker of Parliament 
Refik Koraltan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin RüĢtü Zorlu and Ali Fuat 
BaĢgil, a pro-DP professor of constitutional law at Istanbul University, were 
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present at the meeting (BaĢgil, 1966: 129).129 BaĢgil‟s opinion on the legal 
background of the Committee‟s existence was sought. BaĢgil pointed out that the 
Committee was not unconstitutional; however certain regulations that organized 
the activities of the Committee were undemocratic in essence and contrasted 
with the Constitution (BaĢgil, 1966: 130).  
BaĢgil essentially recommended a reconsideration of the law regulating 
the activities and composition of the Committee. He also argued that the 
Committee should avoid taking and implementing harsh measures against the 
university students. Bayar did not agree with BaĢgil on these matters. He thought 
that a reconsideration of the Committee‟s mandate and composition would make 
the government appear weak. He perceived the Committee as constitutional and 
he thought it was the government‟s legitimate right to find out if the opposition 
party was planning a military takeover of the government (Bozdağ, 1991: 36-
37). As for BaĢgil‟s point on responding moderately to the youth protests, Bayar 
thought that the government should act without any hesitations and that such 
protests should be suppressed decisively. Bayar even used the term tenkil (doing 
away with) which implied use of force when referring to the level of 
decisiveness that should be adopted (BaĢgil, 1966: 134). Later Bayar said that 
with this word he referred to the necessity of disciplinary action against the War 
Academy cadets (Harbiye) who broke their school‟s internal regulations.130 
Another example of Bayar‟s emphasis on decisiveness and his firm 
stance vis-à-vis the opposition was his reaction to the rally that took place in the 
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 Basgil declared his intention to run for the presidency in 1961 elections after re-transition to 
multi-party politics but he withdrew from the presidential race later on.  
130
 Bayar did not remember using the word tenkil, but he considered the people who took notes of  
the meeting as honest and said that if they noted him using that word, he would not deny it 
(Bozdağ, 1982: 378). 
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Kızılay Square in Ankara on May 5, 1960, an incident that later came to be 
known as 555 K. The 555 K stood for May 5, 1960, 17:00 Kızılay Square, the 
main venue for demonstrations in Ankara at the time. This was a major protest 
against the government. Bayar asked Minister of Interior Affairs Namık Gedik 
to go to Kızılay Square and announce that if the crowd did not disperse 
voluntarily, the police would open fire (Yavuzalp, 1991: 45). This was a 
recommendation that would escalate the conflict on a societal level instead of 
containing it in other peaceful ways.  
Due to his approach described through the examples above, Bayar did 
not have a positive impact on negotiating the political tensions that accumulated 
in the second half of the 1950s. He did not take the initiative to consolidate 
government-opposition relations through a declaration similar to the Declaration 
of July 12, 1947 (Aydemir, 1973: 199; Ağaoğlu, 1972: 142). Further detailed in 
Chapter II, the Declaration of July 12, 1947 had been useful in addressing the 
concerns of the DP at the time. It had also facilitated the dialogue between the 
opposition and the government as President Ġnönü brought central leaders from 
both parties together several times before he issued the Declaration. Bayar‟s role 
in 1950-1960 was different. He did not create opportunities for the government 
and opposition to have a healthy dialogue. Even certain leading figures from the 
DP, such as Speaker of Parliament Refik Koraltan and Minister of Defense 
Ethem Menderes, noted in their diaries that Bayar did not have any positive 
impact in addressing the political tension (Sır Weekly, October 15 , 1960).  
It should be noted that in retrospect Bayar did not think that he was 
taking sides with the DP and acting against the opposition. He either did not 
think that the activities of the opposition party were hampered by the 
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government (Erer, 1963: 317-318). He sided with the government on most of the 
political issues because he believed that the policies promoted or implemented 
by the government were right and that, therefore they should be supported. 
Bayar stated that had he thought that the government‟s policies were flawed, he 
would have stood against them without hesitations (Bayar 2010: 217).  
Bayar also thought that he acted to contain the tension between the 
opposition and the government. He claimed to have advised Menderes to refrain 
from getting into polemical situations with the opposition (Bayar 2010: 192). 
However, he did not point out for which circumstances he made such 
recommendations and if such recommendations had any effect on Menderes. He 
also thought that he could not have done more to relieve the tension between the 
opposition and the government because the 1924 Constitution did not provide 
him more powers and that he was later accused of not using powers that he did 
not have (Bozdağ, 1986: 113). 
In the final analysis on this matter, despite Bayar‟s argument that he did 
all in his power to negotiate the tensions between the government and the 
opposition, the examples provided above point to the contrary.  
The final question that should be brought up in this section is why Bayar 
pursued this style and failed to be an impartial presidency.  Firstly, Bayar‟s 
interpretation of democracy as elaborated in Chapter II made him support the 
electoral victors without much restraint and consider them as the only 
representatives of the nation. Bayar relied on a majoritarian understanding of 
democracy that considered electoral victors as the ultimate holders of power. He 
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considered any force that attempted to limit the will of the electoral victors, be it 
the opposition or institutions such as a  constitutional court, illegitimate.  
Secondly, Bayar was not able to break his ties with the party he founded. 
He had resigned from his position as the chairman of the party; however he 
remained a member of the DP. Several times he found himself in a position 
where he had to resolve the problems caused by the internal tensions of the DP, 
as exemplified above.   
Thirdly, although the Constitution hinted an impartial office of the 
presidency, it did not introduce mechanisms to ensure the president‟s 
impartiality. The principle of impartiality and disassociation with any party 
group was effectively introduced only with the 1961 Constitution (Savcı, 1963: 
324). Under the 1924 Constitution the president could be aware of this 
impartiality principle as Bayar expressed he was, but this did not guarantee 
impartial action. It created a vague context where much depended on the 
president‟s own interpretation of his position.  
Lastly, the DP phase can be seen as an extension of certain earlier 
patterns in Turkish domestic politics. Similar to Atatürk, Ġnönü or even the 
Ottoman Sultans Mahmud II and Abdülhamid II, Bayar also maintained the old 
concepts of government and statehood, which emphasized authority. During the 
DP rule the authority of the leader was expressed through a strong executive 
rather than a strong monarch as it was during Ottoman times (Karpat, 2004f: 
309-310) or a single leader as was the case in the single party era. Bayar was 
simply following this old habit and adapting it to the then current political 
context.  
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This should not come as a surprise because as a political entity the DP 
shared the same background with the CHP. Core members of the DP were 
previously CHP members and their political careers matured under the 
conditions of single party rule.  In this sense, DP rule was a continuation of the 
single party period‟s legacy (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 89; Sarıbay, 1991: 127) 
especially with regard to government‟s approach to political opposition. The DP 
leadership was as suspicious of the opposition as the CHP leadership had been in 
1923-1950.  
5.3 The End of Bayar’s  Term  
Bayar‟s presidency ended with the 1960 military intervention. He was 
arrested on May 27, 1960 by a group of soldiers headed by General Burhaneddin 
Uluç. His first reaction was to resist the arrest. He argued that he was elected to 
office by the people and would leave only if the people demand it from him 
(KarakuĢ, 1977:500). When officers asked for his resignation, he did not accept 
it because “he did not want to take his place in history as a coward” (Öymen, 
1986:254). 
Bayar did not consider the intervention legitimate. He considered it a 
breach of the nation‟s will (Bayar, 2010: 87). Bayar‟s years after 1960 and his 
presidency are beyond the scope of this study, but it should be mentioned that 
his dignity and uncompromising attitude from the moment officers arrested him 
in the presidential residence to the trial days, earned the respect of many 
observers (Bilgiç, 1982: 46; Sarol, 1982: 162; Ağaoğlu, 1972: 145; Tunçay, 
2002:22; Bozdağ, 1986: 117). The decision taken at the Yassıada trial 
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condemned Bayar to a death sentence, which was later commuted into lifetime 
imprisonment because of his old age. Bayar spent nearly three years in the 
Kayseri Prison and was released in 1964 due to his failing health (ġenĢekerci, 
2000: 263).  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In previous chapters, Bayar‟s executive leadership positions, his 
approach to certain political concepts and his political experience have been 
taken up in detail. The interactive approach has provided the framework for this 
analysis. The major objectives have been to identify the internal and external 
resources of Bayar‟s leadership and to provide a basis from which an accurate 
portrait of Celal Bayar as a political leader could be construed. In this chapter 
the findings of the previous chapters will be considered all together. For this 
purpose, first the interactive method employed for this study will be briefly 
elaborated. Next, the internal and external resources of Bayar‟s leadership will 
be pointed out. An analysis of how these resources affected Bayar‟s leadership 
will follow and the question what kind of a political leader portrait did Bayar 
present will be addressed. The interactive approach will then be revisited in the 
light of the findings of this study. The chapter will close with some 
recommendations for further studies.  
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6.1 Interactive Approach 
The interactive approach seeks to identify the resources that dictate or 
influence a leader‟s political decisions and activities as a way to study individual 
leaders in particular and leadership in general. For this purpose, the interactive 
approach defines two broad categories, which have been referred to as internal 
and external resources throughout this dissertation. In general external resources 
are defined with regard to institutional arrangements that regulate executive 
leadership offices; the nature of the political regime; the political culture and 
history; and the political context, i.e. daily political issues and challenges that 
leaders face. The internal resources are, on the other hand, key to an analysis of 
how leaders perceive these external resources. Internal resources are often the 
combination of a leader‟s perception of certain key political concepts, such as 
democracy, and his/her life experience which is likely to have an impact on the 
leader‟s later decisions and activities. This categorization of internal and external 
resources is crucial, because leaders act against the backgrounds set by the 
external environment (Hargrove, 2004: 580; Llanos and Margheritis, 2006: 86).  
The interactive methodology does not offer any universal scheme for the 
study of leaders beyond these broadly defined categories; and it recommends 
that external and internal resources of leadership should always be defined with 
reference to specific case studies. The proper definitions of internal and 
external resources on the exercise of leadership change according to the leader, 
the country and the period studied. None of the contemporary scholars working 
on the questions of leadership have attempted to provide a universal scheme of 
external and internal resources that can be applied to the study of all leaders at 
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all times and places. It has been noted that “it would be artificial to 
discriminate in an abstract manner between personal characteristics, positional 
context and environmental constraints without reference to specific cases” 
(Cole, 1994a: 467). Each leadership study that uses the interactive method has 
to identify the external and internal resources that have an impact on the leader 
under focus.  
This emphasis placed on case studies results from the unique character of 
each political leader, of the period that s/he was active in and of differences in 
the political regimes that the leader operated under. This flexibility also implies 
that the external and internal resources of leadership are not static (Elgie, 1995: 
8; Helms, 2005: 20). Leaders affect their political environment and they 
themselves change due to their interaction with the political environment. The 
extent of this change also depends upon the leader under focus. Thus although 
the external factors may constrain the leaders in many ways and partially 
determine the political issues to be addressed by them, leaders are not hostages 
of their environment (Helms, 2005: 20).  
There is also no predetermined hierarchy between the resources of 
political leadership. According to the interactive approach, external and internal 
resources are both important for an accurate analysis of leadership. The 
comparative weights of these impacts change depending on individual cases. It 
has also been highlighted that it is always a combination of external and internal 
impacts that influence the leader under concern and that external and internal 
resources of leadership are not mutually exclusive.  
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6.2 External and Internal Resources in Bayar’s Case 
Throughout this study three categories of external resources have been 
defined for Bayar‟s leadership in 1937-1960. The first group is the non-
institutional external resources that result from political history and the political 
regime of the period under study. In terms of political history, unfavorable 
attitudes toward the opposition was one external impact Bayar inherited. In 
terms of the political regime, the transitional character of the regime, lack of 
efficient checks and balance mechanisms on leadership, the regime‟s priorities 
of Westernization, nationalism and secularism, as well as its security orientation, 
were consequential external resources for Bayar. 
The second category of external resources, which are also non-
institutional were those that occurred due to the political context and the 
challenges it presented. In Bayar‟s case, the most significant of those resources 
were the Cold War and its undeniable weight in Turkish foreign policy and the 
effects of the 1929 Great Depression. There were also some less consequential 
external resources that can be considered under this category, such as the 1937-
1939 Dersim uprising and the 1936-1939 Alexandretta dispute with France. The 
Kurdish revolt in Dersim was a major security concern for the regime and it was 
repressed by military means under Atatürk‟s control. The Alexandretta dispute 
with France concerned the status of the current city of Hatay which turned into 
an independent entity, subsequently voting to join Turkey. The reasons for their 
lesser impact are discussed further below. 
The third set of external resources has been defined with regard to 
institutions and institutional arrangements. These were the constitutional 
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characteristics of the offices of prime minister and president as opposed to actual 
political practice. The ceremonial presidency, lack of barriers on the president‟s 
re-election, the requirement to be a deputy in Parliament to be able to run for 
office, and finally Bayar‟s relations with other executive office holders and these 
other leader‟s impacts on him should also be referred to as a part of the 
institutional external resources. 
The internal resources of Bayar‟s leadership have been considered with 
regard to his lifetime experiences and his reading of major political concepts. 
The most consequential lifetime experiences as a part of internal resources have 
been Bayar‟s experience in the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti-ĠTC), his pursuits to boost the local economy in Bursa as well 
as Ġzmir and his participation in the Turkish War of Independence. With regard 
to his reading of political concepts, his understanding of Communism, 
democracy, nationalism and secularism were the significant internal resources 
for his leadership in 1937-1960.  
6.3 External and Internal Resources and Bayar’s Leadership 
Certain internal resources, in combination with certain external 
resources turned into leadership opportunities for Bayar. For instance his 
successful record in the local economy, which is an internal impact, combined 
with two major external impacts, i.e. the worldwide economic crisis of 1929 
and the general failure to address its consequences, opened the way for Bayar‟s 
becoming a minister in 1932 and eventually for his prime ministry in 1937. 
Likewise Bayar‟s commitment to the new Turkish regime‟s priorities, i.e. 
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secularism, nationalism, Westernization and its security orientation also turned 
out to be favorable for him. Thanks to his attachment to these principles Bayar 
emerged as a reliable political actor in the eyes of the leading statespersons. 
For instance Ġnönü‟s acceptance of Bayar as head of the opposition party in 
1945 was mainly due to Bayar‟s adherence to these principles.  
Another favorable external impact when combined with Bayar‟s 
commitment to the regime‟s principles was the regime‟s transitional character. 
The new political regime was being formed at the time Bayar became involved 
in politics. The urgencies and necessities of this transitional setting presented 
him with opportunities to turn him into a vital asset for the new Turkish 
regime. This in practice meant that Bayar could have an impact on how certain 
institutions and political practices would evolve. The major example is Bayar‟s 
role in the economy. Eventually Bayar was able to carve a leadership role for 
himself in macro-economic management and planning.  
In other cases, his other internal leadership resources, for instance his 
interpretation of the political context, had a negative impact on his leadership 
assets. When the Cold War became the dictating political reality for Turkish 
foreign policy after 1946, a major external impact on any Turkish leader, Bayar 
interpreted this challenge in rather narrow terms. He approved of and called for 
the restriction of freedom of expression for communist-minded intellectuals and 
politicians. At times his obsession with the Communist threat facing Turkey 
obscured his judgment of the political circumstances for Bayar misread the 
political circumstances.  
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Similar to his interpretation of the Communist threat, Bayar‟s 
understanding of the notion of democracy was widely criticized. Bayar was in 
favor of majoritarian democracy in Turkey. In 1950-1960, Bayar‟s preference 
seriously undermined the chances of developing healthy relations between the 
government and opposition and eventually became one of the reasons for the 
military intervention in 1960. In this case, Bayar‟s reading of democracy, which 
can be seen as an internal impact on his leadership, created negative 
consequences for the political developments and eventually for his leadership. 
External impacts had mixed influences on Bayar‟s leadership. As 
mentioned, the new regime‟s priorities, its transitional nature and the 1929 
economic crisis posed favorable opportunities for Bayar‟s leadership assets. On 
the other hand, the Dersim revolt or the Alexandretta  dispute with France did 
not turn into such opportunities. These were critical matters for the regime and 
on paper they provided the prime minister of the time a chance to display his 
leadership skills.  However, Bayar was not able to take any initiative because he 
was not in charge of policy planning on these critical political issues. The 
political context offered policy questions for his leadership to shine through but 
the same context also placed restrictions on his activities. Bayar‟s own 
interpretation did not have a critical impact on the course of events such as the 
Dersim revolt and the Alexandretta dispute.  
The institutional aspect of external resources also had a mixed impact on 
Bayar‟s leadership. For instance the requirement to be a deputy in Parliament to 
be able to run for office ended up in the president‟s association with the 
dominant party in Parliament, first in order to be elected to Parliament and then 
to the office of president. After such a close association with the party in 
 224 
 
question it was difficult for any president to cut their ties with their former 
political party and stay impartial, especially when they depended on the same 
group for their re-election. Bayar was widely criticized for his close association 
with the government party. Likewise, Bayar‟s decade as president also 
highlighted the lack of barriers against the president‟s re-election. As opposed to 
the later Turkish constitutions, the 1924 Constitution did not place any barriers 
against a president‟s re-election. This in practice meant that as long as Bayar 
was elected to Parliament as a deputy and retained the support of the DP group 
in the presidential election, he could be re-elected president for an unlimited 
number of terms.  
A further deficiency revealed throughout the decade with regard to both 
the regime and the institutions was the lack of a higher court that could act as a 
barrier to the president‟s political agenda by intervening in critical matters on 
which the president took sides with the government. Discussion on these 
deficiencies had been mostly absent or marginal during the terms of the two 
former presidents, Atatürk 1923-1938 and Ġsmet Ġnönü (1938-1950). By the end 
of the decade, matters such as the obligation to guarantee the president‟s 
impartiality came to be recognized as indispensable. The constitutional 
arrangements that followed addressed these matters.  
The favorable institutional leadership resource for Bayar was his 
harmonious relations with President Atatürk, but this was not a continuous 
asset for Bayar. For instance the appreciation of his skills in economics by 
Atatürk was a temporary opportunity. The opportunity faded away when Ġnönü 
became president in 1938. Bayar‟s skills in economy management were not 
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found adequate by the new administration. A change in the political context 
thus put an end to Bayar‟s executive leadership.  
Was it the external or the internal resources that were more influential in 
Bayar‟s exercise of leadership? As already pointed out, it is difficult to answer 
this question definitively, as it is practically without exception a combination of 
these factors that dictate a leader‟s acts. To begin with, Bayar‟s internal 
resources made him a reliable candidate for political office in the new Turkish 
regime. Certain other internal leadership resources, for instance his conception 
of democracy and his assessment of the Communist threat, turned into 
unfavorable resources for Bayar‟s leadership. In other words, his adherence to 
the main tenets of the Republic rendered him an undisputed candidate for high 
political office, but his narrow interpretation of certain political concepts caused 
many observers to question his success as a leader.  
Nevertheless in the final analysis certain external resources seem to have 
relatively more impact on Bayar‟s leadership practices. In particular Atatürk‟s 
trust in Bayar and later Ġnönü‟s approval for his leadership of the opposition 
party appear to have been more influential on the course Bayar‟s career took. 
Likewise, Bayar‟s leadership story could be expected to evolve differently if 
Ġnönü had not objected to his prime ministry in 1939 or if the military 
intervention in 1960 had not put an end to his presidency and placed further 
limitations on his political career through the Yassıada court rulings. Yet, there 
was no way of predicting what would have happened at the time. 
A further objective in this dissertation has been to answer the question 
what kind of a leader portrait Bayar presents. As already stated, Bayar‟s 
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interpretation of certain political concepts placed him in between a political and a 
state elite.  Turkish state elites, including bureaucratic and military elites and 
members of the single-party establishment were non-elected actors influential in a 
number of vital state affairs. Political elites, on the other hand, were victors of the 
elections. The state elites considered themselves to be defending the longer 
interests of the state and the nation whereas the political elites were often 
concerned with defending more particularistic interests.  
To remind here briefly of an observation earlier shared, Bayar‟s role first 
as minister of economics and later as prime minister, and his CHP affiliation since 
the early years of the Republic made Bayar one of the core members of the 
political elites.  Although Bayar challenged established views on the economy 
during the single party phase, he did not contradict the state elite on more core 
political issues, such as nationalism and secularism. The importance he attributed 
to the state in political life was another quality that he inherited from the state 
elite. 
The primary matters that placed Bayar close to the political elites were his 
opposition to non-elected bodies in the political structure, such as the 
Constitutional Court and the Senate established by the 1961 Constitution and the 
prominent role he thought that the bureaucracy wanted to play. This was related to 
his broader understanding of democracy. He thought such institutions were 
against the will of the nation because their members were unelected but instead 
appointed by state elites.  
The study of Bayar‟s executive leadership roles and his activities in those 
roles further confirm his liminal position with regard to his internal resources of 
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leadership. It should again be highlighted that Bayar was not in charge of policy-
making as prime minister in 1937-1939 or as president in 1950-1960. In the 
former period, initially President Atatürk and then Prime Minister Ġsmet Ġnönü 
were primarily in charge of policymaking and in the 1950s Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes mostly controlled the political agenda. For this reason, it is difficult to 
trace actual policies that qualified him as part of either the state elite or the 
political elite. Nevertheless, his support of the Dersim operations against the 
uprisings, his efforts to nationalize the Turkish economy mainly due to his 
security concerns, and the restrictive press and association laws legislated during 
his prime ministry should be mentioned as examples of his statist policies. His 
much disputed stance as president, aligning himself with the government and 
against the opposition, on the other hand, was the primary example of his political 
elite attitude.  
 The last question that should be considered for drawing a complete portrait 
of Bayar as a leader is whether Bayar‟s political goals changed over time. Studies 
of several political leaders have shown that leaders‟ goals often do change over 
time. Had  this also been the case for Bayar? In this study, two overarching 
principles that shaped Bayar‟s policy choices have been defined. These principles 
were his emphasis on the unity of the nation and the domestic as well as the 
international security of the state.  It can be argued that Bayar had more narrow 
policy goals, which appealed to time and context specific problems, but in 
retrospect achieving these two principles were his non-changing goals. Bayar 
updated his daily policies according to contemporary challenges that were faced 
in adhering to these principles. The support he gave to the 1980 military 
intervention was a major example of this.  Bayar‟s commitment to these two 
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overarching principles also partially explains why Bayar at times acted as a 
political elite and at other times as a state elite. In matters that he considered 
critical, he nevertheless maintained a position closer to the state elite. 
6.4 Revisiting the Interactive Approach 
The findings of this study contribute to the theory of the interactive 
approach especially with regard to non-institutionalized regimes. An 
institutionalized regime refers to a regime where the rules governing executive 
offices are not subject to constant scrutiny and where there is not much room for 
widely diverging interpretations of major legal texts such as the constitution. In 
the studies that employ the interactive methodology it has been affirmed that 
under non-institutionalized regimes, institutional arrangements to some extent 
lose their defining impact on leadership. The interactive theory, however, fails to 
indicate which other leadership resources replace the institutional and 
constitutional arrangements under non-institutionalized regimes. The study of 
Bayar‟s leadership in 1937-1960 has highlighted certain resources of leadership 
that partially replaced constitutional and institutional arrangements.  
The first such resource is the relations between individual leaders. The 
interactive method puts emphasis on relations between executive offices, for 
instance relations between the legislative body and the executive body as part of 
the external resources of leadership. However, it fails to recognize the 
significance of personal relations between power holders. The study of Bayar‟s 
leadership in 1937-1960 has shown that under regimes that are not fully 
institutionalized personal relations between political leaders might become much 
 229 
 
more influential on a leader‟s career than the constitutional and institutional 
arrangements and should be considered as a part of de-facto institutional setting. 
For Bayar, the influential actors on his leadership were Atatürk, Ġnönü and 
Menderes. His relation to Atatürk and the latter‟s confidence in him provided 
certain leaps in Bayar‟s career. His relations with Ġnönü, which were sour for a 
number of reasons, on the other hand often had contrary impacts on Bayar‟s 
leadership. For instance, his less than harmonious relations with Ġnönü in 1950-
1960 became a matter of controversy and has been cited as one of the reasons for 
the accumulation of political tension in those years. Earlier exceptions to this 
negative pattern of relations between Bayar and Ġnönü were Bayar‟s support for 
Ġnönü‟s presidency in 1938 and Ġnönü‟s approval of Bayar‟s leadership of the 
opposition party in 1945. Ġnönü‟s approval in these cases provided Bayar with a 
considerable leadership opportunity. 
Bayar‟s relations with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes also had an 
impact on his leadership assets.  Bayar was unable to maintain a distance 
between himself and Menderes. Such a distance could have given Bayar the 
necessary leverage needed to restrain certain political acts of Menderes, which 
turned out to be detrimental to the regime‟s stability. Besides Bayar also 
encouraged Menderes to take stern measures toward the opposition wherever 
that opposition came from. Bayar‟s relations with Menderes resulted in even 
further establishing his association with the government in the Turkish public‟s 
eyes.  
According to the findings of this study the second leadership resource 
that replaces institutional and constitutional arrangements under non-
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institutionalized regimes is a leader‟s interpretation of his/her powers and duties. 
There is plenty of room in non-institutionalized contexts for different readings of 
political offices. This is important firstly because in non-institutionalized 
regimes executive leaders might be restrained by de-facto arrangements that are 
not written in the constitution. In this case, they might have to work to develop a 
different interpretation of their powers and duties. Secondly, in the absence of 
effective checks and balance mechanisms, such as higher courts that supervise 
the leaders, there is little to stop a leader from pursuing policies of his/her choice 
other than his/her interpretation of political office. Bayar experienced both of 
these situations in his leadership roles as prime minister and as president.   
Strong prime ministers have been defined as having the power to 
designate and dismiss ministers of the cabinet, exercising a superior position 
over the rest of the cabinet members and having a strong say on the activities of 
ministries (Helms, 2005: 13-14). According to the 1924 Constitution, Bayar had 
these powers, which in theory should have rendered him a powerful prime 
minister; however, that was not the case. Bayar‟s field of activity was 
demarcated not by the constitution but first by Atatürk‟s and later by Ġnönü‟s 
choices. His agenda was loosely defined by Atatürk and his task was to detail 
these narrowly defined objectives into thorough work programs and implement 
them. As prime minister, Bayar was often not in a position to devise major 
policies by his own initiative under the prevailing circumstances. This state of 
affairs continued under Ġnönü‟s presidency. Bayar interpreted his position as 
prime minister in line with this political reality and did not consider challenging 
it. 
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Bayar‟s presidency also draws a similar picture. As president, Bayar was 
constitutionally obliged to refrain from participating in daily political issues and 
party affairs. Bayar conformed to this rule in his political rhetoric and paid 
attention to highlight his impartiality, but in practice he was involved in 
governmental affairs and was closely associated with the government.  There 
were no efficient checks and balances on the presidency and thus it was to a 
great extent up to the president himself how to interpret his position. Bayar 
preferred taking sides with the government on most of the issues. These two 
external resources identified above might be useful for further studies that use 
the interactive approach especially with regard to non-institutionalized regimes. 
6.5 Recommendations for further Studies 
This study has also highlighted a number of deficiencies from the 
perspective of Turkish leadership studies, which may be addressed in subsequent 
studies. Firstly, analyses of political institutions in Turkey are scarce. Although 
individual leaders or periods in Turkish politics have been studied, there is no 
analysis of how prime ministry or presidency has evolved over time. Such studies 
have only been conducted in legal terms where the institutional framework is 
considered with reference to the constitutional text, rather than a combination of 
the constitution and the leaders in practice. 
 Secondly, studies that take up the common and differing characteristics of 
various Turkish political leaders with a focus on internal and external resources of 
leadership have not been made. This means that there has not yet been any 
attempt to develop an overall analysis of Turkish political leadership and show 
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whether there is a Turkish model of leadership. There is a need to identify the 
common grounds for Turkish political leaders in different periods and engage in a 
discussion for a Turkish model of leadership. The interactive approach would 
offer a convenient methodology for such a task. It can then also be established 
whether Bayar was an exceptional Turkish leader or if he conformed to a common 
pattern shared by Turkish leaders in general.  
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